Suchergebnisse

This article focuses on transformation of collective identity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 'Nakba' (catastrophe) of 1948. The article argues that Arab identity, which was dominant in Palestine during the Mandate period, continued to be dominant after the 'Nakba'. The weak Palestinian identity started to strengthen continuously among all Palestinians after the June War of 1967. In the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian identity greatly intensified and became the strongest identity in the last two to three decades. Comparison of collective identity before and after the Oslo Agreement shows that while under the Palestinian Authority (PA), Palestinian identity remained the strongest identity, Muslim identity and clan (or hamula) identity have greatly intensified.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, originally a native-settler conflict, is one of the most durable and intractable conflicts since World War II. While the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis has started, no final solution has been reached between the two sides, and Israel still occupies most of the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under these conditions, an interesting question is raised about normalization between Palestinians and Israelis. Based on data collected in 1994 from a total sample of 270 students in Birzeit University, this article studies the attitudes of Palestinian students toward cultural normalization with Israel. Despite the fact that Israel still occupies the Palestinian territories, a major part of Palestinian students support normalizing cultural relations between Palestinians and Israelis. Support for normalization is significantly associated with social class or father's occupation. Students from the working class are more supportive of cultural cooperation with Israelis than those from other classes. This is explained by the working-class families' greater experience of contact with Israelis and a greater dependence on the Israeli labour market.

Data from a 1994 survey of 270 students at Birzeit U are drawn on to examine the attitudes of Palestinian students toward cultural normalization with Israel. Despite the fact that Israel still occupies the Palestinian territories, a majority of these students support normalizing cultural relations between Palestinians & Israelis. Support for normalization is significantly associated with social class or father's occupation. Students from the working class are more supportive of cultural cooperation with Israelis than are those from other classes. This is explained by the working-class families' greater experience of contact with Israelis & a greater dependence on the Israeli labor market. 2 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Die Untersuchung beschäftigt sich mit der Lage der palästinensischen Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen in Fabriken in der Westbank und im Gazastreifen, deren geringe Löhne während der Intifada noch weiter sanken. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Ausbeutung der palästinensischen Arbeitskräfte in der nationalen palästinensischen Wirtschaft kaum geringer ist als in den israelischen Betrieben, wohingegen die Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern hier in der Regel als gut beschrieben werden. Eine Gewerkschaftsbewegung auf regionaler Ebene ist nicht vorhanden. (DÜI-Sra)

This article examines the extent of Palestinian public support for democracy through the time period from 1997 to 2016. The analysis is based on data collected from five public surveys launched in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Our findings show that evidently the Palestinians support almost all elements of democracy, measured in these surveys, and support moderately few others, especially freedom of establishing parties and not using violent means to overthrow a 'bad' government. Our findings also reveal that this support is nearly constant and has not changed significantly since the early years of the Oslo accords era until recently. Based on these findings, and a few others revealed by using multiple regression analysis, we argue that Palestinian public opinion is not fully democratic, but rather is semi (or nearly) democratic. We also argue that the cultural hypothesis, claiming that Muslim Arab culture is incompatible with democracy, has no support according to the empirical evidence of this study.