Abstract The late 19th century saw a national awakening of the Belarusian people. During World War I, under German occupation, the Catholic Belarusian national movement intended to create a sovereign Belarusian state (the Belarusian People;s Republic) or in union with Lithuania (a revived Grand Duchy of Lithuania). After the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Orthodox national activists wanted a sovereign Belarus within a federal and democratic Russia. The Belarusian People's Republic, established in March 1918, was not recognized by any state. Poland, Lithuania and Soviet Russia intended to incorporate the Belarusian lands on an autonomous basis. As a result of the Riga Peace Treaty (1921), the Belarusian lands were divided between Poland and Soviet Russia.
W czasie II wojny światowej wyszła z koncepcją integracji Europy Środkowej we współpracy z Czechosłowacją. Polska tradycja wolności i pokojowych unii z sąsiednimi narodami była alternatywą dla niemieckiej i radzieckiej jedności Europy Środkowej na drodze przemocy. Polski plan pokojowej i dobrowolnej integracji państw Europy Środkowej miał im przynieść bezpieczeństwo i rozwój oraz regionalną solidarność i niezależność od wrogich i sojuszniczych mocarstw. Stałe spotkania polskiego rządu w Londynie z ośmioma emigracyjnymi rządami państw okupowanych miały doprowadzić do powstania subregionalnych związków państw. Miały być jednym z filarów pokoju i bezpieczeństwa w Europie obok mocarstw. Sprzeciw ZSRR uniemożliwił realizację polskich planów.
W czasie II wojny światowej wyszła z koncepcją integracji Europy Środkowej we współpracy z Czechosłowacją. Polska tradycja wolności i pokojowych unii z sąsiednimi narodami była alternatywą dla niemieckiej i radzieckiej jedności Europy Środkowej na drodze przemocy. Polski plan pokojowej i dobrowolnej integracji państw Europy Środkowej miał im przynieść bezpieczeństwo i rozwój oraz regionalną solidarność i niezależność od wrogich i sojuszniczych mocarstw. Stałe spotkania polskiego rządu w Londynie z ośmioma emigracyjnymi rządami państw okupowanych miały doprowadzić do powstania subregionalnych związków państw. Miały być jednym z filarów pokoju i bezpieczeństwa w Europie obok mocarstw. Sprzeciw ZSRR uniemożliwił realizację polskich planów. ; During World War II, Poland put forward the concept of the integration of Cen¬tral Europe in cooperation with Czechoslovakia. The Polish tradition of freedom and peaceful union with its neighbors was an alternative to Germany and the Soviet Union uniting Central Europe through violence. The Polish plan of peaceful and voluntary integration of Central European states was to have secured their security and develop¬ment, as well as regional solidarity and independence from hostile and allied pow¬ers. Regular meetings of the Polish government-in-exile in London with eight emigre governments of the occupied countries were expected to lead to the establishment of subregional associations of states. They were to have become one of the pillars of peace and security in Europe alongside European powers. However, opposition from the USSR thwarted the implementation of the Polish plans.
W czasie II wojny światowej wyszła z koncepcją integracji Europy Środkowej we współpracy z Czechosłowacją. Polska tradycja wolności i pokojowych unii z sąsiednimi narodami była alternatywą dla niemieckiej i radzieckiej jedności Europy Środkowej na drodze przemocy. Polski plan pokojowej i dobrowolnej integracji państw Europy Środkowej miał im przynieść bezpieczeństwo i rozwój oraz regionalną solidarność i niezależność od wrogich i sojuszniczych mocarstw. Stałe spotkania polskiego rządu w Londynie z ośmioma emigracyjnymi rządami państw okupowanych miały doprowadzić do powstania subregionalnych związków państw. Miały być jednym z filarów pokoju i bezpieczeństwa w Europie obok mocarstw. Sprzeciw ZSRR uniemożliwił realizację polskich planów. ; During World War II, Poland put forward the concept of the integration of Central Europe in cooperation with Czechoslovakia. The Polish tradition of freedom and peaceful union with its neighbors was an alternative to Germany and the Soviet Union uniting Central Europe through violence. The Polish plan of peaceful and voluntary integration of Central European states was to have secured their security and development, as well as regional solidarity and independence from hostile and allied powers. Regular meetings of the Polish government-in-exile in London with eight emigre governments of the occupied countries were expected to lead to the establishment of subregional associations of states. They were to have become one of the pillars of peace and security in Europe alongside European powers. However, opposition from the USSR thwarted the implementation of the Polish plans.
