With the rise of Black Lives Matter and immigrant rights protests, critics have questioned whether mainstream black and Latino civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and UnidosUS are in touch with the needs of minorities - especially from younger generations. Though these mainstream groups have relied on insider political tactics, such as lobbying and congressional testimony, to advocate for minority interests, Michael D. Minta argues that these strategies are still effective tools for advocating for progressive changes.
Race, ethnicity, and a theory of substantive representation in congressional oversight -- Congress, minority interests, and federal policymaking -- Black and brown voices in committee deliberations on civil rights -- Congressional oversight and social welfare policy
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieses Buch ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar:
Oversight answers the question of whether black and Latino legislators better represent minority interests in Congress than white legislators, and it is the first book on the subject to focus on congressional oversight rather than roll-call voting. In this important book, Michael Minta demonstrates that minority lawmakers provide qualitatively better representation of black and Latino interests than their white counterparts. They are more likely to intervene in decision making by federal agencies by testifying in support of minority interests at congressional oversight hearings. Min.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 73, Heft 1, S. 208-220
This paper examines the role that racial and ethnic diversity plays in improving the legislative success of minority interest groups. Relying on campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures to explain minority interest groups' influence on legislators' behavior is not sufficient, because most minority organizations are public charities, or 501(c)(3) organizations, and as such are both banned by federal law from making candidate contributions and limited in how much they can spend on federal lobbying. I argue, however, that the inclusion of more blacks and Latinos on congressional committees enhances the lobbying influence—and thus the legislative success—of civil rights organizations in Congress. Using data from lobbying disclosure reports on bills supported by black American and Latino civil rights groups in the 110th Congress (2007–2008) and 111th Congress (2009–2010), as well as House markup data, I find that National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights (LCCR), and UnidosUS-supported bills referred to House committees with greater proportions of racial and ethnic minorities received more markups than did bills referred to House committees with less diversity. Diversity is significant in predicting committee attention even when accounting for possible confounding factors, including committee jurisdiction and the ideological composition of committee membership.
When determining whether or not legislators are representing their constituents' interests, scholars using voting studies may overstate the role of strategic factors, such as reelection goals and constituent influence, while understating the effect of descriptive characteristics. I argue that race and ethnicity matter in congressional oversight of bureaucratic policymaking. My examination of hearing transcripts from the 107th Congress indicates that minority legislators are more likely than white legislators to participate in racial‐oversight hearings but not more likely than whites to participate in social welfare hearings. The results show that descriptive representation contributes to substantive representation, even if the costs of participating outweigh the electoral benefits.
AbstractDespite claims by normative theorists that gender diversity in Congress leads to better representation of women's interests, the results of empirical studies have been largely mixed. While some scholars have found positive effects of gender diversity, others have found very little impact. We argue that it is not the presence of White and minority women alone that makes political institutions more responsive to women's issues, but rather it is the organizational presence of minority men along with minority women who make similar claims for inclusion, power, and organizational formation to achieve those goals that matters. We examine to what extent gender and racial diversity have led to more attention to issues that directly and indirectly impact women. Using congressional hearings data from 1951–2004, we find that the increased presence of minority men and women legislators in the House, but less so in the Senate, is responsible for keeping women's interests on the congressional agenda. We demonstrate how an intersectional and additive approach can add both theoretical and empirical value to the study of political representation by demonstrating the impact of women and minorities in Congress.
Despite claims that diversity benefits the democratic process, critics question whether increased diversity significantly improves government responsiveness and accountability beyond electoral competition and constituency influence. The authors advance a diversity infrastructure theory to explain why and how minority legislators have kept minority interests on the congressional agenda. Using data on congressional hearings held on civil rights and social welfare from 1951 to 2004, the authors find that despite the decline of national attention to civil rights and social welfare issues in general, increased diversity in the House and to a lesser extent in the Senate is responsible for keeping minority interests on the congressional agenda. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 127-140
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 127-140
Despite claims that diversity benefits the democratic process, critics question whether increased diversity significantly improves government responsiveness and accountability beyond electoral competition and constituency influence. The authors advance a diversity infrastructure theory to explain why and how minority legislators have kept minority interests on the congressional agenda. Using data on congressional hearings held on civil rights and social welfare from 1951 to 2004, the authors find that despite the decline of national attention to civil rights and social welfare issues in general, increased diversity in the House and to a lesser extent in the Senate is responsible for keeping minority interests on the congressional agenda.