How do developing states decide who gets access to public goods like electricity, water, and education? Power and the Vote breaks new ground by showing that the provision of seemingly universal public goods is intricately shaped by electoral priorities. In doing so, this book introduces new methods using high-resolution satellite imagery to study the distribution of electricity across and within the developing world. Combining cross-national evidence with detailed sub-national analysis and village-level data from India, Power and the Vote affirms the power of electoral incentives in shaping the distribution of public goods and challenges the view that democracy is a luxury of the rich with little relevance to the world's poor
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We inventory more than 150 studies of distributive politics in more than three dozen countries other than the United States. We organize existing studies under two theories: theories of democratic accountability and theories of government responsiveness. Studies that concern democratic accountability conceptualize distributive allocations as attempts by politicians to protect themselves electorally by targeting specific groups of voters. We identify four subsets: (a) studies of whether politicians target goods to core or swing voters; (b) studies of general political favoritism in targeting government goods; (c) studies of whether goods are disbursed according to the electoral cycle; and (d) studies of whether elected officials gain votes from the disbursement of government goods. We illustrate each with examples from the literature. We then discuss distributive politics as responsiveness to the median voter. This perspective entails a focus on the redistributive consequences of government policy and investigates whether special interests capture a disproportionate share of goods coming from government. To illustrate the utility of both perspectives, we analyze original data on electricity provision in India's largest state.
We inventory more than 150 studies of distributive politics in more than three dozen countries other than the United States. We organize existing studies under two theories: theories of democratic accountability and theories of government responsiveness. Studies that concern democratic accountability conceptualize distributive allocations as attempts by politicians to protect themselves electorally by targeting specific groups of voters. We identify four subsets: (a) studies of whether politicians target goods to core or swing voters; (b) studies of general political favoritism in targeting government goods; (c) studies of whether goods are disbursed according to the electoral cycle; and (d) studies of whether elected officials gain votes from the disbursement of government goods. We illustrate each with examples from the literature. We then discuss distributive politics as responsiveness to the median voter. This perspective entails a focus on the redistributive consequences of government policy and investigates whether special interests capture a disproportionate share of goods coming from government. To illustrate the utility of both perspectives, we analyze original data on electricity provision in India's largest state. Adapted from the source document.
A critical question in the quantitative study of war is how to choose appropriate units of analysis. While most studies link wars to the sovereign states that fight them, several authors have recently offered alternative perspectives, focusing on the the properties of rebel organizations and armies or tracking events in fine-grained geographic spaces. We contribute to these developments by introducing a new dataset of wars fought from 1816-2001 on fixed territorial units of observation that conform to the grid of states in 2001. Compared to standard datasets, we expand the geographic purview to include states not recognized by the international system.We provide location codes that identify the territories on which conflicts are fought, which is especially important for the analysis of imperial wars and colonial rebellions. We also introduce a new typology of wars based upon the aims of warring parties rather than their status in the state system. This dataset is uniquely suited to explore new questions that cannot be addressed with other datasets. To illustrate, we test an institutionalist theory of war and show empirically that the types of wars fought in a territory depend on whether it is governed as a modern nation-state, an imperial dependency, or the center of an empire. (International Interactions/ FUB)
Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state's center. drawing on a new data set on ethnic power relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, the authors analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. the findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past. (World Politics / SWP)
Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state's center. drawing on a new data set on ethnic power relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, the authors analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. the findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past. Adapted from the source document.
Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. Other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state's center. Drawing on a new data set on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, the authors analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. The findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.
"In der quantitativen Bürgerkriegsforschung ist seit langem umstritten, ob ethnische Vielfalt die Wahrscheinlichkeit bewaffneter Auseinandersetzungen beeinflusst. In dem Beitrag gehen die Autoren über diese Debatte hinaus. Sie zeigen, dass ethnische Diversität als solche Gesellschaften nicht gewaltanfälliger macht, dass aber spezifische ethno-politische Machtkonfigurationen das Risiko bewaffneter Auseinandersetzungen erhöhen. Erstens sind Staaten, die weite Teile der Bevölkerung auf Grund ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit von der Herrschaft ausschließen, besonders anfällig für Rebellionen. Zweitens tragen Staaten, in denen sich mehrere ethnische Gruppen die Macht teilen, ein hohes Risiko, dass sich diese Gruppen untereinander bekämpfen. Drittens sind bewaffnete Sezessionskonflikte für inkohäsive Staaten, deren Bevölkerungsgruppen lange Zeit unter indirekter Herrschaft standen, besonders wahrscheinlich. Die Autoren überprüfen ihre Hypothesen mit Hilfe eines neuen Datensatzes 'Ethnic Power Relations' (EPR), der alle unabhängigen Staaten seit 1945 umfasst. Ihre Analyse zeigt, dass ethnische Politik, wenn sie erst einmal sinnvoll erhoben und gemessen wird, genauso zuverlässig über das Bürgerkriegsrisiko von Gesellschaften Auskunft gibt wie ihr ökonomischer Entwicklungsstand. Sie weisen dann mit Hilfe multinomialer logistischer Regressionen nach, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Rebellionen, Binnenkonflikten und Sezessionen in der Tat vom jeweiligen Maß der politischen Diskriminierung, der ethnischen Segmentierung des Zentrums und der Kohäsion einer Gesellschaft abhängen. Demgegenüber tragen ethnisch diverse Gesellschaften an sich kein besonders hohes Gewaltrisiko." (Autorenreferat)
There has been a phenomenal global increase in the proportion of women in politics in the last 20 years. While there is evidence that raising the share of women politicians has substantive impacts on the composition of government spending, there is scarcely any evidence of how it influences economic performance. We investigate this using comprehensive data on competitive elections to India's state legislative assemblies, exploiting close elections between men and women to isolate the causal effect of legislator gender in a regression discontinuity design. We identify significantly higher growth in economic activity in constituencies that elect women. Probing mechanisms, we find evidence that women legislators are less likely to be criminal and corrupt, more efficacious, and less vulnerable to political opportunism. We find no evidence of negative spillovers to neighbouring (male-led) constituencies, consistent with net growth.
There has been a phenomenal global increase in the proportion of women in politics in the last two decades, but there is no evidence of how this influences economic performance. We investigate this using data on competitive elections to India's state assemblies, leveraging close elections to isolate causal effects. We find significantly higher growth in economic activity in constituencies that elect women and no evidence of negative spillovers to neighbouring male-led constituencies, consistent with net growth. Probing mechanisms, we find that women legislators are less likely to be criminal and corrupt, more efficacious, and less vulnerable to political opportunism.
