Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe article uses the punctuated equilibrium theory to explain changes in the local policy agenda of municipal governments. It focuses on feedback (negative and positive) as a key concept that associates intergovernmental institutions in a federalist system of governance and the budgetary punctuations and change in the municipal policy agenda. I analyze a 17‐year period of decentralization process along a generalized structural equation multinomial model. Findings show that decentralized resources, from state and federal governments, affect the municipal's local policy agenda. Such effects are conditional to an overall institutional setting, thus, providing additional insights into the contingency of institutional friction shaping feedback and policy change.

This study is concerned with the broad question of why more pluralism reduces expenditure in local governments. According to the literature, proportional representation (PR) systems are associated with greater expenditure, but I offer empirical evidence showing that the case of Mexican local governments challenges this notion. An amendment to the Federal Constitution in 1983 allowed Mexican states to change the electoral rule for assigning incumbents to local councils in municipalities. Variations in the way state legislatures interpreted the Constitution produced two types of municipal councils, with majority representation or PR. These are examined in detail and tested using a difference‐in‐difference analysis to explore the decentralization reform and its wider ramifications. I conclude that more pluralism in conjunction with the current design of local councils increases the chances of gridlock. This is evident in budgetary decisions and explains why changes to electoral rules do not suffice to improve local government performance.Related Articles

Moreno‐Jaimes, Carlos. 2011. "." Politics & Policy 36 (): 1021‐1052. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00328.x/abstract


French, P. Edward. 2003. "" Politics & Policy 31 (): 694–725. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2003.tb00168.x/abstract


Southwell, Priscilla L. 2011. "." Politics & Policy 39 (): 979‐996. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00330.x/abstract
Related Media
. 2015. "SIMBAD: Sistema Estatal y Municipal de Bases de Datos." http://sc.inegi.org.mx/cobdem/

. 2013. "Deuda de los estados y municipios" Youtube Video." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a7KAENdctu4


Meza, Oliver D. 2015. "Ayuntamientos: arcaicos e ineficientes." Revista Nexos, Junio, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=24990

This study reviews the relationship between democracy, development, and inequality, particularly the link between electoral competition and the provision of inequality-reducing policies at different stages of development. I argue that local government tools that help reduce income inequality may be underprovided due to the electoral risks faced by the local incumbents. The literature on clientelism and patronage together with the literature on the political budget cycle offers theoretical insights that explain why the opportunistic behavior of the incumbents depends on the development level of the polity. And while it is commonly assumed that specific types of expenditure are prone to manipulation, I challenge this view by showing how the socioeconomic characteristics of the locality influence the incumbents' decision to strategically provide inequality-reducing policies.

AbstractThis article explores the role of trust in corrupt networks and networks that facilitate corruption. Specifically, we ask what is the role of particularized trust in the operation of systemic corruption? How is the basis of trust reflected in the logic of corruption and with which effects? Based on the analysis of 50 in‐depth interviews in two Mexican cities, we analyze two types of particularized trust that bind actors in informal networks: trust based on political affiliation and/or personal relationships and trust derived from complicity, or the co‐participation in illicit activities. Analysis suggests that the basis of trust and the dynamics that arise thereof have different effects on the functioning and stability of the informal networks and that these, in turn, reflect the informal governance systems in place. This article provides further empirical evidence to the central role that particularized trust plays in contexts of systemic corruption, highlighting the importance of understanding these dynamics for the design of anti‐corruption efforts.

AbstractThis article constructs a grounded framework to study how corruption is consolidated in local governments. We focus on the fine‐grained texture of corrupt practices that can only be achieved by looking at rich contextual studies. We argue that neglecting the way corruption becomes the 'rule of the game' has led to the creation of anti‐corruption policies that tend to be overly reliant on formal institutions, addressing only dyadic and venal types of corruption, and have therefore proven ineffective. Based on a two‐staged, mixed methods research design—including 50 in‐depth interviews in two Mexican cities and three surveys applied to citizens and public officials—this article's framework focuses on how networks are shaped and organized to perform corrupt practices, and how opacity and weak checks and balances grant them impunity. Results show corrupt schemes to be outstandingly malleable and resilient, able to circumvent formal anti‐corruption strategies.

No poca bibliografía apunta las dificultades políticas, presupuestales y de organización, que tiene la administración pública en México. Sin embargo, no se ha observado ni de manera sistemática ni suficiente las formas existentes para hacer frente a esas barreras. ¿Qué tipo de acciones tienen los gerentes públicos en sus repertorios para incrementar la eficacia de los programas que administran? En este trabajo, se identifica una forma que hemos dado en llamar táctica de política, por medio de la cual los gerentes públicos toman ventaja de la interacción entre la ciudadanía y los agentes del Estado para aprovechar la discrecionalidad burocrática a favor de la eficacia de la misma política. El artículo pretende definir las tácticas de política, ilustrar con un caso real cómo éstas se observan en la práctica y ofrecer vías alternas para mejorar la eficacia de las políticas, usando la discreción de los operadores de forma instrumental.

AbstractCitizens' responses to dissatisfaction with public services are often portrayed as following one of four distinct patterns, each consistent with current provision structures: exit, voice, loyalty or neglect (EVLN). Citizens may also initiate efforts to access public services through more subversive supply mechanisms. This study focuses on 'gaming' as an additional, understudied response pattern, within which individuals aim at improving the personal outcome of public service delivery by exploiting, manipulating or working around current rules and arrangements. Survey analysis of citizens' responses to dissatisfaction in Mexico indicates that gaming is indeed a distinct response, which is positively related to the unavailability of exit and, to some extent, to low trust in government. As a response pattern that encompasses behaviours inconsistent with current policy arrangements, gaming emphasizes the need to distinguish service improvement as a public good as opposed to a private good and further unfolds 'grey areas' in citizen–government relationships.

AbstractTo better understand street‐level bureaucracy in developing countries, this study focuses on street‐level implementation as embedded within systemic corruption, which is well‐documented in the developing world. Analysis focuses on a large city in Guanajuato, which exhibits among the highest corruption rates in Mexico. To allow for a broad perspective, the analysis applies a sequential exploratory mixed‐method research design and draws on in‐depth interviews with varied stakeholders (N = 17) and a representative survey of street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs) (N = 594). Findings indicate that organizational corruption (ORG‐C) and street‐level corruption (SL‐C) are two distinct, yet related phenomena. Additionally, SLBs' perceptions about the level of corruption both among superiors and among colleagues are associated with their tolerance towards inappropriate street‐level interactions with citizens. By shifting attention to street‐level implementation as embedded within a corrupt environment, this study provides new theoretical and practical insights about street‐level implementation in developing countries and about the unique challenges of fighting systemic corruption. Policy impact statement: Common anticorruption policies often reflect an assumption that higher‐level ORG‐C and SL‐C are separate, isolated phenomena, thus overlooking the implications of systemic corruption environments for street‐level implementation in general, and for SL‐C in particular. By uncovering that the willingness for street‐level divergence among SLBs is influenced by their perception of corruption established by municipal administration as well as by colleagues, this study emphasizes that fighting corruption should account for the interrelationships between corruption at different organizational levels.