Search results

This report examines the politics of differentiated integration (DI) in Luxembourg between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse at the conceptual level and also in terms of more concrete references to DI mechanisms and instances. The report aims to define the position of the government of Luxembourg – understood broadly as the set of all political actors. The report relies on quantitative text analysis and qualitative analysis of the salience of DI and Luxembourg's position on it. Overall, references to DI concepts are rare, although the idea of a multi-speed Europe has been debated. References to DI mechanisms (enhanced cooperation and opt-outs) and specific instances are more frequent than conceptual references in parliamentary debates. The government of Luxembourg generally adopts a neutral or positive position on DI (concepts, mechanisms and instances). Luxembourg supports DI when it refers to a multi-speed Europe in which the country can act as an example of European integration and incentivise other Member States to follow its path. In accordance, Luxembourg tends to reject opt-out mechanisms for Member States in EU law while supporting (and joining) most instances of enhanced cooperation. In general, Luxembourg participates in most mechanisms that can put the country at the vanguard of European integration. In stark contrast, Luxembourg opposed one important instance of enhanced cooperation which it considered would hurt its core financial interests (the Financial Transaction Tax). ; This paper is part of the InDivEU project which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. The content of this document represents only the views of the InDivEU consortium and is its sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains.

This report investigates the politics of Differentiated Integration (DI) in France between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse, on conceptual grounds and on more concrete references. The report also aims to define the position of the French government (broadly understood as a set of institutional actors) on differentiated integration over time and to assess its stances on specific mechanisms and instances of differentiated integration. It shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) has increased over time in France. Notably, Emmanuel Macron engages more than his predecessors with European issues and DI in terms of concepts and models. On the other hand, DI mechanisms are more salient in parliamentary debates, particularly during two EU institutional crises: the 2012 eurocrisis and the 2016-2018 Brexit crisis. In both cases, the emphasis put on enhanced cooperation or opt-outs relates to economic issues. Conceptual references to differentiated integration in political discourse in France are generally neutral or positive. Two factors seem to be shared by all the French presidents: a need for enhanced cooperation on strategic issues (defence, foreign affairs, economic issues) and an emphasis put on Franco-German cooperation. Debates in parliamentary committees on differentiated integration and different models of it reflect a consensual position: DI is desirable, but needs to be debated with caution. To this end, multi-speed Europe is generally connoted negatively, while references to multi-end Europe are more positive. Positions on DI mechanisms follow a pro-European line: the French government (in the broad sense) usually views enhanced cooperation positively and opt-outs negatively. In particular, the French government seems to actively promote enhanced cooperation on economic issues. It is noteworthy that opt-outs are usually associated with a critique of the British influence on European integration. ; This [report/publication/etc] is part of the InDivEU project which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304.

Defence date: 15 May 2017 ; Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, EUI; Professor Martial Foucault, Sciences Po Paris; Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, EUI (Supervisor); Professor Jens Rydgren, Stockholm University ; This thesis looks at the success of radical right parties in Western Europe through the perspective of welfare politics, by examining parties and voters in a comparative and mixed method perspective. I argue that purely socio-cultural or socio-economic accounts of the radical right success face several theoretical and empirical shortcomings. Focusing on the conflict dimension of welfare politics - who gets what, when and how in terms of social benefits – constitutes a novel approach to explain these parties' and voters' political preferences. Relying on different theories of the political sociology of the welfare state, I put forward the protection and exclusion hypotheses, which have implications at the party and at the voter levels. On the demand side, the precarization sub-hypothesis expects that economically insecure voters are likely to support radical right parties who offer them an alternative to mainstream parties. The scapegoating sub-hypothesis expect that voters who feel that core normative beliefs of the moral economy of the welfare state are being violated by individuals or outgroups should support the radical right because it fosters an exclusive conception of welfare politics. On the supply side, the programmatic shift sub-hypothesis expects that radical right parties turn their back on their initial 'winning formula' (which entailed retrenchment of welfare institutions) in order to adopt protective welfare preferences that match their constituents' economic insecurity. The exclusive solidarity sub-hypothesis expects that radical right parties frame their welfare preference in terms of group inclusion and exclusion. I find that economic insecurity and welfare specific attitudes (welfare populism, welfare chauvinism, welfare limitation and egalitarianism) underlie voters' support for radical right parties. Conversely, some – but not all – West European radical right parties have adapted their welfare preferences towards protective welfare policies in order to match their constituents' concerns. However, all radical right parties put forward an exclusive conception of solidarity. These findings contribute to a finer-grained understanding of the electoral of radical right parties in Western Europe, and also open a broader research agenda for the better inclusion of welfare politics in electoral studies.

