Suchergebnisse

Mitropolija –crnogorsko primorska ima osam vekova dug kontinuitet u okviru Srpske pravoslavne crkve. Sveti Sava je osnovao Zetsku Episkopiju 1219. godine. Nakon propasti srpskog carstva poslednji srpski srednjovekovni pravoslavni vladari iz dinastije Crnojevića prenose sedište Zetske Episkopije, odnosno Mitropolije, na Cetinje gde 1484. godine podižu i manastir. Sve do 1766. godine i ukidanja Pećke patrijaršije od strane sultana Mustafe III cetinjski mitropoliti ili vladike se hirotonišu u Pećkoj patrijaršiji. Nakon 1776. godine pa sve do početka XX veka, Mitropolija ostaje jedini deo srpske Pećke patrijaršije koji nije priznao vlast Carigradske patrijaršije. Najjasniji dokaz za to je titula egzarha Pećkog trona koju nose cetinjski mitropoliti još od 1750. godine. Nakon 1922. godine i dobijanja tomosa od Carigradske patrijrašije, obnavlja se jedinstvena Pećka patrijaršija sa Mitropolijom kao sastavnim delom. Sa druge strane, moderna država Crna Gora nema međunarodnopravni kontinuitet sa srednjovekovnom Zetom Crnojevića niti sa državom koja je 1484. godine podigla sadašnje sedište Mitropolije crnogorsko-primorske – Cetinjski manastir. Pravna teorija nam, dakle, pokazuje da ne postoji međunarodnopravni kontinuitet između srednjovekovne države Crnojevića i moderne Crne Gore. Nakon pada Zete 1496. godine ne postoji nezavisni i međunarodno priznati subjekt na teritoriji današnje Crne Gore, sve do 1878. godine i Berlinskog kongresa. Zato su netačne tvrdnje aktuelnog crnogorskog rukovodstva kojima se pokušava opravdati donošenje nelegalnog i nelegitimnog Zakona o slobodi vjeroispovijesti iz 2019. godine, prema kojima, navodno, postoji 1.000 godina neprekidnog kontinuiteta državnosti. Na osnovu takvih konstrukcija se tvrdi da, navodno, postoji autokefalna CPC još od vremena Crnojevića. Članovi 62 i 63 Zakona o slobodi vjeroispovijesti su doneti upravo u tom kontekstu. Svrha ovih članova je da se na osnovu konstrukcije o navodnom državnom kontinuitetu na nelegitiman i nelegalan način preuzme imovina SPC u Crnoj Gori.

Without a doubt, Slobodan Jovanovic was one of the greatest Serbian jurists,
and in the period between the two World Wars, he was probably the most
influential Serbian jurist. In this context, his views on the
Serbian-Russian relations have exerted an influence on the formation of the
dominant discourse, but also on many generations that came after his time
(his bust in front of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade symbolically shows how
highly he is valued in today?s legal circles, more than 60 years after his
death). In his voluminous opus Jovanovic suggests that the Peace of
Bucharest, the Akkerman Convention and the Peace of Edirne were bilateral
agreements between Russia and Turkey, with provisions that went in favour of
the third party (pactum in favorem tretii), i.e. Serbia. He also gave a
positive assessment of the Russian diplomacy during the 19th century. In
that sense, Jovanovic criticizes the Serbian historians who claimed the
opposite, and even Milos Obrenovic himself. Finally, as a jurist, he also
rejects the ideological division according to which only reactionary
influences came from Russia, and only freedom and enlightenment from the
West. In his analysis of the Serbian-Russian relations Jovanovic points out
that it was Russia which insisted on the formation of a National Council in
Serbia which was to ?limit? the absolute power of Milos Obrenovic. Such an
attitude has retained its validity even in the 21st century because the
dogma about the so-called Russian reactionary policy is still very much
alive. As a jurist, Jovanovic also shows understanding of the conflict of
Russian and Serbian interests, or the interests of a small country and those
of an empire. He remains midway between the uncritical idealization of
Russia and even more intolerant Russophobia. He cites and compares numerous
examples. He pointed out that, for instance, a Polish insurrection broke out
in 1830, at the very same time when Russia was in negotiations with the
Ottoman Porte over the Serbian issue. However, despite these (undeniable)
facts, Jovanovic does not draw Russophobic conclusions, which were so
prevalent in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He remains midway between the
non-critical idealization of Russia and even more intolerant Russophobia.
Such opinions of a jurist, who was ideologically an anglophile, are still
very important in 2018, when Russophobia present in the West, but also in a
part of the Serbian elite, reaches the Cold War level.

