Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Coordination mandates are used to steer collective action between local government agencies. When higher levels of government allow agencies to choose how to work together, the organizational forms and institutional arrangements they adopt likely influences their ability to achieve mandated coordinated outcomes. How group-level interactions influence achievement of coordinated outcomes is not well understood. California's Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) provides opportunity to shed light on this topic. SGMA is a state-legislative mandate that requires local agencies who share groundwater basins to undertake groundwater sustainability planning. The mandate affords agencies leeway in deciding how they engage with one another so long as they meet multiple requirements for coordinated outcomes. Drawing on institutional theories of collective action and ethnographic data collected from 2018 to 2022, we employ multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis to examine how configurations of organizational forms and institutional arrangements adopted by agencies in eighteen groundwater basins influenced their achievement of coordinated outcomes. Our findings highlight the importance of adopting collaborative institutional arrangements. Yet, the specific configuration of collaborative institutional arrangements varies depending on the type of coordinated outcomes agencies are mandated to achieve. These findings point to the need for mandates to require adoption of collaborative institutional arrangements, the specific configurations of which will be dictated by the requirements of the mandate.

As reliance on groundwater increases, the impact of groundwater-intensive use in internationally shared aquifers threatens not only to create negative environmental and economic externalities, but also to generate tensions between neighboring nations. Through an investigation of the shared Santa Cruz aquifer, located along the United States—Mexico border, we aim to understand factors leading to effective management of transboundary groundwaters. Specifically, we find that purely state-centric approaches provide limited explanatory value, and instead examine how national (domestic) arrangements for water management condition a country's position vis-à-vis its shared groundwaters. Polycentricism in national and subnational institutional regimes leads to gaps and overlaps in authority, limiting binational groundwater management. Concurrently, evolving institutional arrangements lead to ambiguity in decision making, yet crucially also provide opportunities for innovation in binational agenda setting and data sharing, which in turn aid in the alignment of both countries' priorities for the transboundary Santa Cruz aquifer.

Abstract
A critical question in relation to inter-agency coordination is not only whether, but how, to coordinate. This question is particularly salient when agencies are subject to a top-down mandate. While inter-agency coordination can provide multiple benefits, agencies frequently have concerns about the potential risks of coordination. Differing coordination mechanisms may reduce or exacerbate those concerns. Depending on their coordination concerns, agencies will be inclined to favor certain mechanisms over others. Examination of the implementation of California's Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which mandates local agency coordination, indicates that coordination mechanism selection is influenced by which combination of concerns agencies hold, with autonomy considerations taking priority over other concerns. These findings suggest opportunities to improve the explanatory power of theories of inter-agency coordination by incorporating potential hierarchies of concerns, their distribution across the multiple agencies tasked with coordinating, and configurational effects. To this end, we propose a contingency theory of agency concerns and coordination mechanism choice under a mandate to coordinate.

Despite pressures to improve performance and reduce costs, innovation in the municipal wastewater sector in the United States has been notoriously slow. Previous research has suggested that wastewater utility managers may see regulation as a barrier to developing and deploying new technologies. To better understand how environmental regulation may fuel or hinder innovation in this sector, we conducted a nationwide survey of wastewater utility managers and wastewater regulators in the United States, asking both populations about their perceptions of specific aspects of regulation and innovation. Survey results revealed broad agreement between the two groups that funding and capacity, regulatory relationships, and complexities and inconsistencies within the regulatory environment present key barriers to and opportunities for enabling increased innovation in the municipal wastewater sector. While utility managers perceived almost all aspects of regulation as stronger barriers and opportunities than regulators did, both groups ranked them similarly. These results are promising evidence of common ground between wastewater regulators and municipal wastewater utility managers, and suggest shared views of key leverage points for encouraging innovation. Notably, neither regulators nor utility managers viewed reducing regulatory stringency as a productive way to encourage the deployment of new technologies. Rather, our survey results suggest that improving relationships and communication between utility managers and regulators, along with additional funding support for increased capacity of both utilities and regulators, would be more fruitful ways to encourage innovation in the municipal wastewater sector.

In many areas of the world, groundwater resources are increasingly stressed, and unsustainable use has become common. Where existing mechanisms for governing groundwater are ineffective or nonexistent, new ones need to be developed. Local level groundwater governance provides an intriguing alternative to top-down models, with the promise of enabling management to better match the diversity of physical and social conditions in groundwater basins. One such example is emerging in California, USA, where new state law requires new local agencies to self-organize and act to achieve sustainable groundwater management. In this article, we draw on insights from research on common pool resource management and natural resources governance to develop guidelines for institutional design for local groundwater governance, grounded in California's developing experience. We offer nine criteria that can be used as principles or standards in the evaluation of institutional design for local level groundwater governance: scale, human capacity, funding, authority, independence, representation, participation, accountability, and transparency. We assert that local governance holds promise as an alternative to centralized governance in some settings but that its success will depend heavily on the details of its implementation. Further, for local implementation to achieve its promise, there remain important complementary roles for centralized governance. California's developing experience with local level groundwater management in dozens of basins across the state provides a unique opportunity to test and assess the importance and influence of these criteria.

In many areas of the world, groundwater resources are increasingly stressed, and unsustainable use has become common. Where existing mechanisms for governing groundwater are ineffective or nonexistent, new ones need to be developed. Local level groundwater governance provides an intriguing alternative to top-down models, with the promise of enabling management to better match the diversity of physical and social conditions in groundwater basins. One such example is emerging in California, USA, where new state law requires new local agencies to self-organize and act to achieve sustainable groundwater management. In this article, we draw on insights from research on common pool resource management and natural resources governance to develop guidelines for institutional design for local groundwater governance, grounded in California's developing experience. We offer nine criteria that can be used as principles or standards in the evaluation of institutional design for local level groundwater governance: scale, human capacity, funding, authority, independence, representation, participation, accountability, and transparency. We assert that local governance holds promise as an alternative to centralized governance in some settings but that its success will depend heavily on the details of its implementation. Further, for local implementation to achieve its promise, there remain important complementary roles for centralized governance. California's developing experience with local level groundwater management in dozens of basins across the state provides a unique opportunity to test and assess the importance and influence of these criteria.