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___Winner of the Financial Times Business Book of the Year award___ 'Pulse quickening. A nonfiction thriller - equal parts The China Syndrome and Mission Impossible' New York Times An epic account of the decades-long battle to control the world's most critical resource-microchip technology Power in the modern world - military, economic, geopolitical - is built on a foundation of computer chips. America has maintained its lead as a superpower because it has dominated advances in computer chips and all the technology that chips have enabled. (Virtually everything runs on chips: cars, phones, the stock market, even the electric grid.) Now that edge is in danger of slipping, undermined by the naïve assumption that globalising the chip industry and letting players in Taiwan, Korea and Europe take over manufacturing serves America's interests. Currently, as Chip War reveals, China, which spends more on chips than any other product, is pouring billions into a chip-building Manhattan Project to catch up to the US. In Chip War economic historian Chris Miller recounts the fascinating sequence of events that led to the United States perfecting chip design, and how faster chips helped defeat the Soviet Union (by rendering the Russians' arsenal of precision-guided weapons obsolete). The battle to control this industry will shape our future. China spends more money importing chips than buying oil, and they are China's greatest external vulnerability as they are fundamentally reliant on foreign chips. But with 37 per cent of the global supply of chips being made in Taiwan, within easy range of Chinese missiles, the West's fear is that a solution may be close at hand. 'A riveting history. Features vivid accounts and colourful characters' Financial Times 'Fascinating...A historian by training, Miller walks the reader through decades of semiconductor history - a subject that comes to life thanks to [his] use of colorful anecdotes' Forbes 'Indispensable' Niall Ferguson

"An epic account of the decades-long battle to control what has emerged as the world's most critical resource--microchip technology--with the United States and China increasingly in conflict.You may be surprised to learn that microchips are the new oil--the scarce resource on which the modern world depends. Today, military, economic, and geopolitical power are built on a foundation of computer chips. Virtually everything--from missiles to microwaves--runs on chips, including cars, smartphones, the stock market, even the electric grid. Until recently, America designed and built the fastest chips and maintained its lead as the #1 superpower, but America's edge is in danger of slipping, undermined by players in Taiwan, Korea, and Europe taking over manufacturing. Now, as Chip War reveals, China, which spends more on chips than any other product, is pouring billions into a chip-building initiative to catch up to the US. At stake is America's military superiority and economic prosperity. Economic historian Chris Miller explains how the semiconductor came to play a critical role in modern life and how the U.S. became dominant in chip design and manufacturing and applied this technology to military systems. America's victory in the Cold War and its global military dominance stems from its ability to harness computing power more effectively than any other power. But here, too, China is catching up, with its chip-building ambitions and military modernization going hand in hand. America has let key components of the chip-building process slip out of its grasp, contributing not only to a worldwide chip shortage but also a new Cold War with a superpower adversary that is desperate to bridge the gap. Illuminating, timely, and fascinating, Chip War shows that, to make sense of the current state of politics, economics, and technology, we must first understand the vital role played by chips." --

"We Shall Be Masters is an illuminating account of Russia's attempts-and failures-to achieve great power status in Asia. Since Peter the Great, Russian leaders have been lured by opportunity to the East. Under the tsars, Russians colonized Alaska, California, and Hawaii. The Trans-Siberian Railway linked Moscow to Vladivostok. And Stalin looked to Asia as a sphere of influence, hospitable to the spread of Soviet Communism. In Asia and the Pacific lay territory, markets, security, and glory. But all these expansionist dreams amounted to little. Here, Chris Miller explores why, arguing that Russia's ambitions have repeatedly outstripped its capacity. With the core of the nation concentrated thousands of miles away in the European borderlands, Russia's would-be pioneers have always struggled to project power into Asia and to maintain public and elite interest in their far-flung pursuits. Even when the wider population professed faith in Asia's promise, few Russians were willing to pay the steep price. Among leaders, too, dreams of empire have always been tempered by fears of cost. Most of Russia's pivots to Asia have therefore been halfhearted and fleeting. Today the Kremlin talks up the importance of "strategic partnership" with Xi Jinping's China, and Vladimir Putin's government is at pains to emphasize Russian activities across Eurasia. But while distance is covered with relative ease in the age of air travel and digital communication, the East remains far off in the ways that matter most. Miller finds that Russia's Asian dreams are still restrained by the country's firm rooting in Europe"--

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface: The Strongman Economy? -- Note on Transliteration -- 1 Putin's Economic Inheritance -- 2 Reforging the Russian State -- 3 Rise of the Energy Giants -- 4 Stabilizing Russia's Finances -- 5 Restructuring Russian Industry -- 6 Wages and Welfare -- 7 From Crisis to Crisis -- 8 Putinomics under Pressure -- Postscript: Can Putinomics Survive? -- Acknowledgments -- Suggestions for Further Reading -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z

Asian pivot: the roots of Soviet economic reform -- Take off or leap forward?: Soviet assessments of China after Mao -- Gorbachev's gamble: interest group politics and perestroika -- Soviet industry, Sichuan style: Gorbachev's enterprise reforms -- A Soviet Shenzhen?: copying China's special economic zones -- Of subsidies and sovkhozes: restructuring Soviet agriculture -- Fiscal crisis, the Tiananmen option, and the dissolution of the USSR -- Conclusion: paths not taken?

While the US and China battle for technological supremacy, the European Commission has been misunderstanding the nature of the struggle. Intervening in supply chains is the wrong approach. (IPQ)

This article examines shifts in Soviet ideas about the economic and political role of the state. Drawing on documents from Russian archives as well as published debates, the article traces Soviet ideas about how states operate. Examining the role of writers such as Fedor Burlatsky and Karen Brutents, the article suggests that by the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet analysts increasingly believed that state structures could be self-interested, functioning as a type of class. Soviet scholars concluded that such self-interested state structures explained some of what they perceived as the failures of third-world economic development—as well as some of the pathologies of the USSR's own politics.