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This book asks why, in the wake of the Cold War, Japan suddenly reversed years of steadfast opposition to security cooperation with its neighbors. Long isolated and opposed to multilateral agreements, Japan proposed East Asia's first multilateral security forum in the early 1990s, emerging as a regional leader. Overcoming Isolationism explores what led to this surprising about-face and offers a corrective to the misperception that Japan's security strategy is reactive to US pressure and unresponsive to its neighbors. Paul Midford draws on newly released official documents and extensive interviews to reveal a quarter century of Japanese leadership in promoting regional security cooperation. He demonstrates that Japan has a much more nuanced relationship with its neighbors and has played a more significant leadership role in shaping East Asian security than has previously been recognized.

Public attitudes, opinion, and the conditions for policy influence -- Views on the utility of military force and America's use of force -- Reassessing public opinion during the Cold War -- The First Gulf War -- International peacekeeping and the U.S. alliance in the 1990s -- Japanese public opinion and responses to 9-11 and the Afghan invasion -- The Iraq War and the SDF -- Reversing course : an Iraq syndrome in Japan

This article poses the question of why, after having consistently pursued an isolationist strategy of avoiding security ties with partners other than the US, and having followed the US in opposing regional security multilateralism, did Japan suddenly reverse course and get out in front of the US with its first post-war regional security initiative. This article addresses this question by tracing the internal debates, policy process and motivations that drove Japan to reverse its position, a process that transformed Japan into the leading champion of regional security multilateralism in East Asia. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

During the cold war the United States was overwhelmingly central in Japan's security policy. Japan hosted US bases and the Self-Defense Forces held joint exercises with the US military, even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan essentially refused even to discuss security with its neighbors. Special exceptions were made for the United States in otherwise sweeping policies, such as the exception for the United States in Tokyo's ban on weapons exports and co-development. Since the end of the cold war, Japan's security policy has undergone a little noticed transformation: it has steadily moved away from being centered on the United States as its sole security partner. Tokyo has initiated bilateral security dialogues with its Asian neighbors and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as a supplement to the US alliance. Japan has begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. Paradoxically these changes have occurred even as the US–Japan alliance has strengthened. The articles in this special issue examine these new security ties with states and multilateral organizations, and other changes in policy that have made the United States less 'special,' such as by allowing arms exports to other actors. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

This article addresses Japan's role in maritime security in the South China Sea. It identifies Tokyo's three main policy tools: regional multilateralism, ODA, and JCG aid to littoral states in the form of equipment and capacity building. Barring a major external shock Tokyo will continue playing a more active but low-key role.

This paper asks why it was much easier for Japan to dispatch its military overseas after 9-11 than it had been during the 1990 Gulf crisis, when similar plans failed due to overwhelming opposition. While several factors in Japanese domestic politics, including the astronomical popularity and hawkishness of Prime Minister Koizumi, played an important role, a significant reduction in Asian gaiatsu on Japan to not send its military overseas played a bigger role. This reduction in Asian gaiatsu resulted from Japan's decade-long effort to build up a reassuring track record of benign overseas deployments for non-combat missions. While Japan must continue to pursue historical reassurance regarding its Pacific War role, the demonstration effect of continued benign overseas deployments is likely to be of greater importance for encouraging Asian acceptance of a larger Japanese military role.