Polish foreign policy and role of the armed forces in geopolitical considerations of Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Zakrzewski addressed to Prime Minister Władysław SikorskiIn January 1943, Commander-in-chief and Prime Minister of Poland, General Władysław Sikorski, received a memorandum on the objectives of the Polish foreign policy drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Zakrzewski (1897–1964), former military attaché in Bucharest (1938–1940). The policy was founded on three pillars: the Polish Armed Forces, the Polish populace, and propaganda. He emphasised that Poland would achieve true victory with the consolidation of its independent existence within its pre-war borders in the east, and strategically expanded borders – at the expense of Germany (East Prussia, Opole Silesia) – in the west. Central and Eastern Europe was to be divided between Poland (Union of Central Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Hungary) and the USSR (Eastern Union: the USSR, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria). Romania could choose between the two. Peace and security in the world would rely on the cooperation of regional powers and the relations of states supervised by an international organisation. The durability of the post-war order would be ensured by the universal adoption of democracy, the protection of human and minority rights, extensive trade in commodities and raw materials, and the isolation of warmonger states from the international community. Польская иностранная политика и роль армии в геополитических рассуждениях подполковника Тадеуша Закржевского, обращенных к премьер-министру генералу Владиславу СикорскомуБывший военный атташе в Бухаресте (1938–1940), подполковник Тадеуш Закржевский (1897–1964) в январе 1943 г. отправил главнокомандующему и премьер-министру генералу Владиславу Сикорскому докладную записку о целях польской иностранной политики. Ее основой он назначил: польскую армию, отношение страны к немецкому оккупанту и пропаганду польских целей войны. Он подчеркивал, что польской победой в войне должно стать укрепление независимости в довоенных границах на Востоке, расширенных стратегически и экономически за счет Германии (Восточная Пруссия, Опольская Силезия). Центральная и Восточная Европа должны были быть разделены между Польшу (Центральноевропейский Союз – Польша, Чехословакия, Югославия, Греция, Венгрия) и Советский Союз (Восточный Союз – СССР, Финляндия, Латвия, Эстония, Болгария). Румыния могла принадлежать или к Восточному или к Центральному Союзу. Мир и мировая безопасность опирались бы на сотрудничество держав и региональные союзы государств в рамках международной организации. Прочность послевоенной системы обеспечили бы: всеобщность демократии, права человека и национальных меньшинств, торговое и сырьевое сотрудничество, изолирование агрессора от международного общества.
Polish foreign policy and role of the armed forces in geopolitical considerations of Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Zakrzewski addressed to Prime Minister Władysław SikorskiIn January 1943, Commander-in-chief and Prime Minister of Poland, General Władysław Sikorski, received a memorandum on the objectives of the Polish foreign policy drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Zakrzewski (1897–1964), former military attaché in Bucharest (1938–1940). The policy was founded on three pillars: the Polish Armed Forces, the Polish populace, and propaganda. He emphasised that Poland would achieve true victory with the consolidation of its independent existence within its pre-war borders in the east, and strategically expanded borders – at the expense of Germany (East Prussia, Opole Silesia) – in the west. Central and Eastern Europe was to be divided between Poland (Union of Central Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Hungary) and the USSR (Eastern Union: the USSR, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria). Romania could choose between the two. Peace and security in the world would rely on the cooperation of regional powers and the relations of states supervised by an international organisation. The durability of the post-war order would be ensured by the universal adoption of democracy, the protection of human and minority rights, extensive trade in commodities and raw materials, and the isolation of warmonger states from the international community. Польская иностранная политика и роль армии в геополитических рассуждениях подполковника Тадеуша Закржевского, обращенных к премьер-министру генералу Владиславу СикорскомуБывший военный атташе в Бухаресте (1938–1940), подполковник Тадеуш Закржевский (1897–1964) в январе 1943 г. отправил главнокомандующему и премьер-министру генералу Владиславу Сикорскому докладную записку о целях польской иностранной политики. Ее основой он назначил: польскую армию, отношение страны к немецкому оккупанту и пропаганду польских целей войны. Он подчеркивал, что польской победой в войне должно стать укрепление независимости в довоенных границах на Востоке, расширенных стратегически и экономически за счет Германии (Восточная Пруссия, Опольская Силезия). Центральная и Восточная Европа должны были быть разделены между Польшу (Центральноевропейский Союз – Польша, Чехословакия, Югославия, Греция, Венгрия) и Советский Союз (Восточный Союз – СССР, Финляндия, Латвия, Эстония, Болгария). Румыния могла принадлежать или к Восточному или к Центральному Союзу. Мир и мировая безопасность опирались бы на сотрудничество держав и региональные союзы государств в рамках международной организации. Прочность послевоенной системы обеспечили бы: всеобщность демократии, права человека и национальных меньшинств, торговое и сырьевое сотрудничество, изолирование агрессора от международного общества.
