Suchergebnisse

Intro -- European Citizenship after Brexit -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- Notes -- References -- 2 The Status of European Citizenship: An Overview -- 2.1 EU Citizenship: A Brief History -- 2.1.1 The Background -- 2.1.2 A Farewell to Traditional International Law -- 2.2 The Derivative Character of Union Citizenship -- 2.3 Entitlements Connected to the Status -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 3 A Sudden Loss of Rights -- 3.1 The Home Office's New Workload -- 3.2 From Expat to Post-European -- Notes -- References -- 4 Understanding Citizenship: The Functionalist Approach -- 4.1 Four Arguments in Favour of Theory -- 4.2 Applying Citizenship Theory to Brexit -- 4.2.1 The Functionalist Theory -- 4.2.2 How Can it be Applied to Brexit? -- Notes -- References -- 5 Can Rights Be Frozen? -- 5.1 Lessons from International Law -- 5.1.1 Duty to Negotiate Solutions -- 5.1.2 Duty to Inform -- 5.1.3 Right to Option -- 5.2 Saving Citizens' Rights? -- 5.2.1 The Kurić Doctrine -- 5.2.2 Residence Rights in the EU -- 5.3 The Wrong Saviour? -- Notes -- References -- 6 Who Gets to Withdraw the Status? -- 6.1 Who Gets to Withdraw Union Citizenship? -- 6.2 Limits of Public International Law -- 6.3 EU Law Limits to State Discretion -- 6.3.1 Resisting Temptation -- 6.3.2 Consequences for the UK -- 6.3.3 Consequences for Member States -- 6.4 To Challenge Loss of Status -- 6.5 Enacting Union Citizenship -- Notes -- References -- 7 Towards a Functionalist Reading of Union Citizenship -- Notes -- References -- Index.

European Union; politics; citizenship

The theme of "citizenship" has become very topical once again. Who should be considered a citizen? What does it mean to be a citizen? What are the mechanisms regulating inclusion and exclusion from citizenship? How can these mechanisms be justified and criticized? Using a multidisciplinary approach, the volume presents some studies on citizenship, moving across political science, case-law and social sciences. The aim of the volume is to reconstruct the debate, with references to empirical cases, and, on the basis of conceptual analysis, to enable a discussion on the main models of citizenship and on the different forms they have taken on in history. The suggested functional theory provides a tool to establish whether the attribution of the said status is justified or not.

The relationship between law and politics is one of the most debated topics in legal theory. There is no consensus on the range and scope of the political and the legal element in law. Legislation or lawmaking is conceptually ambiguous because it indicates the law which has been promulgated, and therefore the primary object of many modern theories of law, but also the process of making it, that many theories of law usually locate outside the scope of jurisprudence and more specifically in the realm of politics. The first section sets the problem of legislation by distinguishing a number of different problems that often appear indistinctly under this label. Standpoints can be viewed according to a spectrum stretching from legal theories holding politics to essentially permeate the law to those claiming the opposite. The aim is to situate Hägerström's view on law-making along this spectrum. My claim is that Scandinavian realism holds middle ground in that ideological constructs structurally affect the law yet legal normativity cannot be reduced to the will of de facto holders of power: law cannot be reduced to any idea of will, including that of the majority or of the people. To substantiate this claim the article investigates Hägerström's view on the foundation of a new constitution pursuant to a political revolution, the ultimate touchstone for maintaining the (in)distinctiveness of law and politics. His bottom line is that the problem cannot be explained in terms of discovery of public interest, because of his non-cognitivist approach. But it cannot be explained in terms of decision-making either. Law-making here amounts to access and control of technical procedures grounded in a form of faith, or in his own terms "ideas governing men's minds". ; civis sum WAF 2015-2020

The article considers what arbitrary law-making is and what may count as arbitrary law-making in the field of migration policy. It contributes to the discussion of arbitrary law-making in relation to migration policy in two ways. First, it offers an analysis of arbitrariness, pointing out that rhetorical definitions abound – perhaps not surprisingly, given that migration is a highly-contested policy area – and argues for why transposing a conception developed in ethical theory to the law has high theoretical costs. An alternative conception is described and found to be better equipped to deal with arbitrary law-making in migration policy. It is argued that if we want to understand how arbitrariness plays out in the field of migration law – which is necessary to find ways to hinder its spread by the adoption of specific law-making practices – we first need to distinguish arbitrariness from legitimate choices of legislators. Secondly, a typology of forms of arbitrariness is fleshed out in relation to contemporary migration policy. The policy area is here broadly construed to include not only naturalisation processes, but also migration, asylum and refugee policies and more generally border control. The examples are taken from a broad selection of countries. They have been chosen for illustrative purposes only. ; Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, KAW 2014 0133

Does the regulation of migration constitute a blatant case of arbitrary law-making? What is arbitrary law-making? And how does it manifest itself in contemporary migration policy? These are pressing issues that the scholars who come together in this special issue seek to engage with, by exploring international migration from the point of view of arbitrary power. When does legitimate state discretion slide into an exercise of arbitrary power? Since we cannot address what we do not understand, the urgency of the matter addressed in this special issue speaks for itself. Deciding who may enjoy the right of abode, the right to remain, the right to asylum and to citizenship is a key power of the state: it is a regal prerogative, an act of sovereignty, limited only by deliberately accepted commitments, such as the respect for human rights. This makes migration policy an exceptionally interesting ground to test the limits of discretion and the forms of arbitrariness. Power can be understood to be of a discretional nature if it acts freely within the boundaries defined by law, whereas arbitrariness qualifies discretional power exceeding the limits of law.

