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In recent years, Congress has recurrently failed to meet its minimum responsibilities in federal budgeting. This article analyzes whether it is possible to repair this problem, using concepts popularized by Allen Schick in his influential article "The Road to PPB." His article compared the PPB reform effort to the history of budget process reforms that started with the design of the executive budget. It publicized a logical sequence of budget process improvements that started with control and then advanced through management and planning. The article did not substantially address the role of Congress, but eight years after it was published, Congress reasserted its constitutional role in the budget process. Its record of performance since then has ranged from mixed to dysfunctional. The Congress has been criticized for budgetary delays, micromanagement, myopia, procrastination, indiscipline, and an inability to prioritize intelligently. If these faults are set in stone, then an integrated system of budgeting, as described in "The Road to PPB" and related work, is unattainable. On the other hand, if reform of Congressional budgeting is politically feasible, improvements to that system can utilize the unique contributions that a legislature can make to a good system of budgeting.

Budgeting in the federal government recently imploded. The competing parties played repeated games of chicken in which they set short‐term budget deadlines and established automatic procedures in hopes of outmaneuvering their opponents. They went to the brink of defaulting on the government's debt, and then shut down the government. This article recounts the history of this implosion and discusses what might have caused it. Budgeting's decline was certainly driven by partisan conflict. Yet budgeting's decline was also due to a dumbing down of aspirations for the process. Ironically, budget hawks contributed substantially to this when they endorsed "action‐forcing mechanisms" that they hoped would constitute "credible commitments" to adopt sustainable budgetary policies. Even if their aspirations were partially realized, their logic was flawed and the collateral damage was substantial.
"Obama, Congress Must Reach Deal On Budget By March 1, And Then April 1, And Then April 20, And Then April 28, And Then May 1, And Then Twice A Week For Next Four Years"–Headline in The Onion, February 27, 2013
"So we're going to hit the debt ceiling then go off the fiscal cliff. I assume an anvil lands on us after that."–@pourmecoffee, December 26, 2012

The budget process is seriously flawed, as Irene Rubin suggests, but there is little prospect for its effective reform. Current economic and political conditions could open the window for reform, but the excessive partisanship that helped create these conditions also has reduced the pool of institutionalists who could lead reforms. More important is confusion about which reforms might be most effective. Most proposed reforms would create more rules, but they will not work unless politicians commit to meeting the goals such rules are intended to support. Those commitments could be produced by deliberation over critical issues that have been neglected in recent discussions of budget process reform: how the process could support macroeconomic policy making, how improved budget concepts could accurately measure finances and aid in dealing with upcoming policy challenges, how reorganization could enable intelligent priority setting, and how the process could be better aligned with the constitutional sharing of powers and the electoral system.

Book Review of Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense. Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones; Greenwich, Conn., Information Age Publishing, 2004, 476 pages, ISBN 1-59311-104-5 and Budgeting and Financial Management in the Federal Government. Jerry L. McCaffery and L.R. Jones; Greenwich, Conn., Information Age Publishing, 2001, 472 pages, ISBN 1-931576-12-2