Suchergebnisse

In diesem Buch werden die Komponenten und treibenden Kräfte hinter dem geschlechtsspezifischen Lohngefälle untersucht, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf Deutschland liegt. Es befasst sich mit der historischen Bedeutung und Messung des Lohngefälles und liefert relevante theoretische und empirische Belege. Außerdem werden drei Schlüsselbereiche untersucht, die mit der Zusammensetzung und den Kräften zusammenhängen, die das geschlechtsspezifische Lohngefälle auf den heutigen Arbeitsmärkten aufrechterhalten: die Auswirkungen radikaler Veränderungen in den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Institutionen; die Bedeutung von Berufen und als letztes die Auswirkungen von Diskriminierung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und von Soft Skills. Das Buch schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse, des Forschungsbedarfs und der Implikationen für die wissenschaftliche Debatte.

Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left.

Pregnancy termination and its interplay with critical life stages and events has rarely been subjected to careful scrutiny in the social sciences, mainly due to a lack of high-quality survey data. Using the first eleven waves (2008-2018) of the German Family Panel Study (pairfam) and employing linear probability models, we examine women and also men with partners who either had induced abortion (N=260 women; N=170 men) or became parents (N=1478 women; N=1220 men). We frame abortion as a social process in which life circumstances and disruptive life events fundamentally shape the decision to carry a pregnancy to term or to discontinue it. We find that teenage or late pregnancy, educational enrolment, previous children, partnership dissolution and economic uncertainty are associated with induced abortion. Our evidence suggests that abortion decisions are powerfully shaped by life-course contingencies and their complex intertwining.

Many contemporary studies find that married couples are more satisfied with life than unmarried people. However, whether marriage makes people more satisfied with life or whether more satisfied couples are more likely to marry remains a debated question. We reassess this relationship with panel data from the German Family Panel (pairfam) and extend previous analyses by adding individual trajectories (slopes) to standard fixed-effects regressions (FEIS). We are thereby able to distinguish - controlling for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity - whether there is in fact an effect of marriage on life satisfaction, whether people who are simply happier in their relationship are more likely to get married, or whether people whose development in life satisfaction is more positive are more likely to get married. We translate these different social mechanisms into different analytical strategies and find that OLS regression - due to its confounding effects between and within persons - overestimates the effect of marriage on life satisfaction. A fixed-effects estimator reveals a much lower effect of marriage on life satisfaction for couples who marry compared to those who continue to live apart together or cohabitate. Additionally, using a FEIS estimator and adjusting for - non-linear - development of individual life satisfaction over time, suggests that this effect is in fact causal.

Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left. Resumen Coincidiendo con el desplazamiento hacia la izquierda de la política latinoamericana, la integración regional en América Latina se ha acelerado durante las dos últimas décadas. Sin embargo, mientras que el apoyo a la integración europea ha sido estudiado sistemáticamente durante décadas, todavía no existen análisis referidos a las tendencias de la opinión pública con respecto a la integración de América Latina. Este artículo, al combinar los datos de ocho encuestas de Latinobarómetro realizadas a 106,590 encuestados de 17 países de América del Sur y América Central, proporciona el primer análisis longitudinal referido al apoyo por parte de los latinoamericanos a la integración política y económica del continente. Utilizando una regresión logística de efectos mixtos multinivel, revelamos tendencias y escisiones internas e inter-sociales. Nuestros resultados muestran que si bien existía un alto nivel inicial de apoyo, en general, este porcentaje está disminuyendo. Es más, si bien las brechas educacionales y de género se han mantenido estables a lo largo del tiempo en el ámbito de la opinión pública, se han producido cambios considerables respecto de la orientación política: en un comienzo con valores iniciales más bajos, la izquierda superó a la derecha y —al menos en el caso del apoyo a la integración política— también al centro para convertirse en el ala política que más propiciaba la integración. Este hallazgo demuestra, contrariamente a las ideas dominantes, que el centro político no es necesariamente el principal partidario de la integración. Cuando el regionalismo se ve cada vez más impulsado por los gobiernos de izquierda, el apoyo público a la integración regional también puede oscilar hacia la izquierda.

Published on 28 Mar 2018 ; Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left.

Did the election of Donald Trump affect the popularity of the European Union (EU) in Europe? Theoretically, both a positive rally effect (due to a perceived external threat) and a negative domino effect (due to resignation among Europhiles and/or reinforcement among europhobe nationalists) are plausible. We treat Trump's unexpected victory as an external shock and use a Eurobarometer survey that was conducted in all EU-28 member states four days prior to (control group) and six days after the election (treatment group) as source material for a natural experiment. The analysis reveals that the election of Trump caused a significant increase in the EU's popularity in Europe immediately after the election. This "Trump effect" is considerable in size, roughly equivalent to three years of education. Gains in popularity were particularly high among respondents who perceived their country as economically struggling and, surprisingly, among the political right, suggesting that Trump's victory broadened and ideologically diversified the EU's base of support.

Did the election of Donald Trump as US president affect the popularity of the European Union (EU) in Europe? In new research, Lara Minkus, Emanuel Deutschmann and Jan Delhey find that that Trump's surprise victory in 2016 did cause a considerable increase in the EU's post-election popularity. Gains in popularity were particularly high among those who perceived their country as economically struggling and, surprisingly, among the political right, suggesting that Trump's victory broadened and ideologically diversified the EU's base of support.

Objective: The aim of this study is to extend our knowledge about uncertainty in fertility intentions from a life course perspective. We want to find out if life course markers such as economic circumstances, relationship status, family size, and the so-called "biological clock" (getting older) influence uncertainty in fertility intentions. Uncertainty in fertility intentions is the state in which individuals are not sure whether they will have (more) children. Background: Determining what drives uncertainty in fertility intentions may lead to a better understanding of fertility decision-making and its outcomes. Method: We use German panel data (German Family Panel, pairfam) for three birth cohorts (1971-73, 1981-83, 1991-93), and employ multinomial fixed-effects logit models as well as bivariate analyses based on waves 1 to 11. Results: Uncertainty in fertility intentions is volatile across an individual's life course, serving as a transitional phase between certainly intending and not intending to have any (more) children. Approaching the end of the reproductive life span (getting older), separating from a partner, having two or more children, and, for men, subjective economic fears increase the odds of being uncertain. Conclusion: By showing that uncertainty in fertility intentions is a volatile concept and that relevant life course markers shape this volatility, we provide new insights into the process of fertility decision-making.

This dataset of soft skill phrases and their clusters was obtained based on the semi-automated approach using job-descriptions from Armenian job postings from 2004-2015.
https://www.kaggle.com/madhab/jobposts

This dataset was curated as a part of our journal publication "Responsible team players wanted: An analysis of soft skill requirements in job advertisements" being published in EPJ Data Science.

In addition we release job-skills matrix, where we matched the soft skills from our list to UK job ads for the analysis computed based on this dataset:
https://www.kaggle.com/c/job-salary-prediction