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Although scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators' focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators' attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non‐elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions.

Federal agencies award thousands of grants and contracts each year. Although we have considerable insight into the implications of these expenditures for politicians, we know little about their consequences for agencies. I develop a theory that links agency spending in citizens' states to their support of agency performance, with the expectation that this relationship is conditioned by citizen–agency ideological congruence. I contend that agency spending serves as an information shortcut for citizens when evaluating agencies because it is often visible in a way that other agency activities, such as regulatory decisions, are not. When a citizen fundamentally supports the policies and projects an agency is funding, the positive effect of spending may be enhanced. I find support for these expectations. This article contributes to our understanding of the ways in which expenditures shape opinion toward agencies, which is important given the significance of public sentiment for an agency's political survival.

The critical efforts of essential workers during the COVID-19 crisis might have important implications for how individuals view government, nonprofit, and for-profit sector workers and their pay. This article explores views of employees' pay considering three rationales (anticipated judgment, motivation for work, and competency in that work) that might lead to a lower valuation of work in the public and nonprofit sectors (i.e., lower pay rationales), particularly among those who work in the for-profit sector. However, highlighting a concrete way that public and non-profit employees serve the public, such as providing services during COVID-19, might mitigate this negative effect by showing their commitment to public service in an intuitive way. Our survey experiment provides evidence that activating the competency or motivation rationales lowers the likelihood that nonprofit employees are viewed as underpaid among those who work in the for-profit sector when a concrete example of public service is not provided. However, we also find some evidence that an example of public service can help to counteract these effects.

One of the most important events in U.S. congressional history is the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon. The rebellion had myriad ramifications for the inner workings of the House of Representatives and dramatically altered the chamber's power structure. Despite its significance, we do not have a clear understanding of the character of the revolt and why the 42 Republican insurgents revoked their allegiance to Cannon and their party. Did the insurgents rebel because of their strong progressive ideals or for more pragmatic reasons, such as political survival or retribution? Using data gathered from Cannon's personal papers and other sources, we systematically explore disparate explanations credited for the revolt. For the progressive core of the insurgency, our analysis indicates that policy differences drove their behavior. These early insurgents were later joined by a group of less progressive members who appear to have supported the rebellion for electoral and retaliative reasons. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

One of the most important events in U.S. congressional history is the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon. The rebellion had myriad ramifications for the inner workings of the House of Representatives and dramatically altered the chamber's power structure. Despite its significance, we do not have a clear understanding of the character of the revolt and why the 42 Republican insurgents revoked their allegiance to Cannon and their party. Did the insurgents rebel because of their strong progressive ideals or for more pragmatic reasons, such as political survival or retribution? Using data gathered from Cannon's personal papers and other sources, we systematically explore disparate explanations credited for the revolt. For the progressive core of the insurgency, our analysis indicates that policy differences drove their behavior. These early insurgents were later joined by a group of less progressive members who appear to have supported the rebellion for electoral and retaliative reasons.

AbstractThe theory of representative bureaucracy posits that citizens will view policy and service delivery more favorably if public servants share their background characteristics. However, automation is changing public service delivery, limiting human involvement in the process. We examine attitudes toward automated decision making through the lens of representative bureaucracy, generating expectations about how a lack of passive representation will affect views toward automated versus human decision making in government. Using a survey experiment, we find evidence that black citizens are more likely to rate automated decision making higher, compared with police officers, on fairness and preference when exposed to a lack of passive representation in a police agency. We do not find evidence of this relationship for white citizens. Our findings provide insight into the way in which passive representation conditions minority citizens' views toward automation, highlighting the importance of considering representation, or lack thereof, as governments contemplate the adoption of automated services.

AbstractResearch indicates that administrative burden influences the behaviors and views of clients and potential clients of government programs. However, administrative burden may also shape mass attitudes toward government programs. Taking a behavioral public administration approach, the authors consider whether and how exposure to information about administrative burden embedded within eligibility‐based programs influences citizen favorability toward those programs. It is hypothesized that if information about the existing screening mechanisms is highlighted and made salient, this will lead to greater approval of eligibility‐based programs. This expectation is evaluated using a survey experiment that explores administrative burden in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The evidence shows that being exposed to information about administrative burden increases favorability toward TANF and its recipients, though these effects are conditional on party identification. The results provide insight into a potential consequence of administrative burden, showing the way in which information regarding burden can shape citizens' support for eligibility‐based programs.

AbstractWe seek to understand the incentives facing Congress members to hold executive agencies accountable. Specifically, we explore whether Congress members are rewarded for taking politically costly oversight actions. We evaluate the effect of oversight activities on citizens' evaluations of Congress members, taking into account the member's partisanship, the citizen's partisanship and agency ideology. Using a survey experiment, we find evidence that citizens' evaluations of members are affected by the members' oversight activity, with both copartisan and cross-party members rewarded for oversight efforts. Politically costly actions against ally agencies, however, do not appear to be rewarded to a greater extent by copartisans. These results provide insight into the way in which citizens interpret oversight activities by Congress members, suggesting that while good governance actions hold value for citizens, costly oversight actions aimed at ally agencies are not rewarded by copartisan citizens more than politically expedient oversight actions.

There is substantial evidence that citizen assessments of political actors and associated institutions are shaped by shared partisanship. However, much of this evidence comes from citizen evaluations of political actors who are policy generalists—officials elected with broad policy jurisdictions (e.g., chief executives and legislators). We suggest that citizen assessments of policy specialists—officials elected with relatively narrow policy jurisdictions (e.g., labor commissioners and education secretaries)—may be shaped to a lesser degree by shared partisan leanings than evaluations of policy generalists. Using a survey experiment, we find evidence that, among out-partisans, favorable performance information has a greater positive effect for specialists than generalists, highlighting one way in which shared partisanship may be less influential for evaluations of specialists. These results may help to provide insight into the diversity of partisanship we see across policy generalists and specialists within the same governments and have potential implications for accountability.

While previous research has explored how performance data can influence organizations and considered the factors that shape public managers' use of performance data, we know less about the way in which individual bureaucrats respond to performance information. Considerable research illustrates the power of peer information in a variety of contexts, including energy use, voting, and charitable giving. We suggest that public employees may adjust their behavior in response to information about how their performance compares with their peers. Providing peer information to public employees allows for learning. If alerted to an unflattering comparison, public employees might be motivated to alter their behavior. Using the case of administrative law judges in the Social Security Disability programs, we find evidence that is consistent with the expectation that individual bureaucrats respond to peer information. This study provides insight into whether and how public managers can harness the power of peer information.