Suchergebnisse

In this article we explore the impact of the euro adoption and the effect of the volatility of the real exchange rate on trade both on intra EMU trade and on EMU trade with third countries. To this end, we use a large database covering 93% of world trade that includes 80 countries during the period 1980-2009. We estimate a gravity equation using one of the most complete specifications in the literature to isolate the euro effect from other factors affecting trade, as regional trade agreements or exchange rate volatility. Our results show that the elimination of the volatility boosted export per se especially before 1999 and therefore, the possibility to peg to the euro could boost trade of third countries and between these third countries. ; Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation SEJ2007-62081, and the Regional Programs P07-SEJ-03261 and SEJ‐340 of the Regional Government of Andalusia.

Compared to the new European members (NEM) and to the new candidate countries, the Middle-East and North African (MENA) countries are a very heterogeneous and fragmented EU frontier. As far as monetary issues are concerned, exchange rate regimes are very different and bilateral exchange rates quite volatile. Moreover, weak trade integration and generalized capital controls constitute major obstacles to economic and financial integration. Existing works yet suggest that anchoring to the euro would undoubtedly be the best exchange-rate strategy for most MENA countries. Monetary integration and trade integration are interdependent. This is especially the case when trade flows are sensitive to the volatility of exchange rates or to movements in relative prices. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the potential of monetary integration in the South Mediterranean area, in a context of trade liberalization and of a strong orientation of trade flows towards the EU. The empirical part of the paper would rely on a gravity equation of trade which would include exchange rates volatility and relative prices, in order to gauge the impact of de facto exchange-rate and monetary conditions on trade integration. The sample of countries is large (OECD, NEM, MENA and Asian countries) in order both to have robust estimates and to investigate whether the MENA countries exhibit a specific sensitivity of trade flows to exchange-rate volatility and exchange-rate misalignments. The impact of the competitiveness of third countries will also be investigated. This latter issue is especially important, though seldom assessed, when it comes to the potential trade-diverting effect of the latest EU enlargement on MENA trade wit the EU. The gravity setting also allows simulating the consequences for the trade of MENA countries of a deeper monetary integration, by comparing the impact on trade of a regional monetary integration and of a euro peg.

In this article, we investigate the determinants of individuals' opinions concerning the economic impact of immigrants. Unlike most previous studies, we use a large sample of 61 countries (Joint WVS/EVS 2017–2020 dataset) that are either net receivers or net emitters of migrants. Using a multilevel model, we test the effect of individuals' characteristics and of several macroeconomic variables on the assessment of immigrants' impact on development. We highlight that natives' evaluation of the economic consequences of immigration is more influenced by age, trust, education, and income than by contextual variables such as growth, inflation, inequalities, income level, or number of immigrants in the country. Our results match with the hypothesis that immigrants are considered substitutes for low- and medium-skilled workers in capital-abundant countries. However, neither labour-market nor welfare-state considerations can be considered as the main drivers of the appraisals made about the economic impact of immigration. Our results tend to confirm the prediction that greater contact with immigrants reduces anti-immigrant opinions, in particular for skilled people. In contrast, immigrant inflows lead low- and medium-skilled people to make worse judgments concerning the economic consequences of immigration. All in all, our results validate the view that education comprises a major part of the cognitive assessment of the role played by immigrants in the economy, at least in high-income countries.

We would like to thank the Spanish Ministry of Science (PGC2018-093506-B-100) for the financial support. ; In this article, we investigate the determinants of individuals' opinions concerning the economic impact of immigrants. Unlike most previous studies, we use a large sample of 61 countries (Joint WVS/EVS 2017–2020 dataset) that are either net receivers or net emitters of migrants. Using a multilevel model, we test the effect of individuals' characteristics and of several macroeconomic variables on the assessment of immigrants' impact on development. We highlight that natives' evaluation of the economic consequences of immigration is more influenced by age, trust, education, and income than by contextual variables such as growth, inflation, inequalities, income level, or number of immigrants in the country. Our results match with the hypothesis that immigrants are considered substitutes for low‐ and medium‐skilled workers in capital‐abundant countries. However, neither labour‐market nor welfare‐state considerations can be considered as the main drivers of the appraisals made about the economic impact of immigration. Our results tend to confirm the prediction that greater contact with immigrants reduces anti‐immigrant opinions, in particular for skilled people. In contrast, immigrant inflows lead low‐ and medium‐skilled people to make worse judgments concerning the economic consequences of immigration. All in all, our results validate the view that education comprises a major part of the cognitive assessment of the role played by immigrants in the economy, at least in high‐income countries. ; Spanish Government PGC2018-093506-B-100

