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AbstractThe changes observed in resourcing international organisations over the last decades may have dramatic consequences for their ability to fulfil their mandates. This paper investigates into how far reaching the expected changes really are, and whether the new types and sources of financial and human resources can really be considered as causal for these developments. It appears that resourcing may not be the initial cause, but contributes to the centrifugal dynamics currently observed in the multilateral system. Administrative cost related to the new and complex funding structures are considerable, and ensuring transparency over resource flows represents a major challenge. Official decision‐making bodies lose power to sub‐groups of members or external actors that fund parts of the organisations' activities through separate channels. Given the large volume of non‐core funding and the lack of transparency, they cannot easily adjust their own priorities. It can thus not be expected that the funding of certain activities through external channels will simply be compensated by a corresponding reduction of core funding in this area. Whether this negatively affects the ability of the organisations to fulfil their mandates – and hence, eventually their legitimacy – depends on the motivations of those actors empowered in this process.

Applying the general question of aid effectiveness to the sector of education, this paper reveals an overall positive effect of development assistance on primary enrolment. However, even the most optimistic estimates clearly show that at any realistic rate of growth, aid will never be able to move the world markedly closer towards the internationally agreed objective of education for all. Universal primary education requires increased efficiency of educational spending by donors and national governments alike. Moreover, the recipient countries' general political and institutional background matters. Under conditions of bad governance, the impact of aid on enrolment can actually turn negative.

Only three years after its endorsement by the World Bank & the IMF, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative was considerably altered & enhanced. This policy shift can be explained as a result of utility maximization behavior by national & international politicians, international bureaucrats & NGO. A politico-economic model suggests that the overall rise of HIPC default risk & the symbolic value of the year 2000 have been the two major determinants of changes in volume, eligibility, & conditionality requirements. 1 Table, 4 Figures, 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

Only three years after its initial endorsement by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) - Initiative was considerably altered and enhanced. How did this change come about? Neither developments in economic theory, nor empirical evidence of changed beneficiary behavior can explain the usefulness of this policy shift. The merits of a shift from ex-ante conditionality to process conditionality implied by the link of HIPC debt relief to the elaboration of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) remain equally unclear. However, the change from the initial to the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative can easily be explained as a result of utility maximization behavior by national and international bureaucrats, politicians and NGO. A politico-economic model suggests that the overall rise of HIPC default risk and the symbolic value of the year 2000 have been the two major determinants of the policy shift. ; Bereits drei Jahre nach ihrer Einführung 1996 wurde die Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)-Initiative von Weltbank und IWF erheblich verändert und erweitert. Wie kam es zu diesem Wechsel? Weder neuere Entwicklungen der ökonomischen Theorie, noch empirische Befunde über ein verändertes Verhalten der Empfängerländer können den Sinn dieses politischen Kurswechsels erklären. Ebenso unklar bleibt der Nutzen aus dem Übergang von Ex-ante-Konditionalität zu Prozesskonditionalität, der durch die Verknüpfung von HIPC Schuldenerlass mit der Erarbeitung von Armutsbekämpfungsstrategiepapieren (PRSP) entstanden ist. Die Veränderungen lassen sich allerdings leicht erklären, wenn man sie als Ergebnis eines Nutzenmaximierungskalküls von nationalen und internationalen Bürokraten, Politikern und NRO betrachtet. Ein politökonomisches Modell ergibt, dass der allgemeine Anstieg des HIPC Zahlungsausfallrisikos und die symbolische Bedeutung des Milleniumjahres 2000 als zentrale Determinanten des politischen Kurswechsels betrachtet werden können.