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Investors receive thousands of business plans, but only a few businesses receive funding. While there are many "how-tos" out there for entrepreneurs, no one has focused on the mind-set, tools, and foundation that are important to investors, and therefore essential to entrepreneurs. Getting Funded examines and develops a framework on which to base a business concept, conduct due diligence research and risk analysis, refine a business model and reformulate a business strategy, and develop a risk and reward structure that protects investment money and incentivizes entrepreneurs to successfully manage the opportunity to create and share value. Getting Funded shows entrepreneurs the tools and framework critical to a venture's success, teaching entrepreneurs to refine their business model and strategy as well as to develop an investment model to improve the investability of the venture and thereby increase the chances of getting funded. Even without the need for external funding, these tools will improve a venture's potential odds of success.

AbstractFirm performance has a generally positive, but diminishing relationship with the level of CEO pay‐for‐performance sensitivity to stock returns, consistent with the tradeoffs between incentives and risk sharing that underlie the use of pay‐for‐performance. Two moderating risk variables capture this tradeoff and significantly shape the pay‐for‐performance relationship: a firm's business risk and the standard deviation of its stock returns. At higher levels of pay‐for‐performance sensitivity, the future performance of higher risk firms is more negatively related to sensitivity than for lower risk firms. Our results support the notion that CEO risk aversion limits the benefits from incentive pay, and that when too much risk is placed on the CEO, firm performance suffers. Compensation managers should take these results into account when making changes in CEO pay‐for‐performance plans.

AbstractWe examine the efficiency and value of founding family controlled firms (FFCFs), firms whose CEOs are either the founder or a descendant of the founder. We find that FFCFs are more efficient and valuable than non‐FFCFs that are similar with respect to industry, size, and managerial ownership. We also observe that descendant‐controlled firms are more efficient than founder‐controlled firms. Finally, we show that younger founder‐controlled firms are more efficient than older ones. These results are robust after controlling for the age of the firm and a variety of investment opportunity measures. Our results are consistent with the notions that managerial ownership is endogenous to the firm and that family relationships improve monitoring while providing incentives that are associated with better firm performance.