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Abstract.  The emergence of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of endogenous protection as the preëminent model in the political economy of trade literature has been significantly advanced by the finding that its predictions about the cross‐industry pattern of protection are broadly consistent with the data. However, in their empirical implementation of the Grossman‐Helpman model, researchers have assumed the presence of multiple policy instruments and extraneous political factors. We argue that incorporating these assumptions into the theory significantly changes its predictions about the cross‐industry pattern of protection. JEL classification: F1

Abstract
Barriers to trade are commonly viewed as a result of political systems in which politically influential groups benefit from and successfully lobby for protection. However, trade policy is a highly inefficient tool for redistributing income. Although recent theoretical research has focused on explanations of why (inefficient) trade barriers might be preferred to more direct means of redistribution, this research has been carried out with little empirical support. We address this gap in the literature with an exploratory cross-country empirical investigation of the economic factors correlated with a reliance on tariffs over subsidies. We find that the existing theoretical literature is consistent with the cross-country evidence.

Abstract Should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy? The answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries; our results suggest that they do. Previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous, and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows. In contrast, we find that, when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable, its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported. JEL Classification: F1, F14, F18Est‐ce que la politique environnementale est une barrière commerciale secondaire? Une analyse empirique Est‐ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent être étendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale? La réponse dépend du degré de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour protéger leurs industries nationales. Nos résultats suggèrent que cet impact est important. Des études antérieures de cette relation ont traité la politique environnementale comme exogène, et ont montré qu'il existe une co‐relation négligeable entre politique environnementale et flux commerciaux. Au contraire, nous révélons que, quand la politique environnementale est considérée comme variable endogène, son effet sur les flux commerciaux est plus élevé de manière significative que ce qu'on a noté antérieurement.

U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13141 commits the United States to a careful assessment and consideration of the environmental impacts of trade agreements. The most direct mechanism through which trade liberalization would affect environmental quality in the U.S. is through the composition of industries. Freer trade means greater specialization, increasing the concentration of polluting industries in some countries and decreasing it in others. We begin by documenting the substantial shift in U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner industries from 1972 to 1994. We then use annual industry-level data on imports to the U.S. to examine whether this compositional shift can be traced to the significant trade liberalization that occurred over the same time period, and we conclude that no such connection exists. A shift toward cleaner industries has also occurred among U.S. imports, and we find no evidence that pollution-intensive industries have been disproportionately affected by the tariff changes.

Abstract
In the traditional Becker model of employer discrimination, discriminatory behavior arises from a utility-maximizing owner who balances firm profits against the disutility of hiring workers from the disadvantaged demographic group. However, in the modern firm, many human resource decisions are made by agents of the owner (managers) whose actions may not reflect the preferences of even profit-maximizing owners. We present a principal-agent model of discrimination with a profit-maximizing owner and a gender-discriminating manager and show that managerial discrimination is increasing with the degree of risk in the firm's revenue stream. Empirical tests using a Colombian plant-level dataset support a prediction of our model that female workers should be under-represented in more revenue volatile firms and industries.