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Refugee Protection and Solidarity aims to define the duties that EU member states have towards each other in the field of refugee protection. It employs the analytical tools of normative political theory to bring moral clarity to a highly divisive debate on both principles and political feasibility.

AbstractThe 'flexible' interstate solidarity model envisaged by the 2020 'New Pact on Migration and Asylum' ('the Pact') allows European Union (EU) member states to choose how to do their share in the distribution of the costs connected to asylum. According to one of the proposals contained in the Pact, member states have the option to contribute to the distribution through return sponsorship, taking measures to facilitate the return of irregular migrants residing in other member states. This paper asks: should EU member states be allowed to discharge their solidarity obligations through return sponsorship as envisaged by the Pact? Scholars of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have raised several doubts about this proposal, particularly regarding the feasibility of return sponsorship and the related risks for human rights. Although the proposal is pragmatic in some respects, these problematic aspects pose at least two questions for normative political theorists: first, should member states be allowed to choose their form of contribution in a solidarity scheme? And, if so, should return sponsorship be one of the contributions allowed? Building on normative theories of solidarity in the EU, this article will argue that return sponsorship should be rejected both because it does not further solidarity among member states and because the rights of rejected asylum seekers set a strong presumption against it.

The 'flexible' interstate solidarity model envisaged by the 2020 'New Pact on Migration and Asylum' ('the Pact') allows European Union (EU) member states to choose how to do their share in the distribution of the costs connected to asylum. According to one of the proposals contained in the Pact, member states have the option to contribute to the distribution through return sponsorship, taking measures to facilitate the return of irregular migrants residing in other member states. In this paper I ask: should EU member states be allowed to discharge their solidarity obligations through return sponsorship as envisaged by the Pact? Scholars of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have raised several doubts about this proposal, particularly regarding the feasibility of return sponsorship and the related risks for human rights. Although the proposal is pragmatic in some respects, these problematic aspects pose at least two questions for normative political theorists: first, should member states be allowed to choose their form of contribution in a solidarity scheme? And, if so, should return sponsorship be one of the contributions allowed? Building on normative theories of solidarity in the EU, this article will argue that return sponsorship should be rejected both because it does not further solidarity among member states and because the rights of rejected asylum seekers set a strong presumption against it.

Published online: 19 November 2020 ; The concept of solidarity has been receiving growing attention from scholars in a wide range of disciplines. While this trend coincides with widespread unsuccessful attempts to achieve solidarity in the real world, the failure of solidarity as such remains a relatively unexplored topic. In the case of the so-called European Union (EU) refugee crisis, the fact that EU member states failed to fulfil their commitment to solidarity is now regarded as established wisdom. But as we try to come to terms with failing solidarity in the EU we are faced with a number of important questions: are all instances of failing solidarity equally morally reprehensible? Are some motivations for resorting to unsolidaristic measures more valid than others? What claims have an effective countervailing force against the commitment to act in solidarity?

The concept of solidarity has been receiving growing attention from scholars in a wide range of disciplines. While this trend coincides with widespread unsuccessful attempts to achieve solidarity in the real world, the failure of solidarity as such remains a relatively unexplored topic. In the case of the so-called European Union (EU) refugee crisis, the fact that EU member states failed to fulfil their commitment to solidarity is now regarded as established wisdom. But as we try to come to terms with failing solidarity in the EU we are faced with a number of important questions: are all instances of failing solidarity equally morally reprehensible? Are some motivations for resorting to unsolidaristic measures more valid than others? What claims have an effective countervailing force against the commitment to act in solidarity?

The concept of solidarity has been receiving growing attention from scholars in a wide range of disciplines. While this trend coincides with widespread unsuccessful attempts to achieve solidarity in the real world, the failure of solidarity as such remains a relatively unexplored topic. In the case of the so-called European Union (EU) refugee crisis, the fact that EU member states failed to fulfil their commitment to solidarity is now regarded as established wisdom. But as we try to come to terms with failing solidarity in the EU we are faced with a number of important questions: are all instances of failing solidarity equally morally reprehensible? Are some motivations for resorting to unsolidaristic measures more valid than others? What claims have an effective countervailing force against the commitment to act in solidarity?