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The aim of this article is to find out why the Constitutional Court, while examining constitutional justice cases, formulating the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine and, finally, choosing a specific solution of the case, could or sometimes even should take into consideration soft law norms and the constitutional law development tendencies. The legal effects produced by the soft law was undeniably recognized in Garibaldi's case by the Court of Justice of European Union and the obligation for national courts implementing the EU law to pay attention to the EU's soft law norms was settled out. Most likely this obligation means that national courts have to prove that they are familiar with the appropriate soft law norms and after choosing their own solution meeting soft law norms or not, they should indicate the reasons of chosen different interpretation than recommended. It can be stated that the necessity to pay respect to the soft law in constitutional jurisprudence in appropriate cases is inevitable, if the Constitutional Court do not seek to isolate itself from European and international constitutional context. It is even more so, when there are no binding acts in the specific field of law. It goes without saying that the Constitutional Court would rely on such documents only if there will be no contradictions with the constitutional provisions and will correspond to the particularities of national legal system. Soft law can be perceived as the source of inspiration for judges examining constitutional justice cases and formulating constitutional doctrine and as the signpost for lawmaking subjects adopting binding acts. Sometimes soft law can help understand the complicated or unclear provisions of binding acts and foresee possible consequences, and sometimes it is the only legal act regulating some sort of relationships, especially when it concerns new challenges arising to the changing societies (such as technological progress that obviously will affect human rights and freedoms etc.). There is no reason to invent the new definitions pertinent to the constitutional justice case if they are enshrined in the legal act, even if it is soft, adopted by the competent institution of constitutional law. Soft law is often taken into consideration in the texts of constitutional judgments as a part of international context of the case, as explanatory documents of the notions or examined principles, as the strengthening piece of chosen reasoning and sometimes even as the part of interpretation of constitutional norms. The jurisprudence of Lithuanian, Latvian and Moldovan constitutional courts was analyzed in order to prove the expansion of the use of soft law and the necessity to continue to do so. The constitutional soft law regulates issues common to all the democratic states as it is based on universally recognized principles of democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights. Adopted mostly by the European Commission "For the Democracy through Law" (known as Venice Commission) it proposes legal regulation and some solutions of the constitutional problems that are not adopted or implemented in the national legal system, but should be followed by all the states which have chosen the path of democracy. Therefore, it is not only possible, but sometimes it is necessaire to let the soft law guide. And as the constitutional soft law is based on the values that could be derived from almost all democratic constitution, the possibility that there could be contradiction with the national constitutional provision or that it could menace to the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution doesn't seem very plausible.

The aim of this article is to find out why the Constitutional Court, while examining constitutional justice cases, formulating the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine and, finally, choosing a specific solution of the case, could or sometimes even should take into consideration soft law norms and the constitutional law development tendencies. The legal effects produced by the soft law was undeniably recognized in Garibaldi's case by the Court of Justice of European Union and the obligation for national courts implementing the EU law to pay attention to the EU's soft law norms was settled out. Most likely this obligation means that national courts have to prove that they are familiar with the appropriate soft law norms and after choosing their own solution meeting soft law norms or not, they should indicate the reasons of chosen different interpretation than recommended. It can be stated that the necessity to pay respect to the soft law in constitutional jurisprudence in appropriate cases is inevitable, if the Constitutional Court do not seek to isolate itself from European and international constitutional context. It is even more so, when there are no binding acts in the specific field of law. It goes without saying that the Constitutional Court would rely on such documents only if there will be no contradictions with the constitutional provisions and will correspond to the particularities of national legal system. Soft law can be perceived as the source of inspiration for judges examining constitutional justice cases and formulating constitutional doctrine and as the signpost for lawmaking subjects adopting binding acts. Sometimes soft law can help understand the complicated or unclear provisions of binding acts and foresee possible consequences, and sometimes it is the only legal act regulating some sort of relationships, especially when it concerns new challenges arising to the changing societies (such as technological progress that obviously will affect human rights and freedoms etc.). There is no reason to invent the new definitions pertinent to the constitutional justice case if they are enshrined in the legal act, even if it is soft, adopted by the competent institution of constitutional law. Soft law is often taken into consideration in the texts of constitutional judgments as a part of international context of the case, as explanatory documents of the notions or examined principles, as the strengthening piece of chosen reasoning and sometimes even as the part of interpretation of constitutional norms. The jurisprudence of Lithuanian, Latvian and Moldovan constitutional courts was analyzed in order to prove the expansion of the use of soft law and the necessity to continue to do so. The constitutional soft law regulates issues common to all the democratic states as it is based on universally recognized principles of democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights. Adopted mostly by the European Commission "For the Democracy through Law" (known as Venice Commission) it proposes legal regulation and some solutions of the constitutional problems that are not adopted or implemented in the national legal system, but should be followed by all the states which have chosen the path of democracy. Therefore, it is not only possible, but sometimes it is necessaire to let the soft law guide. And as the constitutional soft law is based on the values that could be derived from almost all democratic constitution, the possibility that there could be contradiction with the national constitutional provision or that it could menace to the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution doesn't seem very plausible.