In relation towards Russia, there is a tacit consent of the West not to apply
basic principles of modern international law. Such rule is not applied in one
state only or in some short post-Cold war period? Unique rules have been
applied in that case for almost 300 years, since the creation of the Russian
Empire. Breaking the rule of diplomatic immunity in case of a Russian
diplomat in 1708 in London and his arrest are an incident that could be
compared to taking of hostages in the US embassy in Teheran. Also, breaking
the Convention on Malta from 1798 by Great Britain shows that even the most
basic principles of international contract law, pacta sunt servanda are not
respected when it comes to Russia. Judgment in case ?Wimbledon? in front of
SSMP shows that sometimes it is legal even to start a violent war against
Russia. Double standards are applied by the West when it comes to recognizing
the independence of Kosovo, 2008 and Crimea, 2014 and breaking the contract
signed with the ex Ukrainian president Janukovic in 2014. Different standards
when it comes to aggression of Saudi Arabia on Yemen and sanctions towards
Russia because of the Ukraine in 2015, show that its custom legal case or one
sided legal rule that the West applies towards Russia. Sometimes, as with the
diplomatic boycott of 9 May celebration in Moscow, the EU does not even ask
for unanimous approval of such custom legal rules. That is why it could be
concluded that customary laws are not based on the idea of justice and
respect for international law and not even on state reason (raison d? ?tat).
This has arisen directly from the theory of customary law that does not
recognize the mutuality of application of rules between civilized and
barbaric countries. That is why such behaviour towards Russia can be defined
as regional customary law that is applied unilaterally by the groups of
states.

In the context of public international law and relations between principles
of territorial integrity and right to self-determination, independence of
Kosovo will never be legal if it is not recognized by Serbia. This can be
concluded from the examples of violent secession of Bangladesh and Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. That is why Serbia still has a right to decide
about the independence of Kosovo and Metohija despite signing Brussels
Agreement and the fact that 100 UN member states recognized Kosovo as an
independent state. Forty years after the secession of northern part of the
island, Nicosia has not recognized Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus, which
caused that this secessionist creation does not become a member of the UN.
Its independence is not full from the perspective of international law, and
this fact that cannot be disputed in spite of the factual occupation of the
northern part of island by Turkey. On the other side, Pakistan recognized the
independence of Bangladesh and forever lost half of its population and state
territory. In return, half of its foreign debt was written off, 90,000
prisoners were released and 13,000 square kilometers of territory in western
part of Pakistan, controlled by India, were returned. However, no one is
offering anything similar to Serbia to recognize the independence of Kosovo.
Debts of Kosovo towards IMF and World Bank are paid by Serbia. In addition,
if Serbia recognized the independence of Kosovo, Serbia would lose about
100,000 Serbs living on that territory and about 1,200 square kilometers of
territory in the northern part of Kosovo which is not controlled by Pristina.
In that context, it is clear that principles of territorial integrity are
still stronger in international law then right to self-determination.
Postmodernist theories have a goal to hide that fact. Key of the independence
of so-called ?Kosovo? is still in hands of Belgrade. That is why there are so
many persistent attempts and strong pressures from the West to recognize the
independence of ?Kosovo?. Example of Cyprus shows how to resist those
attempts within the framework of public international law (by applying the
principles of territorial integrity). However, if in the future Serbia
chooses the same approach as Pakistan in the case of Bangladesh, Kosovo will
be lost forever. At that moment, it would be clear that the relations of
great powers in the world have changed.