Abstract After the German invasion in 1941, the USSR declared to be the defender of the Slavic nations occupied by Germany. It did not defend their allies, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, against the Germans in the 1938-1941. In alliance with Germans it attacked Poland in 1939. Soviets used the Slavic idea to organize armed resistance in occupied nations. After the war, the Soviet Union intended to make them politically and militarily dependent. The Polish government rejected participation in the Soviet Slavic bloc. In the Polish political emigration and in the occupied country the Slavic idea was really popular, but as an anti-Soviet idea. Poland not the Soviet Union was expected to become the head of Slavic countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe.
In January 1943, Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister of Poland,General Władysław Sikorski, received a memorandum on the objectives of the Polish foreignpolicy drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Zakrzewski (1897–1964). Zakrzewski believedthat, to ensure Poland's victory in the war, the government should make use of its three mainadvantages with regard to the governments of the Allied states, the European allies of Germanyand international public opinion. The role of the armed forces was to fight alongside their allies.The nation was expected to mount an active resistance against the Germans and to combatcollaboration with the occupier. The task of propaganda was to spread knowledge about thePolish contributions to the war, as well as to present the Polish proposal for the frameworkfor peace. The expected outcome of these policies was the permanent restoration of the Polishstate within its pre-war borders – with some territorial gains at the expense of Germany – andthe establishment of the Union of Central Europe. ; p.153-169 ; Includes source appendix: Tadeusz Zakrzewski, Mój pogląd na politykę zagraniczną Polski i rolę wojska ; Summary in English and Russian. ; In January 1943, Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister of Poland,General Władysław Sikorski, received a memorandum on the objectives of the Polish foreignpolicy drawn up by Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Zakrzewski (1897–1964). Zakrzewski believedthat, to ensure Poland's victory in the war, the government should make use of its three mainadvantages with regard to the governments of the Allied states, the European allies of Germanyand international public opinion. The role of the armed forces was to fight alongside their allies.The nation was expected to mount an active resistance against the Germans and to combatcollaboration with the occupier. The task of propaganda was to spread knowledge about thePolish contributions to the war, as well as to present the Polish proposal for the frameworkfor peace. The expected outcome of these policies was the permanent restoration of the Polishstate within its pre-war borders – with some territorial gains at the expense of Germany – andthe establishment of the Union of Central Europe. ; s. 153-169 ; Zawiera aneks źródłowy: Tadeusz Zakrzewski, Mój pogląd na politykę zagraniczną Polski i rolę wojska ; Streszcz. ang., ros.
This paper analyses changes in the region's states, and the evolution of Central Europe's (CE) position in the international environment. Since forming in 1918, the new CE independent states have remained a focus for neighbouring powers and Western powers. The paper looks at the background for the historical, political, economic, demographic, cultural and geopolitical importance of Central Europe. Th ree essential periods can be distinguished, the first being the post-WW1 period, when after the downfall of Austria-Hungary and the weakening of Germany, Russia and Turkey, a number of independent states emerged. The lack of Western assistance and insufficient mutual cooperation meant that CE countries became subject to aggression from Berlin and Moscow. After WW2, the region was forcefully reintegrated into the Soviet Union – and its states were subjected to political, social, economic and cultural degradation. The downfall of the Soviet Union and democratic transition in the states of Central Europe contributed to the regional economic and security integration. EU membership and close ties to the USA forged significant possibilities for development and becoming a subject of European policy. Historical experiences show that Central Europe has had a significant impact on international security in Europe. The region's states of increasing signifi cance have the capability potential to forge their own concepts of close regional political and economic cooperation.
