Suchergebnisse

We consider a two small open economies model with cross-border pollution that is generated from consumption. Within this framework we examine i) the non-cooperative equilibrium consumption taxes and compare them to when pollution is only local, ii) the cooperative equilibrium consumption taxes and we compare them to the non-cooperative tax rates, and iii) cases where cooperative taxes are different between countries. In this framework, tax harmonization may not be the optimal policy if, for example, pollution per unit of consumption differ between countries. Many results of the paper depend on the relationship in consumption (i.e., complementarity or substitutability) between pollution and the polluting good.

This paper investigates the welfare consequences of immigration policies in a model with two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and international capital mobility. This paper examines the effect of government policies - which change the immigration cost and causes immigration of one type of labour - on the welfare of natives when the other type of labour and/or capital are also mobile. It is shown that in the absence of capital mobility, if skilled and unskilled labour are highly complementary in production (as attested by many empirical studies), then a decrase in the immigration cost of the net fiscal contributor skilled labour decreases the welfare of natives.

This paper investigates the welfare consequences of immigration policies in a model with two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and international capital mobility. The paper examines the effect of government policies - which change the immigration cost and causes immigration of one type of labour - on the welfare of natives when the other type of labour and/or capital are also mobile. It is shown that in the absence of capital mobility, if skilled and unskilled labour are highly complementary in production (as attested by many empirical studies), then a decrease in the immigration cost of the net fiscal contributor skilled labour decreases the welfare of natives.

ABSTRACTThis paper constructs a general equilibrium trade model of a small open economy that produces many traded private goods and one non‐traded public consumption good. Trade in goods is free, but the country taxes the internationally mobile capital to finance the provision of the public good. Within this framework, the paper identifies the conditions under which the optimal policy on the internationally mobile capital calls for a tax. Under the assumptions that (i) the welfare function is concave with respect to the tax rate, and (ii) the net revenue‐maximizing capital tax rate is positive, it is shown that the marginal cost of the public good always understates its social marginal cost.

Cyprus has recently applied for full membership of the European
Community (EC). As a member of the Community, Cyprus will experience
economic (political) costs and benefits. Examines the static costs and
benefits for Cyprus′s national income from the application of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP will cause two types of income
transfers between Cyprus and the rest of the EC: transfers through the
Community′s budget; and direct income transfers from Cyprus′s consumers
to the Community′s producers and vice versa in the form of higher
prices. Using data for 1986 and 1987, demonstrates that Cyprus will have
positive budgetary gains and net direct income transfers from Cypriot
consumers to EC producers. The latter outweigh the former and the total
outcome is a loss for Cyprus′s national income.