Introduction : the key themes of my work -- The sources of great power conflict and cooperation -- Explaining great power cooperation in conflict management -- International effects on regional conflicts -- The global sources of regional transitions from war to peace -- The sources of regional war and peace -- Does democratization pacify the state? : the cases of Germany and Iraq -- Between the revisionist and the frontier state : regional variations in state war-propensity -- Grand strategy, intervention and national security -- The concept of security : should it be redefined? -- Democracy promotion : offensive liberalism vs. the rest (of IR theory)
This volume is a collection of the best essays of Professor Benjamin Miller on the subjects of international and regional security. The book analyses the interrelationships between international politics and regional and national security, with a special focus on the sources of international conflict and collaboration and the causes of war and peace. More specifically, it explains the sources of intended and unintended great-power conflict and collaboration. The book also accounts for the sources of regional war and peace by developing the concept of the state-to-nation balance. Thus the volume is able to explain the variations in the outcomes of great power interventions and the differences in the level and type of war and peace in different eras and various parts of the world. For example, the book's model can account for recent outcomes such as the effects of the 2003 American intervention in Iraq, the post-2011 Arab Spring and the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. The book also provides a model for explaining the changes in American grand strategy with a special focus on accounting for the causes of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Finally, the book addresses the debate on the future of war and peace in the 21st century. This book will be essential reading for students of international security, regional security, Middle Eastern politics, foreign policy and IR.
Abstract This article advances a novel theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of international and domestic conflicts, especially in the twenty-first century. I argue that nationalism plays a major role in the rise of these conflicts. Yet, nationalism is not monolithic. I distinguish among five types of nationalism (satisfied; stateless; consolidating; irredentist; populist). The variations in the type of nationalism explain variations in peace and conflict in different parts of the world. The explanation of the variations of types of nationalism, in turn, is based on the combined effect of variations in state capacity (i.e., the functioning of state institutions) and national congruence (i.e., the congruence between national identities and state borders). Variations in these two independent variables account for both civil and international wars as well as for peaceful states and for domestic polarization. Thus, national congruence and high capacity produce satisfied nationalism and a peaceful state. In contrast, national incongruence and low capacity lead to stateless nationalism and, thus, to civil wars in failed states. High capacity and national incongruence, especially external incongruence, produce irredentist nationalism of revisionist states, leading to war-prone interstate conflicts. High capacity and declining congruence generate nationalist populism and societal polarization. Thus, the theory developed here explains the recent rise of nationalist populism (and the related domestic polarization) in quite a few democracies in comparison with other types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate.
How did the attempt to make the world more liberal end up making the West less liberal? Following the end of the Cold War the US tried to promote liberalism in various parts of the world. This promotion took place under the liberal belief in its universality. A few of these attempts succeeded, most notably the integration of China into the global economy. Many other liberalizing endeavours failed, notably democracy-promotion in China, Russia and the Middle East. Yet, both the successes and the failures resulted in the rise of illiberal elements in the West as reflected in Brexit and Trumpism. The article shows how the outcomes of the attempts at liberalization—both the failures and the successes—generated these populist forces. The Chinese economic success took place at least partly because of the US-led integration of China into the international order. Yet, this success produced adverse economic effects in the West. Such outcomes led to the rise of economic populism. The American liberal interventions in the Middle East affected the rise of terrorism and of Muslim migration to the West. These developments influenced the rise of cultural populism in the West, which advances resentment of foreigners, migrants and minorities.
Abstract I argue that we cannot fully understand Aristotle's position on political stability and state preservation in the Politics with paying close attention to his Eudemian Ethics. We learn from considering the Politics and the Eudemian Ethics in concert that even 'correct' regimes are unstable when citizens do not possess full virtue. Aristotle introduces his formal account of the knowledge requirements for virtue in Eudemian Ethics 8.3, and he applies these knowledge requirements as an explanation for state decline in Politics 2.9 when discussing the Spartans. If we primarily focus on the Nicomachean Ethics as Aristotle's single essential ethical work, we will not learn the lesson he intends his readers to take away from the Spartan discussion in the Politics: that virtue requires correct understanding of the hierarchy and structure of the good life. This knowledge prevents the erosion of the virtues of character and the decline of political regimes.
