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This article raises the possibility of de- and reconstructing realist constructivism for the purpose of studying foreign policy, with an emphasis on explaining and forecasting change and continuity. I discuss why Samuel Barkin's explication of realist constructivism has in my view struggled to take off as an IR perspective and which tenets appear problematic, especially when applying them to foreign policy. I suggest a way of revitalising realist constructivism across three layers of theorising: political ontology, explanatory theory, and praxis. Constructivism's "open ontology"offers a meeting point with classical realism, together with its (less deterministic and more interpretivist) explanatory approach. Classical realism adds to the third layer with its focus on practice sensibility, including the choices actors make in highly uncertain contexts. Its strong interest in discovering the truth of politics is important here. I argue that such a synthesis, which is informed by Ned Lebow's conceptualisation of causation as "inefficient", could be well-suited to unpack the complex reality of foreign policy. I seek to make the case for realist constructivism as a dynamic thinking tool, among others when investigating the effects of material, intersubjective and subjective factors on foreign policy decisions and outcomes. While my propositions can only be sketched here, the goal is to encourage further debate about the value of realist constructivism, which has ebbed since the mid-2000s.

This book provides the first assessment of the performance of three leading European polities in providing estimative intelligence during an era of surprise. It develops a new framework for conducting postmortems guided by a normative model of anticipatory foreign policy. The comparative analysis focuses on how the UK, the EU and Germany handled three cases of major surprises: the Arab uprisings, the rise to power of the Islamic State (ISIS), and the Russian annexation of Crimea. It considers not just government intelligence assessments, but also diplomatic reporting and expert open sources and how these assessments were received by organisational leaders. The book tests and develops new theories about the causes of strategic surprises, going beyond a common focus on intelligence versus policy failures to identify challenges and factors that cut across both communities. With the help of former senior officials, the book identifies lessons yet to be learnt by European polities to better anticipate and prepare for future surprises.

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