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It may seem obvious that happiness is valuable, but is it the only thing valuable for its own sake, as opposed to being useful as a way to get something else? The 19th-century utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) argues that it is.[1] His argument is notorious because some critics charge that it contains obvious errors. This essay considers whether Mill really makes elementary blunders.

Harriet Taylor Mill (1807–1858) poses a unique set of problems for an encyclopedist. The usual approach to writing an entry on a historical figure, namely presenting a straightforward summary of her major works and then offering a few words of appraisal, cannot be carried out in her case. This is because she worked in such close collaboration with John Stuart Mill that it is exceedingly difficult to disentangle her contributions to the products of their joint effort from his, and the few pieces that we can declare without fear of contradiction to have been written primarily by her—some of which are published, some not—are philosophically slight. In attempting to assess Taylor Mill's philosophical career, one encounters sharply conflicting reports about her intellect from people who knew her, contradictory evidence about what if any important philosophical works belong to her corpus as an author, and widely varying judgments about how much influence she exerted on Mill's thought and work.

In the fourteenth paragraph of the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism, J. S. Mill writes that 'We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.' I criticize the attempts of three commentators who have recently presented act-utilitarian readings of Mill – Roger Crisp, David Brink, and Piers Norris Turner – to accommodate this passage.

AbstractWhile it may not be surprising that Mill's proposal for a "plural voting" scheme that would award more votes to citizens with more education has few contemporary supporters, it is surprising that so many interpreters take him to regard plural voting as merely a temporary measure meant to ease the transition from restricted to universal suffrage. Contra Amy Gutmann, Maria Morales, Wendy Donner, David Brink, Wendy Sarvasy, Bruce Baum, and Jonathan Riley, I argue that Mill believes that plural voting should always accompany universal suffrage and thus that it should be in place indefinitely.

In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" according to which the essay advances the thesis that good consequences are the "wrong kind of reason" to justify "practices of punishment and moral responsibility." Darwall names this thesis "Strawson's Point." I argue for a different reading of Strawson, one according to which he holds this thesis only in a qualified way and, more generally, is not the unequivocal critic of consequentialism that Darwall makes him out to be. In fact, I contend, Strawson's account of the reactive attitudes can potentially be a useful resource for consequentialists.

This book offers a clear and highly readable introduction to the ethical and social-political philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Dale E. Miller argues for a "utopian" reading of Mill's utilitarianism. He analyses Mill's views on happiness and goes on to show the practical, social and political implications that can be drawn from his utilitarianism, especially in relation to the construction of morality, individual freedom, democratic reform, and economic organization. By highlighting the utopian thinking which lies at the heart of Mill's theories, Miller shows that rather than allowing for well-being for the few, Mill believed that a society must do everything in its power to see to it that each individual can enjoy a genuinely happy life if the happiness of its members is to be maximized. Miller provides a cogent and careful account of the main arguments offered by Mill, considers the critical responses to his work, and assesses its legacy for contemporary philosophy. [From Amazon.com] ; https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_books/1008/thumbnail.jpg

In this article, I argue that the reading of Mill that D.G. Brown presents in 'Mill's Moral Theory: Ongoing Revisionism' is inconsistent with several key passages in Mill's writings. I also show that a rule-utilitarian interpretation that is very close to the one developed by David Lyons is able to account for these passages without difficulty.

Insofar as John Stuart Mill can be accurately described as a socialist, his is a socialism that a classical liberal ought to be able to live with, if not to love. Mill's view is that capitalist economies should at some point undergo a `spontaneous' and incremental process of socialization, involving the formation of worker-controlled `socialistic' enterprises through either the transformation of `capitalistic' enterprises or creation de novo. This process would entail few violations of core libertarian principles. It would proceed by way of a series of voluntary transactions. Capitalists' property rights would be respected throughout. The process would take place within a national system of laws that permits private ownership of productive property and competition, and would not result in that system's overthrow. And, if we accept some basic tenets of Mill's social philosophy, the outcome at which we should expect the process to arrive is a `patchwork' economy in which capitalistic and socialistic enterprises exist side by side.

Insofar as John Stuart Mill can be accurately described as a socialist, his is a socialism that a classical liberal ought to be able to live with, if not to love. Mill's view is that capitalist economies should at some point undergo a 'spontaneous' & incremental process of socialization, involving the formation of worker-controlled 'socialistic' enterprises through either the transformation of 'capitalistic' enterprises or creation de novo. This process would entail few violations of core libertarian principles. It would proceed by way of a series of voluntary transactions. Capitalists' property rights would be respected throughout. The process would take place within a national system of laws that permits private ownership of productive property & competition, & would not result in that system's overthrow. &, if we accept some basic tenets of Mill's social philosophy, the outcome at which we should expect the process to arrive is a `patchwork' economy in which capitalistic & socialistic enterprises exist side by side. [Copyright 2003 Sage Publications, Ltd.]

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Preface -- Note on Citations -- Part I Mill's Autobiography and Biography -- Chapter 1 Mill's Mind: A Biographical Sketch -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2 Mill's Epiphanies -- 1. First Epiphany -- 2. Second Epiphany -- 3. Bentham's Two Faces -- 4. From Revolution to Reform -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3 The Afterlife of John Stuart Mill, 1874-1879 -- 1. Immortalizing Mill -- 2. Religious Controversy -- 3. The Character Question -- 4. Politics -- 5. Helen Taylor and the Chapters on Socialism -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Further Reading -- Chapter 4 Mill's Autobiography as Literature -- 1. An Artifact -- 2. In a Genre -- 3. Necessary Form -- 4. Summary -- References -- Part II Influences on Mill's Thought -- Chapter 5 Mill and the Classics -- 1. Plato's Moral Quandary -- 2. Reforming Plato's Dialectic -- 3. Regenerating Human Agency -- 4. Athens and Sparta -- 5. Spartan Moral Education -- 6. The Athenian Will -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 6 Roots of Mill's Radicalism -- 1. Radical Practice -- 2. Philosophic Radicalism -- 3. Bentham and Radical Democracy -- 4. Bentham's Philosophic Radicalism -- 5. Mill's Revision of Radicalism -- 6. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 7 British Critics of Utilitarianism -- 1. Becoming Acquainted: Mill, Coleridge, Maurice and Sterling -- 2. Maurice and Sterling: Assailants of Benthamism -- 3. Coleridge's Clerisy -- 4. Carlylean Corpuscles -- 5. Macaulay's Assault -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 8 Harriet Taylor Mill -- 1. Early Life, First Meeting, and Friendship -- 2. Paris and the Great Utilitarian Compromise -- 3. Withdrawal from Society and Socialism -- 4. Marriage, Death, and Religion -- Notes -- References -- Further Reading -- Chapter 9 The French Influence

Utilitarianism, the approach to ethics based on the maximization of overall well-being, continues to have great traction in moral philosophy and political thought. This Companion offers a systematic exploration of its history, themes, and applications. First, it traces the origins and development of utilitarianism via the work of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and others. The volume then explores issues in the formulation of utilitarianism, including act versus rule utilitarianism, actual versus expected consequences, and objective versus subjective theories of well-being. Next, utilitarianism is positioned in relation to Kantianism and virtue ethics, and the possibility of conflict between utilitarianism and fairness is considered. Finally, the volume explores the modern relevance of utilitarianism by considering its practical implications for contemporary controversies such as military conflict and global warming. The volume will be an important resource for all those studying moral philosophy, political philosophy, political theory, and history of ideas.