Suchergebnisse

This volume is a welcome addition to an ever growing body of work in economic education. A wide range of content areas are covered throughout, with dedicated chapters of the Coase theorem and tax evasion

Interest in politics and the political process-topics that economists consider to be the purview of the sub-field of study known as public choice-appears to be as high as ever. This Special Issue aims to provide a collection of high-quality studies covering many of the varied topics traditionally investigated in the growing field of public choice economics. These include expressive and instrumental voting, checks and balances in the enforcement of rules, electoral disproportionality, foreign aid and political freedom, voting cycles, (in)stability of political ideology, federal spending on environmental goods, pork-barrel and general appropriations spending, politics and taxpayer funding for professional sports arenas, and political scandal and "friends-and-neighbors" voting in general elections. In bringing these topics together in one place, this Special Issue offers a mix of conceptual/formal and empirical studies in public choice economics.

Interest in politics and the political process—topics that economists consider to be the purview of the sub-field of study known as public choice—appears to be as high as ever. This Special Issue aims to provide a collection of high-quality studies covering many of the varied topics traditionally investigated in the growing field of public choice economics. These include expressive and instrumental voting, checks and balances in the enforcement of rules, electoral disproportionality, foreign aid and political freedom, voting cycles, (in)stability of political ideology, federal spending on environmental goods, pork-barrel and general appropriations spending, politics and taxpayer funding for professional sports arenas, and political scandal and "friends-and-neighbors" voting in general elections. In bringing these topics together in one place, this Special Issue offers a mix of conceptual/formal and empirical studies in public choice economics.

The 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama, which was decided on 12 December 2017, was one of the most contentious and scandal-laden political campaigns in recent memory. The Republican candidate, Roy Moore, gained notoriety during the 2017 campaign when a number of women alleged to national media that as teenagers they were subject to sexual advances by Moore, who was then in his early 30s and serving as a local assistant district attorney. The process and results of this particular election provide the heretofore unexamined impact of political scandal on localism or friends-and-neighbors voting in political contests. Based on data from the 2017 special election in Alabama, econometric results presented here suggest that a candidate who is embroiled in political scandal suffers an erosion in the usual friends-and-neighbors effect on his or her local vote share. In this particular case, the scandal hanging over Moore eroded all of the friends-and-neighbors effect that would have been expected (e.g., about five percentage points) in his home county, as well as about 40% of the advantage Moore had at home over his opponent in terms of constituent political ideology.

Abstract. An examination of the early writings of British policymaker Edwin Chadwick (1800‐1890) points out that his analysis of an artificial identification of interests in policy prescriptions serves as a precursor to modern ideas on the subject of legislative term limits. His work supports the writings of economists who argue that the private interests of public policymakers often diverge from those of the electorate, or the public interest. By giving legislators a monopoly right to govern, the political arena may be one area where Adam Smith's natural identity of interests does not prevail in practice. Statistical evidence is presented which supports the views of Chadwick and modern‐day public choice scholars on the subject.

Intro -- EXPANDING TEACHINGAND LEARNING HORIZONSIN ECONOMIC EDUCATION -- CONTENTS -- FOREWORD -- ABOUT THE AUTHORS -- PART I. RESEARCH -- THE ACHIEVEMENT OF COLLEGE BUSINESSAND ECONOMICS MAJORS ON THE MAJORFIELD TEST IN BUSINESS -- INTRODUCTION -- THE TEST -- REVIEW OF POTENTIAL FACTORS AFFECTING ACHIEVEMENT -- Gender -- General Ability or Achievement -- Race, Ethnicity, and International Status -- Age and Class Standing -- Transfer Status -- Business Major -- Overall Business Achievement and Course Effects -- DATA AND SAMPLE -- Descriptive Results -- CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS -- Model 1: Effects of Majors -- Model 2: Course Effects -- Model 2 Extended: Course Effects by Major -- Model 3: Course Transfer Effects -- Model 4: Transfer Course and Major Interaction -- CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- CHICKS DON'T DIG IT:GENDER, ATTITUDE AND PERFORMANCEIN PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS CLASSES -- INTRODUCTION -- DATA AND METHODOLOGY -- ESTIMATION MODELS -- DISAGGREGATING THE ATTITUDE MEASUREMENT -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- APPENDIX 1: MODEL AND SPECIFICATION -- APPENDIX 2: SPECIFICATION TESTING -- A. Testing Validity of Instruments for IV estimation -- B. Testing for Sample Selection -- REFERENCES -- EXPERIENCES WITH, AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS,CHEATING AMONG BUSINESS STUDENTSAND THEIR PEERS -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- DATA AND METHODOLOGY -- RESULTS -- SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS -- APPENDIX. DEMOGRAPHICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS -- REFERENCES -- DO THEY, OR DON'T THEY? A REVIEWOF EVIDENCE ON CHEATINGBY ECONOMICS MAJORS∗ -- INTRODUCTION -- A VERY SHORT COURSE IN THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CHEATING -- The Literature on Cheating -- Cost-Benefit Studies -- Survey-Based and Review Studies -- Econometric Studies -- Do Economists Think Differently? -- Some Unresolved Questions -- Problems with Survey Data.