Cet article examine l'impact des crises liées à la pandémie de Covid-19 et au déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine sur le vote pour Emmanuel Macron au premier tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2022. Pour cela, il met à l'épreuve empirique deux théories établies des conséquences électorales des crises internationales : le vote rétrospectif et l'effet de ralliement au drapeau. Au moyen de données panélisées, cette contribution démontre la pertinence de ces deux mécanismes dans le contexte français de 2022. Bien que la pandémie de Covid-19 ait débuté plus de deux ans avant l'élection présidentielle, l'évaluation des politiques de gestion sanitaire et économique de cette crise reste déterminante pour comprendre le succès du président sortant. De plus, celui-ci a bien bénéficié électoralement – mais dans une moindre mesure – d'un effet drapeau lié à la guerre en Ukraine.

The European Union (EU) as the flagship of supra-nationalism is in a severe crisis. Its legitimacy is increasingly questioned by populist and nationalist parties which claim that the political elites and procedures have become detached from the people and that immigrants endanger the welfare and the culture of the autochthonous population. In this context, the project investigates the potential of transnational citizenship and voting opportunities as current and future pathways contributing to reduce the distance between the people and politicians and to overcome the dichotomy between migrants and sedentary populations.
Based on normative theorizing, current empirical tendencies, and existing ideas, we first develop two proposals for transnationalizing voting spaces on the European and on the national level. The first proposal lays out how voters from EU member states could vote for parties from other member states in the election to the European Parliament. The second proposal envisions that voters from other EU member states could elect (a limited number of) representatives in the national parliament of each EU member state. These proposals build on and expand current trends to allow voting beyond the confines of territory (requirement: residency) and nationality (requirement: citizenship).
Second, with the help of a pan-European Electronic Voting Advice Application (VAA), we will gather information not only about the current extent of transnational voting (by external and dual citizens) and transnational campaigning of parties. We will also find out whether and where people and parties are willing to support and use those further opportunities for transnational voting that we lay out in our two proposals. VAAs play a double role in our project: Conceptually, they are necessary preconditions for making our proposals viable. Empirically, a VAA that we will set up together with the European University Institute in Florence will create the data for our and further scientific studies.Finally, our project brings together two strands of research: The first strand of research is concerned with citizenship rights and practices beyond the realm of the Westphalian nation state, while the second deals with the design of electoral systems for multi-national polities. We will test whether voters and parties are mainly driven by polity-centered considerations (interest in and identification with particular or multiple nation states or with the EU) or by policy-centered considerations (policy positions and preferences).
Altogether, the project will stimulate the discussion about a third transnational pathway for securing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the European Union beyond supranationalism and nationalism. It will tremendously expand our empirical knowledge out the current level of transnational orientations and practices of people and parties in Europe, and at the same time we will find out whether and where people and parties support expanded options for transnational voting. Furthermore, the project will allow us to keep at the forefront of research dealing with VAAs. Finally, the gained insights might be stimulating for other multi-lingual or multi-national democratic systems.

Radical right parties in Western Europe have traditionally shown little support for redistributive policies and have thus been typically classified as economically right wing. Yet, they are contesting the votes of a (formerly) key electorate of the social democratic parties: the working class, who supports welfare redistribution. In this study, we argue and empirically demonstrate that radical right parties have adapted their programmatic preferences to this key segment of electorate by progressively promoting redistributive policies. For our analyses we use mixed methods and rely on a combination of data sources. Firstly, we assess the salience of welfare issues in the manifestos of major West European radical right parties over the last three decades based on CMP data. Secondly, we examine their positions on welfare issues based on recent euandi data. Thirdly, we analyse the most recent manifestos of two successful radical right parties (Austrian FPÖ and French FN) qualitatively. Our findings show that for a majority of radical right parties welfare state expansion has become a salient issue, and that they do not position themselves anymore on the right regarding redistributive issues; however, these parties promote a specific kind of solidarity: exclusive solidarity.

AbstractRecent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the "deservingness criteria" that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.