Abstract This paper considers the potentially wrongful discriminatory nature of certain of our dating preferences. It argues that the wrongfulness of such preferences lies primarily in the simple lookism they involve. While it is ultimately permissible for us to date people partly because of how they look, I argue that we have a duty to 'look behind' people's appearance, which I take to mean that we ought not, on the basis of their appearance, to regard them as absolutely out of the question for us to engage with in a romantic setting. Further, constraints similar to those suggested by a duty to look behind people's appearance gain support from another duty we have, namely, a duty to counteract, also in our daily lives, the fact that people are undeservedly disadvantaged in various ways.
AbstractPeople's lifestyles or their health choices importantly affect their general health. Furthermore, there is a social gradient in these choices such that people in relatively disadvantaged social positions tend to make worse choices with regard to their health than people in more advantaged positions. The consequence is deep inequalities in health. The state, to the extent it is part of its role to prevent harm and to reduce inequality, appears obliged to try to influence people's health choices in the interest of their own health and general well-being. However, the state acting to prevent people from harming themselves is notoriously controversial, at least to liberals. It amounts to paternalism – something liberals have traditionally been loath to accept. Furthermore, the equality-generating credential of the available policy measures is in some cases doubtful. To assess the problem of paternalism in relation to government efforts to change lifestyles, partly with the aim of reducing inequalities in health, we need a clear notion of paternalism. The latter may, roughly, be seen as follows: A acts paternalistically in relation to B, if, and only if, (a) A restricts B's liberty; (b) A does so against B's will; (c) A does so in B's interest; (d) A's behavior cannot be justified without counting its beneficial effects to B in its favor. According to this conception, when the government informs citizens of the danger involved in certain types of health-related conduct, it is not acting paternalistically. However, campaigns may in fact increase rather than decrease inequality of health (because the worse off are less responsive to such measures than the better off). Nudging, on the other hand, stands a better chance of reducing inequality in health. However, nudging policies are less uncontroversial in terms of the problem of paternalism than their proponents are inclined to think. More familiar measures aiming to make the health-endangering behavior more expensive and/or difficult or outright prohibiting it stand a good chance of reducing inequalities, whilst not being more controversial than nudging policies (perhaps less) in terms of the paternalism they involve.
Abstract This paper concerns Philippe Van Parijs's case for an unconditional basic income. It argues that given central egalitarian commitments-to wit, (i) equal concern and respect; (ii) endowment-insensitivity (which can be seen to include Van Parijs's project of maximizing or leximinning real freedom); (iii) ambition-sensitivity; and (iv) neutrality-endorsed by Van Parijs, a basic income does not appear to be a requirement of justice. The core claim defended is that there is a serious tension between (iii) and the idea of an unconditional basic income.
Organtransplantation redder liv og forøger livskvalitet. Der er imidlertid alt for få organer til rådighed. Der er for få donorer. Hvad kan vi gøre for at få flere donorer? Et nyere løsningsforslag er at nudge eller "puffe" folk til at træffe en beslutning. En vigtig fordel ved puffepolitikker er, at den ønskede adfærdsændring frembringes uden anvendelse af tvang. Imidlertid er politikkerne ikke uproblematiske. Selvom de ikke begrænser vores valgfrihed, kan de hævdes at krænke vores selvbestemmelsesret. De rejser altså et klassisk dilemma mellem et hensyn til borgernes velfærd (i dette tilfælde folk på venteliste til en organdonation) og borgernes selvbestemmelsesret (i dette tilfælde til selv at bestemme, hvad der skal ske med deres organer efter deres død). En politik, hvor borgerne som udgangspunkt står som organdonorer, kan dog retfærdiggøres. Den vil alt andet lige fremme udbuddet af organer væsentligt, og i lyset heraf er dens delvise krænkelse af folks ret til selvbestemmelse en acceptabel omkostning.
For many, receiving an organ transplantation is the only viable way to prolong their lives and increase their quality of life. However, the demand for organs exceeds supply. Are there efficient and ethically acceptable ways of increasing the number of organ donors? Recently, nudging has been proposed as an attractive policy instrument. Nudging eschews coercing people. It affects instead the choice architecture within which people make their choices. Still, autonomy concerns arise. Accordingly, we have to make a difficult trade-off between augmenting people's welfare, on the one hand, and respecting their autonomy on the other. An opt-out system in which people count as donors unless they state otherwise is, however, likely to increase donations considerably, and to do so at acceptable costs in terms of infringements on autonomy.