The decisions of institutions responsible for constitutional control are final and not subject to appeal. Constitutional Courts act independently, and the intervention of other state institutions into their activity is strictly forbidden. They are the supreme guardians of constitutions, but it may appear that nobody is guarding the constitutional courts themselves. Therefore, the Juvenal's quotation in the title of the article indicates the aim to look for some external factors that could influence the development of constitutional jurisprudence, and those which may be considered as certain bounds in regards to the liberty of the judicial construction of constitutional norms. Universal constitutional values, such as the rule of law, democracy, independence or the protection of human rights, are not only enshrined in national constitutions, but also in legal acts adopted at the international level. There are no doubts today concerning the influence of binding international and European legal acts and the respective court judgments regarding the development of constitutional jurisprudence, especially when it has been foreseen by the Constitution itself. The constitutional doctrine has continues to evolve in a direction favourable to international law. However, along with the legally binding sources of international law, there are also soft law norms, adopted in the constitutional field by international organizations or their structures. These norms begin to receive to receive some attention in the rulings of Constitutional Courts, and have the potential to gain more and more significant meaning in the nearest future. The The European Commission for Democracy through Law" (also know as Venice Commission) is the best-known international institution acting in the field of constitutional law. Created as a consultative body to the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission adopts recommendations to the member states, including resolutions, studies and opinions, dealing with different issues of constitutional law. These acts are not legally binding, but knowing that they contain references to the protection of human rights, the promotion of the rule of law and democracy and are based on universally recognized constitutional values, constituting common European constitutional heritage, they could become effective instrumen in ensuring the quality of constitutional jurisprudence and the standard for resolving constitutional justice cases. The jurisprudence of the latter years of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has proven that in certain cases, soft law norms are indispensable in order to illustrate or to support a chosen solution and the argumentation of the case.

The decisions of institutions responsible for constitutional control are final and not subject to appeal. Constitutional Courts act independently, and the intervention of other state institutions into their activity is strictly forbidden. They are the supreme guardians of constitutions, but it may appear that nobody is guarding the constitutional courts themselves. Therefore, the Juvenal's quotation in the title of the article indicates the aim to look for some external factors that could influence the development of constitutional jurisprudence, and those which may be considered as certain bounds in regards to the liberty of the judicial construction of constitutional norms. Universal constitutional values, such as the rule of law, democracy, independence or the protection of human rights, are not only enshrined in national constitutions, but also in legal acts adopted at the international level. There are no doubts today concerning the influence of binding international and European legal acts and the respective court judgments regarding the development of constitutional jurisprudence, especially when it has been foreseen by the Constitution itself. The constitutional doctrine has continues to evolve in a direction favourable to international law. However, along with the legally binding sources of international law, there are also soft law norms, adopted in the constitutional field by international organizations or their structures. These norms begin to receive to receive some attention in the rulings of Constitutional Courts, and have the potential to gain more and more significant meaning in the nearest future. The The European Commission for Democracy through Law" (also know as Venice Commission) is the best-known international institution acting in the field of constitutional law. Created as a consultative body to the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission adopts recommendations to the member states, including resolutions, studies and opinions, dealing with different issues of constitutional law. These acts are not legally binding, but knowing that they contain references to the protection of human rights, the promotion of the rule of law and democracy and are based on universally recognized constitutional values, constituting common European constitutional heritage, they could become effective instrumen in ensuring the quality of constitutional jurisprudence and the standard for resolving constitutional justice cases. The jurisprudence of the latter years of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has proven that in certain cases, soft law norms are indispensable in order to illustrate or to support a chosen solution and the argumentation of the case.

The aim of this article is to analyse what kind of powers deriving from the rule of law can be extended to public authorities in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic, what is the balance of powers between the legislative and the executive whilst imposing measures controlling the virus, and what role is played by the constitutional courts whilst deliberating on constitutional disputes involving public authorities. ; Straipsnyje analizuojama, kokių remiantis teisinės valstybės principu įgaliojimų kyla valstybės valdžios institucijoms reaguojant į pasaulinę COVID-19 pandemiją, kokia yra įstatymų leidžiamosios ir vykdomosios valdžių galių pusiausvyra, nustatant viruso valdymo priemones, ir kokį vaidmenį vaidina konstituciniai teismai spręsdami valstybės institucijų konstitucinius ginčus.