Epidemic Spreading and Equilibrium Social Distancing in Heterogeneous Networks
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 258-287
ISSN: 2153-0793
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In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 258-287
ISSN: 2153-0793
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Working paper
International audience ; We study the optimal control of interbank contagion, when the government has complete information on interbank exposures. Financial institutions are prone to insolvency risk channeled through the network of exposures and to liquidity risk through bank runs. The government seeks to maximize, under budget constraints the total value of the financial system or, equivalently, to minimize the dead-weight loss induced by bank runs. The problem can be expressed as a convex optimization problem with a combinatorial aspect, tractable when the set of banks eligible for intervention is sufficiently, yet realistically, small
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International audience ; We study the optimal control of interbank contagion, when the government has complete information on interbank exposures. Financial institutions are prone to insolvency risk channeled through the network of exposures and to liquidity risk through bank runs. The government seeks to maximize, under budget constraints the total value of the financial system or, equivalently, to minimize the dead-weight loss induced by bank runs. The problem can be expressed as a convex optimization problem with a combinatorial aspect, tractable when the set of banks eligible for intervention is sufficiently, yet realistically, small
BASE
International audience ; We study the optimal control of interbank contagion, when the government has complete information on interbank exposures. Financial institutions are prone to insolvency risk channeled through the network of exposures and to liquidity risk through bank runs. The government seeks to maximize, under budget constraints the total value of the financial system or, equivalently, to minimize the dead-weight loss induced by bank runs. The problem can be expressed as a convex optimization problem with a combinatorial aspect, tractable when the set of banks eligible for intervention is sufficiently, yet realistically, small
BASE
SSRN
Working paper
International audience ; We study optimal equity infusions into a financial network prone to the risk of contagious failures, which may be due to insolvency or to bank runs by short term creditors. Bank runs can be triggered by failures of connected banks. Under complete information on interbank linkages, we show that the problem reduces to a combinatorial optimization problem. Subject to budget constraints, the government chooses the set of minimal cost whose survival induces the maximum network stability. Our results demonstrate that the optimal equity infusion might significantly mitigate failure contagion risk and stabilize the system. In the case of partial information on the network, the controllers' focus swiftly changes from preventing insolvencies to preventing runs by short term creditors.
BASE
International audience ; We study optimal equity infusions into a financial network prone to the risk of contagious failures, which may be due to insolvency or to bank runs by short term creditors. Bank runs can be triggered by failures of connected banks. Under complete information on interbank linkages, we show that the problem reduces to a combinatorial optimization problem. Subject to budget constraints, the government chooses the set of minimal cost whose survival induces the maximum network stability. Our results demonstrate that the optimal equity infusion might significantly mitigate failure contagion risk and stabilize the system. In the case of partial information on the network, the controllers' focus swiftly changes from preventing insolvencies to preventing runs by short term creditors.
BASE
International audience ; We study optimal equity infusions into a financial network prone to the risk of contagious failures, which may be due to insolvency or to bank runs by short term creditors. Bank runs can be triggered by failures of connected banks. Under complete information on interbank linkages, we show that the problem reduces to a combinatorial optimization problem. Subject to budget constraints, the government chooses the set of minimal cost whose survival induces the maximum network stability. Our results demonstrate that the optimal equity infusion might significantly mitigate failure contagion risk and stabilize the system. In the case of partial information on the network, the controllers' focus swiftly changes from preventing insolvencies to preventing runs by short term creditors.
BASE
International audience ; We study optimal equity infusions into a financial network prone to the risk of contagious failures, which may be due to insolvency or to bank runs by short term creditors. Bank runs can be triggered by failures of connected banks. Under complete information on interbank linkages, we show that the problem reduces to a combinatorial optimization problem. Subject to budget constraints, the government chooses the set of minimal cost whose survival induces the maximum network stability. Our results demonstrate that the optimal equity infusion might significantly mitigate failure contagion risk and stabilize the system. In the case of partial information on the network, the controllers' focus swiftly changes from preventing insolvencies to preventing runs by short term creditors.
BASE
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Working paper
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