The relationship between law and politics is one of the most debated topics in legal theory. There is no consensus on the range and scope of the political and the legal element in law. Legislation or lawmaking is conceptually ambiguous because it indicates the law which has been promulgated, and therefore the primary object of many modern theories of law, but also the process of making it, that many theories of law usually locate outside the scope of jurisprudence and more specifically in the realm of politics. The first section sets the problem of legislation by distinguishing a number of different problems that often appear indistinctly under this label. Standpoints can be viewed according to a spectrum stretching from legal theories holding politics to essentially permeate the law to those claiming the opposite. The aim is to situate Hägerström's view on law-making along this spectrum. My claim is that Scandinavian realism holds middleground in that ideological constructs structurally affect the law yet legal normativity cannot be reduced to the will of de facto holders of power: law cannot be reduced to any idea of will, including that of the majority or of the people. To substantiate this claim the article investigates Hägerström's view on the foundation of a new constitution pursuant to a political revolution, the ultimate touchstone for maintaining the (in)distinctiveness of law and politics. His bottom line is that the problem cannot be explained in terms of discovery of public interest, because of his non-cognitivist approach. But it cannot be explained in terms of decision-making either. Law-making here amounts to access and control of technical procedures grounded in a form of faith, or in his own terms "ideas governing men's minds". ; La relación entre derecho y política es uno de los temas más debatidos en la teoría del derecho. No hay un consenso sobre el alcance y extensión del elemento político y del elemento jurídico en el derecho. Legislación es un concepto ambiguo porque designa a la ley que ha sido promulgada, y, por tanto, el objeto primario de muchas teorías jurídicas modernas; pero también el proceso de crearla, el cual muchas teorías del derecho, por lo general, colocan fuera del ámbito de la teoría del derecho y, de modo más específico, en la esfera política. La primera sección plantea el problema de la legislación al distinguir un número de diferentes problemas que a menudo aparecen indistintamente bajo esta etiqueta. Los distintos puntos de vista pueden mirarse de acuerdo con un espectro que va desde teorías jurídicas que sostienen que la política permea la ley de manera esencial, hasta aquellas que sostienen lo contrario. El objetivo es situar en este espectro la perspectiva de Hägerström acerca de la legislación. Mi postura es que el realismo escandinavo se mantiene en un punto medio entre la idea de que las construcciones ideológicas afectan al derecho y aquella en que la normatividad jurídica no puede reducirse a la voluntad de quienes, de facto, detentan el poder; así, el derecho no puede reducirse a ninguna idea de "voluntad" o "intención", incluyendo a aquellas de la mayoría o el pueblo. Para fundamentar este argumento, este artículo investiga la perspectiva de Hägerström acerca del establecimiento de una nueva constitución a través de una revolución política, última piedra de toque para mantener la (in)distintividad de la ley y la política. Su conclusión es que el problema no se puede explicar en términos del descubrimiento del interés público, debido a su enfoque nocognitivista; pero este tampoco puede ser explicado en términos de la toma de decisiones. Aquí legislar equivale al acceso y control de procedimientos técnicos basados en una forma de fe, o en sus términos propios, "ideas que gobiernan las mentes de los hombres".

In this chapter I explore what happens to British nationals after Brexit in relation to EU citizenship. Some Union citizens will lose their "fundamental status" (to speak with the ECJ) in 2019: all British nationals of exclusively British nationality. The problems faced by British citizens resident in member states of the European Union after Brexit and British nationals living in the UK (and their family members) are in focus. In the first section I tell my own life story: the tale of an EU citizen with the view to present the highlights of the derivative status of EU citizenship. This way we can appreciate better what Brexit challenges. In the second section, focus is on the legal uncertainty afflicting British citizens turning from expats to post-European third country nationals. In the third section, I discuss why we are facing an automatic collective loss of citizenship that will affect all British nationals of exclusively British nationality, irrespective of place of residence. In the last section, I present some ideas that have come up during the negotiations and that constitute a different, yet quite peculiar constitutional eyesore that has not yet received the attention it merits, that risk turning British nationals into a lesser kind of EU citizens. ; KAW CIVIS SUM

