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Starting July the 1st 1997, Bulgaria adopted a Currency Board (CB) monetary system. This paper aims at investigating if the adoption of the CB monetary system, which involves the cost of loosing monetary autonomy, has provided a relatively better (with respect to other CEEC) monetary integration of Bulgaria with the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since Bulgarian monetary variables are endogenous under a CB, we focus on the ECB and FED interest rates as the main sources on monetary volatility. First, we find that ECB shocks are more rapidly absorbed and have less significant impact of domestic variables, with respect to other external monetary shocks (FED rate changes). Second, the responses of Bulgarian variables following changes in the ECB interest rate present lower persistence and significance, with respect to what the previous literature emphasized for other CEEC with monetary autonomy. This latter result still holds when accounting for different sources of cross-country heterogeneity outlined in the literature, thus supporting that the adoption of the CB may have worked as a rather good device in terms of integration of Bulgaria into the EMU.

International audience ; Although the empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth volatility highlights a robust stabilizing effect of democratic regimes compared to dictatorships, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining this stabilizing effect. We open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic regimes, and study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on macroeconomic volatility along five institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1975-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the stabilizing effect of democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster a more stable development path.

International audience ; Although the empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth volatility highlights a robust stabilizing effect of democratic regimes compared to dictatorships, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining this stabilizing effect. We open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic regimes, and study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on macroeconomic volatility along five institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1975-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the stabilizing effect of democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster a more stable development path.

International audience Although the empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth volatility highlights a robust stabilizing effect of democratic regimes compared to dictatorships, no study focused so far on identifying the precise political institutions explaining this stabilizing effect. We open the political institutions black-box associated to democratic regimes, and study the effects of disaggregated political institutions on macroeconomic volatility along five institutional dimensions, namely forms of government, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. Using a large panel of 140 countries over 1975-2007, we show that institutional details are of crucial importance, since the stabilizing effect of democracies depends on the precise institutional dimensions at work. Thus, our study contributes to the institutional design debate, by showing that the simple promotion of democratic regimes might not be sufficient to foster a more stable development path.

Nous utilisons des données issues d'enquêtes sur les ménages et auprès des organismes de réglementation bancaire, afin d'explorer l'impact de l'accès aux services financiers ( asf ) sur la pauvreté, sur un large échantillon de pays en développement. En contrôlant pour la présence d'un éventuel biais d'endogénéité à l'aide de la méthode des variables instrumentales, nous montrons que l' asf réduit significativement la pauvreté. Ce résultat, qui est robuste à l'utilisation de mesures alternatives d' asf ou de pauvreté, ainsi qu'à l'introduction de plusieurs variables de contrôle, milite en faveur d'une place primordiale pour l' asf dans la conception des Stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté.

Résumé Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons aux effets des déficits publics sur la croissance, dans un modèle de croissance endogène avec investissement public pouvant être financé par impôt ou dette publique. Nous nous focalisons sur la croissance de long terme et étudions la manière dont des déficits persistants influencent la croissance. Nous montrons que ces déficits réduisent toujours la croissance à long terme, indépendamment des règles budgétaires adoptées par le gouvernement.

We develop a simple theoretical growth model to deal with long term public debt, in accordance to stylized facts. We study the effect of a permanent increase in public debt on economic growth, and show that these effects, always negative (or neutral), depend in their magnitude on the adjustment variable to the increase of the debt burden in the Government constraint. Finally, we show that, contrary to economic growth effects, the welfare effects of a permanent increase in the debt burden may be positive. We thus emphasize the existence of an optimal public debt to GDP ratio. ; Nous proposons un modèle théorique simple permettant de prendre en compte l'existence de régimes d'endettement de long terme, en accord avec les faits saillants observés en longue période. Nous nous intéressons particulièrement aux effets d'une hausse permanente de la dette publique sur la croissance à long terme, et nous montrons que ces effets, toujours négatifs (on nuls), dépendent dans leur ampleur de la variable d'ajustement à la charge de la dette dans la contrainte budgétaire de l'Etat. Enfin, nous montrons qu'au contraire des effets sur la croissance, les effets sur le bien-être à long terme d'une hausse permanente de la dette publique peuvent être positifs. Nous en déduisons l'existence d'un seuil optimal pour le ratio de dette publique au PIB.