Suchergebnisse

This book explains why the rigor of environmental and health regulation in the European Union has surpassed that in the United States during the past decade. The essence of this difference is that U.S. regulators seek to balance regulatory objectives with competitiveness goals, while EU regulators must triangulate regulatory objectives, competitiveness, and the effort to advance European integration.

Intro -- STATES OFLIBERALIZATION Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe -- Contents -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS MARKET-MAKING -- 3. EXPLAINING EUROPEANIZATION -- 4. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION POLICY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR -- 5. GOVERNMENT PURCHASING: THE PERSISTENCE OF PROTECTIONISM -- 6. DELAYED DELIVERY: POSTAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT -- 7. CHALLENGING THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY? EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION POLICY AND GERMANY'S PUBLIC LAW BANKS -- 8. LIBERALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS -- Notes -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.

One. Introduction -- One. The Problem of Bays in the Law of the Sea 3 Section A. National Sovereignty versus Freedom of the Seas -- Two. Terminology -- Two. The Bays within the Littoral of a Single State -- A. Development of the Law of Bays -- Three. Development from the Fall of Rome to 1800 -- Four. Development from 1800 to the Present -- Five. Efforts at Codification -- B. The Historic Bay -- Six. Hudson Bay, A Case Study -- Seven. The Concept of the Historic Bay -- Eight. Peter The Great Bay, A Current Issue -- Three. The Bay Within the Littoral of Two or More States -- Nine. The Bay Within the Littoral of Two or More States -- Four. Conclusions -- Ten. Conclusions: A proposed Codification for Bays.

According to literature on organised interests in the European Union, the European Parliament's Environment Committee (ENVI) gives environmental interests a potent point of legislative access. Yet while ENVI helped sustain the EP's commitment to environmental interests in the case of the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive adopted in September 2000, it did not do so for REACH, a regulatory framework for the chemicals sector adopted by the EP and Council in December 2006. Ultimately, the value of legislative access for organised interest groups depends on the extent to which they have privileged interactions with a node in the policy-making apparatus and the degree to which actors in the policy-making process defer to the particular institutional node. For environmental interests, both privileged interactions between environmentalists and ENVI and deference to the committee decline when environmentalists seek regulations that impose concentrated costs on producers. Such instances invoke calls to protect industrial competitiveness and intensify conflict between EP committees.