El ciudadano es el «elemento simple de una forma de gobierno», en palabras de Aristóteles. La ciudadanía aparece, de este modo, como el preámbulo de otros problemas fundamentales relativos a las políticas públicas y al constitucionalismo. Nos vemos confrontados ahora con un concepto triple de ciudadanía, y necesitamos entender cómo se halla constituido a fin de ponderar algunas tendencias recientes en la aproximación al concepto de ciudadanía, la condición nacional de tercer país y la participación cívica. Una buena herramienta para analizar esto es la ciudadanía de la U E. Puede rendirse cuenta de los tres modelos que se combinan hoy en la ciudadanía de la UE considerando al concepto opuesto de «conjunto de ciudadanos». Al enfatizar la inclusión, el centro de atención desde un punto de vista sociológico es el sujeto marginado, la migración y las políticas de asilo. El derecho y la jurisprudencia estudian la ciudadanía tratando de limitar los numerosos casos difíciles que surgen en un mundo de migraciones, donde el opuesto del ciudadano es aún el extranjero. El modelo político presenta al sujeto (sujet) en oposición al ciudadano (citoyen), ocasionando problemas relacionados con la cualidad democrática de las instituciones de la UE. Estos diferentes criterios tienden a solaparse en el debate actual, engendrando confusiones. Como resultado de la erosión de la nacionalidad tradicional, enfrentamos ahora una colcha de retazos a nivel legal, lo cual produce un conjunto de casos difíciles. Sobre la base de una fuerte tradición filosófica, este ensayo propone un posible método para tender un puente entre estos tres criterios, arrojando nuevas luces sobre el proceso de construcción de la ciudadanía trasnacional.AbstractThe citizen is the «simple element of a polity», as Aristotle put it. Citizenship thus appears as prolegomena to other core questions concerning public policy and constitutionalism. We now deal with a threefold concept of citizenship and we need to understand how it is built up in order to assess some recent trends on citizenship, third country national status and civic participation. A good test for analyzing this is EU citizenship. The three models today merging in EU citizenship can be accounted for by looking at the opposite of «citizenry». By emphasizing inclusiveness, the sociological focus is on the marginalized subject, migration and asylum policies. Law and jurisprudence look at citizenship by trying to limit the numerous hard cases arising in a world of migration where the opposite of the citizen is still the alien. The political model holds the subject (sujet) in opposition to the citizen (citoyen), entailing problems related to the democratic quality of EU institutions. These different standards tend to overlap in the current debate and this engenders misunderstandings. As a result of the erosion of traditional nationality, we now face a legal patchwork, which produces an array of hard cases. Building on a strong philosophical tradition, this essay suggests a possible method for bridging these three standards, shedding new light on transnational citizenship-building.

The paper explores forms of arbitrariness in relation to citizenship and migration policies. Non-national disenfranchisement follows from certain migration policies, and these may be cast as an arbitrary form of domination, that may undermine political legitimacy. Political exclusion is the vertex of a chain of other forms of exclusion: the denizenship of the politically powerless is particularly bothersome because liberal-democratic systems lack incentives to promote their rights. We have singled out the specificity and quaintness of the argumentative strategy employed to sustain non-national disenfranchisement. It differs from other argumentations in favour of disenfranchisement because it is not framed in derogatory terms and shifts the burden of proof from the state over to the individual.

To better understand what issues today's technologies raise in relation to political liberty, understood as self-determination, attention should shift from the level of contents of the Internet to its more basic architecture and governance (critical internet resources [CIR], protocols, governance ecology, etc.). Mainstream political science has for a long time eschewed the field of Internet governance. There is nonetheless an interesting debate on how we should handle this new world we have in common that is constituted by the infosphere. The paper shows why the debate on the control of the Internet is often misleading: too much attention on traditional institutional actors has obscured the fact that the «seats of power» are now elsewhere. In order to move within the private ordering that currently characterizes Internet governance, in a way that is respectful of fundamental rights, we need to rethink the relationships between social powers. ; Para entender mejor qué problemas plantea a día de hoy la tecnología en relación a las libertades políticas, entendidas como autodeterminación, la atención debe desplazarse desde el nivel de los contenidos de Internet hacia los elementos básicos que definen su arquitectura y gobernanza (CIR, protocolos, relaciones de poder, etc.). La ciencia política convencional ha ignorado durante mucho tiempo el campo del gobierno de Internet. A pesar de ello, existe un interesante debate sobre cómo se debe gestionar este nuevo mundo, constituido por la infoesfera, que tenemos en común. El artículo muestra por qué el debate sobre el control de Internet se plantea frecuentemente de manera errónea: al prestar demasiada atención a los actores institucionales tradicionales se ha obviado que los «asientos de poder» ahora se encuentran más repartidos. Para poder moverse a través del modelo de gestión privada que actualmente caracteriza Internet de una manera respetuosa con los derechos fundamentales hace falta repensar las relaciones entre los poderes sociales. ; English title in Web of Science: The private ordering of Internet governance: powers of self-determination at stake

The paper explores forms of arbitrariness in relation to citizenship and migration policies. Non-national disenfranchisement follows from certain migration policies, and these may be cast as an arbitrary form of domination, that may undermine political legitimacy. Political exclusion is the vertex of a chain of other forms of exclusion: the denizenship of the politically powerless is particularly bothersome because liberal-democratic systems lack incentives to promote their rights. We have singled out the specificity and quaintness of the argumentative strategy employed to sustain non-national disenfranchisement. It differs from other argumentations in favour of disenfranchisement because it is not framed in derogatory terms and shifts the burden of proof from the state over to the individual.