Putin's wars: from Chechnya to Ukraine; Russia's road to war with Ukraine: invasion amidst the ashes of empires
In: International affairs, Band 99, Heft 6, S. 2536-2538
ISSN: 1468-2346
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In: International affairs, Band 99, Heft 6, S. 2536-2538
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: The RUSI journal: publication of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Band 168, Heft 6, S. 98-100
In: International affairs, Band 99, Heft 1, S. 397-398
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: International affairs, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1474-1476
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 159-180
ISSN: 1743-9558
In: Revista científica General José María Córdova, Band 17, Heft 27, S. 457-480
ISSN: 2500-7645
This article takes the current debate between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches as a point of departure to make its contribution by shifting the focus from the operational and tactical to the strategic realm. To this end, it traces the meanings of each approach to its historical origins, discussing the theoretical underpinnings as to distill the basic tenets and to evaluate to what extent each is suitable to counter an insurgency. The central argument of this article is that while both approaches have different "philosophies," they are two sides of the same coin. Thus, what needs to be taken into account is the strategic dimension and, logically enough, the political, when referring to counterinsurgency as the two will be determinant in which approach is employed.
This article takes the current debate between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches as a point of departure to make its contribution by shifting the focus from the operational and tactical to the strategic realm. To this end, it traces the meanings of each approach to its historical origins, discussing the theoretical underpinnings as to distill the basic tenets and to evaluate to what extent each is suitable to counter an insurgency. The central argument of this article is that while both approaches have different "philosophies," they are two sides of the same coin. Thus, what needs to be taken into account is the strategic dimension and, logically enough, the political, when referring to counterinsurgency as the two will be determinant in which approach is employed. ; Este artículo toma el debate actual entre los enfoques centrados en el enemigo y los centrados en la población como un punto de partida para hacer su contribución, cambiando el enfoque del ámbito operacional y táctico al estratégico. Con este fin, rastrea los significados de cada enfoque desde sus orígenes históricos, discutiendo los fundamentos teóricos para destilar los principios básicos y evaluar hasta qué punto cada uno es adecuado para contrarrestar una insurgencia. El argumento central de este artículo es que, si bien ambos enfoques tienen "filosofías" diferentes, son dos caras de la misma moneda. Por lo tanto, lo que se debe tener en cuenta es la dimensión estratégica y, lógicamente, la política, al referirse a la contrainsurgencia ya que los dos serán determinantes en el enfoque que se emplee.
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The current attention towards wars against non-state actors—counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria)—triggered an immense debate relating to the best approach on the conduct of COIN on the operational and tactical levels, with the current predilection for a population-centric operational approach epitomized by the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This approach is designed for interventionist states' militaries by focusing on two epitomic COIN campaigns, namely, Malaya and, to a lesser degree, Algeria. First, such narrow focus on colonial campaigns is insufficient for making generalizable inferences. It ignores the bulk of the military history of successful COIN campaigns conducted by indigenous actors—denominated as 'first-party actors'—without any (significant) direct intervention by other states. These campaigns include Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka, and contain valuable lessons for both first-party actors as well as their expeditionary counterparts. This thesis seeks to broaden the scope of campaigns from which to draw generalizable lessons. Second, the prevalent field manual offers a detailed blueprint on how to conduct COIN anywhere in the world. This is problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, such thinking ignores the hierarchical, but nonetheless reciprocal, relationship between the levels of war, namely, (military) strategic, operational and tactical levels, by overemphasizing the operational approach which in turn would limit both strategic and political choices. On the other hand, such claim to universality contradicts the ever-changing character of war, thus, decontextualizing and 'destrategizing' the complex phenomenon and reducing it to a mere tactical interaction between insurgents and counterinsurgents in their struggle for legitimacy in eyes of the key population. Against this background, this thesis shifts the focus from the operational level to military strategic, studying it not in isolation from the other levels, but in conjunction ...
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In: The US Army War College quarterly parameters, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 175
ISSN: 0031-1723
In: Defence studies, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 105-125
ISSN: 1743-9698
In: Revista científica General José María Córdova, Band 19, Heft 36, S. 851-866
ISSN: 2500-7645
This paper summarizes medical ethics in the military profession to raise military leaders' awareness of Military Medical Ethics (MME) and the ethical issues that may impact their medical services and personnel. First, it summarizes core concepts, including the four principles of medical ethics (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice), the two legal frameworks for the use of military force in war, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and the concept of dual loyalty. It then examines MME issues during conflict, in garrison healthcare, and during the COVID-19 epidemic. Finally, it concludes by arguing that MME is an important domain of military ethics that should be taught to military leaders to complement the detailed education of MME for military medical professionals.
In: The journal of Slavic military studies, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 1-23
ISSN: 1556-3006
This paper summarizes medical ethics in the military profession to raise military leaders' awareness of Military Medical Ethics (MME) and the ethical issues that may impact their medical services and personnel. First, it summarizes core concepts, including the four principles of medical ethics (autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice), the two legal frameworks for the use of military force in war, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and the concept of dual loyalty. It then examines MME issues during conflict, in garrison healthcare, and during the COVID-19 epidemic. Finally, it concludes by arguing that MME is an important domain of military ethics that should be taught to military leaders to complement the detailed education of MME for military medical professionals. ; Este documento resume la ética médica en la profesión militar para sensibilizar a los dirigentes militares sobre la ética médica militar (EMM) y las cuestiones éticas que pueden afectar a sus servicios y personal médico. Primero, resume los conceptos básicos, incluyendo los cuatro principios de la ética médica (autonomía, beneficencia, no maleficencia y justicia), los dos marcos jurídicos para el uso de la fuerza militar en la guerra, jus ad bellum y jus in bello, y el concepto de doble obligación. Seguido, examina las cuestiones relativas a la EMM durante el conflicto, en la asistencia sanitaria de guarnición y durante la epidemia de COVID-19. Concluye argumentando que la EMM es un dominio importante de la ética militar que debería enseñarse a los líderes militares para complementar la educación detallada de los profesionales médicos militares de EMM.
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In: The RUSI journal: publication of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Band 165, Heft 3, S. 12-21
ISSN: 1744-0378
In: Revista científica General José María Córdova, Band 20, Heft 40, S. 989-1023
ISSN: 2500-7645
This article longitudinally analyzes the strategic interaction between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in their four decades of conflict. Using contemporary strategic theory as an analytical framework, it analyzes how the parties' strategies –grand and military– and political objectives align. It finds that both parties have struggled with establishing (aligning policy, strategy, and resources) and, in several instances, maintaining a functioning strategy bridge. Static approaches that solely worked in a specific context and the absence of a strategy bridge have plagued both actors, thus perpetuating the ongoing conflict. The authors conclude that the conflict will likely continue unless one of the parties can create and maintain a working strategy bridge for an extended period.