Committees, agendas, and voting
In: Fundamentals of pure and applied economics 58
In: Political science and economics section 58
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In: Fundamentals of pure and applied economics 58
In: Political science and economics section 58
In: Public choice, Band 198, Heft 1-2, S. 153-159
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 113-124
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 173, Heft 1-2, S. 91-108
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Scandinavian political studies, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 4-25
ISSN: 1467-9477
It has been shown by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, using several empirical examples under the Danish electoral system, that proportional representation (PR) can produce 'election inversions' such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, Kurrild-Klitgaard's examples result from imperfections in the Danish PR system introduced to serve goals other than proportionality. In this article, Kurrild-Klitgaard's analysis is carried a step further by showing that election inversions can occur even under the purest type of PR - namely, one with (i) a single national constituency, (ii) no explicit seat threshold, and (iii) a highly proportional electoral formula. Inversions result from the unavoidable 'whole number problem'. Recent election data from Israel and the Netherlands is examined and examples of inversions under their relatively pure PR systems are found. Inversions are also found after recalculating seat allocations without a threshold, and on the basis of the most proportional electoral formulas and when the analysis is restricted to seat-winning parties. Kurrild-Klitgaard's Danish data is then re-examined in the same fashion, as is the most recent apportionment of seats in the United States House of Representatives, and more examples of inversions are found. Adapted from the source document.
In: Scandinavian political studies: SPS ; a journal, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 4-25
ISSN: 0080-6757
In: Electoral Studies, Band 35, S. 265-271
In: Electoral Studies, Band 35, S. 265-271
Barthelemy et al. (2014), extending the work of Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003), show that some U.S. presidential elections are subject to a 'House size effect' in that the winner of the election, i.e., the candidate who wins a majority of electoral votes, depends on the size of the House of Representatives. The conditions for the effect relate to the number of 'Senate' versus 'House' electoral votes won by each candidate, but the relationship is not straightforward due to 'locally chaotic' effects in the apportionment of House seats among the states as House size changes. Clearly a Presidential election that is subject to the House size effect exhibits the referendum paradox, i.e., the electoral vote winner is the popular vote loser, for some House sizes but not for others. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
In: Public choice, Band 158, Heft 3-4, S. 399-425
ISSN: 1573-7101
This paper presents a social choice analysis, using simulated data based on English general elections from 1992 through 2010, of the properties of three voting rules: First-Past-the-Post, the Alternative Vote, and the Coombs Rule. More specifically, the paper examines (1) the plurality, anti-plurality, and Condorcet status of candidates in each election and the interrelationships among these statuses, (2) the effects of strict and partial single-peakedness of voter preferences, and (3) the identity of winners, Condorcet efficiency, and the relationship between votes and seats under the three voting rules. The analysis considers only the case of three candidates and, in the manner of basic social choice theory, the set of candidates and voter preferences over them are taken to be fixed. Adapted from the source document.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 265-271
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Public choice, Band 158, Heft 3, S. 399-425
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 158, Heft 3, S. 589-589
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 35, S. 265-271
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Public choice, Band 158, Heft 3-4, S. 589-589
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 158, Heft 3-4, S. 399-425
ISSN: 1573-7101