Suchergebnisse

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part thismay be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation and institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferencesfor institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, and budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes and impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world ofpolitics.

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part, this may be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation & institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferences for institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, & budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes & impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world of politics. 34 References. Adapted from the source document.

The state has, since its origins, been characterized both by the production of public goods & a competition for the surplus benefits generated by the creation of those goods. Holmstrom's (1982) analysis of an impossibility result leads to the conclusion that this problem is logically inescapable. There is no process for exactly allocating the benefits of an interdependent social process that eliminates moral hazard. Further, morally hazardous behavior can undermine the efficiency of the processes that generate the benefits. In both firms & states, therefore, the credible constraint of morally hazardous behavior is a fundamental concern. In both forms of social organization, delegation to bureaucracy can enhance efficiency by creating barriers between those actors with moral hazard & the producers of the benefits. The characteristics of Weberian bureaucracy, including rational/legal constraints & autonomous professional norms, serve to insulate bureaucrats from efficiency-undermining political pressures. This perspective provides support for concerns of the century-old Progressive reform tradition, which wanted to place bureaucrats "above politics." It stands in contrast to the more recent principal/agency perspective, which argues that the fundamental problem is the creation of incentive systems that make bureaucratic subordinates increasingly responsive to the preferences of political superiors. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

Receiving unsolicited commercial email, also known as "Spam," is like receiving junk mail, postage due. Spam shifts the cost of advertising from the advertiser to the consumer. This imposes enormous costs on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and their customers. The Spam problem cries out for a legislative solution, and that is why I introduced H.R. 2162, the "Can Spam Act." The source of the Spam moniker for unsolicited commercial e-mail is apparently attributed to an annoying song in a Monty Python skit. In the skit, actors dressed like Vikings sing the word "Spam" over and over again, becoming louder and louder throughout the skit, until none of the players can hear each other. Finally, the singing Vikings drown everything out and the skit ends. Unsolicited commercial e-mail is also annoying background noise that is growing louder. The concern is that Spam will finally drown out legitimate e-mail on the Internet.

Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession