Suchergebnisse

The elusive ideal of a world constitution is unlikely to be realized any time soon - yet important steps in that direction are happening in world politics. Milewicz argues that international constitutionalization has gathered steam as an unintended by-product of international treaty making in the post-war period. This process is driven by the logic of democratic power, whereby states that are both democratic and powerful - democratic powers - are the strongest promoters of rule-based cooperation. Not realizing the inadvertent and long-term effects of the specialized rules they design, states fall into a constitutionalization trap that is hard to escape as it conforms with their interests and values. Milewicz's analysis will appeal to students and scholars of International Relations and International Law, interested in international cooperation, as well as institutional and constitutional theory and practice.

Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (recognition concerns, increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the European Union). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.

AbstractThe literature on international cooperation through legal commitments focuses chiefly on treaty ratification. What has received much less attention is that before states ratify treaties, they commit to treaties through the act of signature. This article addresses this research gap by investigating how a state's decision to sign a treaty is affected by its diplomatic representation during treaty negotiations. Conceptualizing signature as a commitment step, we argue that participation in treaty negotiations translates into a "ties-that-bind" effect creating incentives for diplomats to support the treaty text leading to treaty signature. Our empirical analysis uses a new data set on signature and tests the argument for 52 multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. Results confirm that participation in treaty making matters for signature but not necessarily for ratification.

The literature on international cooperation through legal commitments focuses chiefly on treaty ratification. What has received much less attention is that before states ratify treaties, they commit to treaties through the act of signature. This paper addresses this research gap by investigating how a state's decision to sign a treaty is affected by its diplomatic representation during treaty negotiations. Conceptualizing signature as a commitment step, we argue that participation in treaty negotiations translates into a "ties-that-bind" effect creating incentives for diplomats to support the treaty text leading to treaty signature. Our empirical analysis uses a new data set on signature and tests the argument for 52 multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. Results confirm that participation in treaty making matters for signature but not necessarily for ratification.

Theories of deliberation, developed largely in the context of domestic politics, are becoming increasingly relevant for international politics. The recently established Universal Periodic Review (UPR) operating under the auspices of the UN's Human Rights Council is an excellent illustration. Our analysis of responses to its reports and recommendations suggests that the deliberative processes surrounding the UPR do indeed evoke co-operative responses even from countries with poor human rights records. Its highly inclusive, deliberative, repeated-play and peer-to-peer nature can serve as a model for how international organizations more generally can enhance deliberative capacity across the international system. ; Australian Research Council Discovery Project DP120103976.

Theories of deliberation, developed largely with respect to domestic politics, are becoming increasingly relevant for international politics. The recently-established Universal Periodic Review (UPR) operating under the auspices of the UN's Human Rights Council is an excellent illustration. Our analysis of responses to its reports and recommendations suggests that the deliberative processes surrounding the UPR do indeed evoke cooperative responses even from countries with poor human rights records. Its highly inclusive, deliberative, repeated-play and peer-to-peer nature can serve as a model for how international organizations more generally can enhance deliberative capacity across the international system.

Who supports multilateral treaties and who doesn't? We offer a systematic account of treaty ratification patterns paying particular attention to different states' roles in international legal cooperation in relation to the United States' ratification behavior. We argue that states' ability to influence the terms of treaties and their acceptance increases their incentives for treaty ratification. Multilateral powers – states which are powerful and independent from the US – support multilateral legal cooperation because this offers them an opportunity to shape treaty content. Their engagement in multilateral treaties is strongest when the United States does not lead. Other states that are weak and/or dependent cannot greatly affect treaties and are therefore less supportive of them but are subject to US pressure. An empirical analysis of states' decisions to ratify prominent postwar multilateral treaties covering a wide range of global issues supports our argument. We conclude with broader implications for future international cooperation.

Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.