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Traditionally Cato's Letters have been seen as a keynote text in the construction of the civic humanist paradigm, a perspective which has come to dominate contemporary understanding of the intellectual currents at work in the shaping of eighteenth century Britain and America. Within this paradigm the Letters have been viewed as emblematic of a 'neo-Harringtonian' critique of Court corruption and the 'new economic order'. However there are significant problems with this interpretation and this thesis argues that the attitude of Trenchard and Gordon towards Walpole's ministry was more nuanced than is usually suggested; that they were prepared to lend his administration their support when occasion demanded. Against the trend to downplay the religious and ideological differences between Whigs and Tories, in order to prioritise the Court-Country division, this thesis suggests that Trenchard and Gordon's position towards Walpole can best be understood in terms of their commitment to traditional Whig principles of freedom of conscience and opposition to arbitrary rule, rather than on the basis of a preoccupation with issues of wealth and virtue. Contrary to the accepted view that Trenchard and Gordon were opposed to commerce and the financial instruments which it generated, and that they viewed a society motivated by self-interest as a threat to civic virtue and liberty, this thesis contends that their 'scientific' political and moral philosophy both naturalised self-interest and redrew it as the foundation of liberty. In the process of calling into question 'Cato's' status as a civic humanist icon, this thesis also points to similarities between Trenchard and Gordon's thought and that of Bernard Mandeville, who conventionally has been represented as Cato's antithesis. By comparing the work of all three writers, and the way in which they were viewed by contemporaries, it is argued that in terms of religious, political and moral philosophy there are major points of convergence in their ideology.

AbstractThis study addresses two interrelated questions. First, how can we expand the utility of the two-level model by developing the international level of the game, and second, how can this new conceptualization of the two-level game improve our understanding of how chief negotiators create a negotiation strategy? To address these questions, it will be explained how a state formulates its international strategy by taking into account that states participate in international institutions and are bound by their own domestic politics. Specifically, the relationship between chief executive, that executive's perception of bargaining strength relative to the legislature and alliance membership will be framed in a two-level game. By utilizing a two-level model, it will be possible to construct a series of hypotheses that explain, which strategy the chief executive will use at the outset of a negotiation. The hypotheses will be tested by examining the strategies chosen by four heads of state (Francois Mitterrand, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl) towards the Iraqi government in the days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Overall, this study is meant to be a ``first-cut'' at explaining the choice of strategy during negotiations and addressing the deficiencies of the two-level model.

Argues that Britain's nationhood has not been diminished by her membership of the EC, but by her decline as a manufacturing and economic power. Outlines the processes by which this has taken place, considers the relevance of the EC and the outlook for the future. (RSM)

Argues that the Labour Party can eventually recapture the ground it threw away from 1979-82 if it moves with the tide. To achieve its basic aim of improving the lot of the mass of British people it is necessary for the Labour Party to work with the spirit of each new age as moods and positions change. (AM)