The present work reassesses the impact of good governance and democracy on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in oil-abundant countries. To this end, we estimate the effect of host countries' institutions on greenfield FDI, using a gravity equation for a dataset that covers 182 countries during 2003-2012. Our findings confirm that compliance to rule of law, lack of corruption, political stability and democracy could boost new FDI links through the extensive margin. Our results could not rule out the "oil curse", meaning that oil producers attract fewer new greenfield projects than similar countries without oil. Unlike other studies, we show that the impact of institutions is not necessarily undermined by the presence of natural resources. ; This work was supported by: Consejería de Economía, Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo, Junta de Andalucía [SEJ 340], Forum Euromediterraneen des Instituts de Sciences Economiques [FEM41-07], Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España [ECO2015-68057-R]; and Generalitat Valenciana [GV/2017/052].

The present work reassesses the impact of good governance and democracy on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in oil-abundant countries. To this end, we estimate the effect of host countries' institutions on greenfield FDI, using a gravity equation for a dataset that covers 182 countries during 2003-2012. Our findings confirm that compliance to rule of law, lack of corruption, political stability and democracy could boost new FDI links through the extensive margin. Our results could not rule out the "oil curse", meaning that oil producers attract fewer new greenfield projects than similar countries without oil. Unlike other studies, we show that the impact of institutions is not necessarily undermined by the presence of natural resources. ; Consejería de Economía, Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo, Junta de Andalucía SEJ 340 ; Forum Euromediterraneen des Instituts de Sciences Economiques FEM41-07 ; Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España ECO2015-68057-R ; Generalitat Valenciana GV/2017/052

A striking feature of the new globalization process is the role played by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in generating employment, growth, productivity gains, technology transfers and in opening a gateway to a better integration in global value chains (Harrison, 1994; Del Prete et al., 2018). Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), therefore, is placed at the top of the agenda for most countries. From the investors' perspective, political risks is, after macroeconomic instability, the factor that poses the greatest constraint on investments in developing countries (MIGA, 2014). Within political risks, ad-verse regulatory changes and breach of contract are the troubles that investors fear the most. This issue has been exacerbated by the Arab Spring, as it brought a surge of political instability and violence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This article builds on the limited research which fo-cuses on this region and on our own study (Carril-Caccia et al., 2018). We delve further into MENA re-gion capacity to attract FDI, highlighting the role played by institutions and violence. ; Economía

This study delves into the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being by gauging the role played by opportunities at the country level. Using data from the World Value Survey, we estimate multilevel models to explain cross-country differences in individuals' life satisfaction. Opportunity and inequality exert a significant effect per se on life satisfaction, and their joint effect explains the puzzling positive relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction in low- and middle-income countries. Income inequalities reduce the well-being of individuals if opportunities are low, but inequality is not relevant for life satisfaction if opportunities in the country are high. Among the aspects of opportunity that really matter, we show that inclusiveness and access to advanced education play a more major role than political freedom or personal rights. Results apply for different social, income, and education groups.

This study delves into the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being by gauging the role played by opportunities at the country level. Using data from the World Value Survey, we estimate multilevel models to explain cross-country differences in individuals' life satisfaction. Opportunity and inequality exert a significant effect per se on life satisfaction, and their joint effect explains the puzzling positive relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction in low- and middle-income countries. Income inequalities reduce the well-being of individuals if opportunities are low, but inequality is not relevant for life satisfaction if opportunities in the country are high. Among the aspects of opportunity that really matter, we show that inclusiveness and access to advanced education play a more major role than political freedom or personal rights. Results apply for different social, income, and education groups.