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According to some influential interpretations, Rawls's later turn to political liberalism contributed significantly to the reorientation of contemporary normative political theory from justice to legitimacy – democratic legitimacy in particular. In this paper, I will not delve into whether these assumptions are correct. My main aim here is to show that we can already find the seeds of a later discussion concerning democratic legitimacy and democratic authority in A Theory of Justice. I will also defend the even stronger claim that Rawls's considerations on democracy in A Theory of Justice are still relevant, both to justify democracy and democratic authority, and for normatively justifying certain democratic decisionmaking procedures. Moreover, I argue that his discussion of the epistemic dimension of majority voting and public deliberation points in the direction of later theories of deliberative democracy and epistemic democracy.

In this paper I analyze Cecile Laborde's conception of justificatory secularism. Laborde points out that in her formulation and defense of the conception of justificatory secularism, she follows Rawls' conception of political liberalism to a certain extent. For that reason, I first provide a sketch of Rawls' conception of political liberalism. Then I focus on justificatory secularism, trying to show to what extent it displays similarities with the conception of political liberalism, but also how it differs. I am interested in whether justificatory secularism represents a better alternative to the conception of political liberalism or whether these two conceptions should be considered complementary.

In this paper I analyze Cécile Laborde's conception of justificatory secularism. Laborde points out that in her formulation and defense of the conception of justificatory secularism, she follows Rawls' conception of political liberalism to a certain extent. For that reason, I first provide a sketch of Rawls' conception of political liberalism. Then I focus on justificatory secularism, trying to show to what extent it displays similarities with the conception of political liberalism, but also how it differs. I am interested in whether justificatory secularism represents a better alternative to the conception of political liberalism or whether these two conceptions should be considered complementary. ; U ovom radu analiziraćemo stanovište sekularizma opravdanja koje je nedavno formulisala Sesil Labord. Labord jasno ističe da prilikom formulisanja i odbrane koncepcije sekularizma opravdanja u određenoj meri sledi Rolsovo shvatanje političkog liberalizma. Zbog toga ćemo u ovom radu najpre ponuditi skicu Rolsove koncepcije političkog liberalizma. Potom ćemo analizirati stanovište sekularizma opravdanja i nastojaćemo pritom da ukažemo u kojoj meri ono ima sličnosti sa koncepcijom političkog liberalizma, ali i u kojoj meri se od nje razlikuje. Tako da će nas prvenstveno interesovati da li koncepcija sekularizma opravdanja predstavlja bolju alternativu u odnosu na koncepciju političkog liberalizma ili na te dve koncepcije treba gledati kao na komplementarne

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snjezana Prijic Samarzija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, l will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijie Samarzija's stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework.

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijić Samaržija's stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework.

U ovom radu bavimo se različitim modelima demokratije za Evropsku uniju. Posebno se razmatraju rešenja koja se odnose na povećanje poverenja i mehanizme demokratske kontrole na nadnacionalnom nivou. Zbog toga se u razmatranje uzimaju različiti modeli demokratije za Evropsku uniju, kako oni koji se isključivo vezuju za državu, tako i oni koji su po svojoj prirodi kosmopolitski. Zastupa se stanovište da kosmopolitski model koji uključuje koncepciju deliberativne demokratije može biti dobar put za dalju demokratizaciju. ; In this paper I will investigate different models of democracy for the European Union. I focus on the solutions that stress the importance of trust and mechanisms of democratic control at the supranational level. In that regard, I will consider different models of democracy for the European Union, both those that are state-centered and cosmopolitan. I defend the cosmopolitan model which includes the conception of deliberative democracy

U ovom radu istražiću značaj razlike između razložnosti i racionalnosti za normativnu političku teoriju. Polazište istraživanja biće Rolsovo (J. Rawls) pravljenje ove distinkcije u okviru njegove kasnije filozofije politike. Glavna karakteristika razložnih osoba, po Rolsovom shvatanju, jeste da one mogu da ponude drugima opravdanje za svoje postupke, ali i pravične osnove saradnje, u svetlu razloga koji su prihvatljivi za sve. Rolsovo viđenje razložnosti bilo je predmet brojnih kritika. Upravo zbog toga nastojaću da ispitam da li je uvođenje pretpostavka razložnosti nužno ako se već pretpostavlja da su sve individue racionalne. Argumentovaću da je za normativnu političku teoriju važna ne samo ideja razložnosti, već upravo relacija između razložnosti i racionalnosti. ; In this paper I will explore the importance of making the difference between the reasonable and the rational for normative political theory. The starting point of my analysis is Rawls's distinction between the rational and the reasonable in his later political philosophy. For Rawls one of the main characteristics of reasonable persons is that they are able to offer the justifications for their actions, but also for fair principles of cooperation, in terms of reasons that all can accept. There are many criticisms of this view of reasonable persons and its role within normative political theory. My main concern, however, is whether the presupposition of reasonableness is necessary if one already assumes that all individuals are rational. I will argue that not only the reasonable, but the relationship between the reasonable and the rational is crucially important for normative political theory.

U ovom radu bavićemo se idejama i idealima koji su karakteristični za političku kulturu demokratskog društva, a koji omogućavaju trajnost demokratije i dalji razvoj demokratskih institucija. Naš osnovni cilj biće da istražimo normativnu dimenziju političke kulture demokratskog društva. Polazeći od slobode i jednakosti kao osnovnih principa demokratije razmotrićemo pitanje na koji način ovi principi utemeljuju osnovne ideje i ideale političke kulture demokratskog društva. Iako je naše istraživanje prevashodno normativne prirode ono će nastojati da ukaže na značaj povezivanja normativne političke teorije sa empirijski orijentisanim teorijama u vezi sa političkom kulturom. ; In this paper we shall investigate the ideas and ideals of the political culture in a democratic society, which contribute to the viability of democracy and its further development. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the normative dimension of the democratic political culture. Starting from the principles of freedom and equality we ask how these principles provide grounds for some basic ideas and ideals of the political culture of a democratic society. Although our investigation is normative in nature, we argue that normative political theory should pay attention to empirically oriented research on political culture.

In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy and its authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a monograph (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). It could be said that Kolodny's approach is a non-standard one given that he avoids typical ways of justifying democracy. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justification. It is not so much that he insists that the usual approaches are wrong as much as that an independent justification is necessary in order to discern what it is that gives them their significance. Kolodny's independent justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equality. In this paper I will try to reconstruct and critically assess Kolodny's approach by paying special attention to the question of democratic authority. ; U ovom radu diskutovaćemo jedan skorašnji pokušaj opravdanja demokratije i njenog autoriteta. Reč je o nedavno objavljenim tekstovima Nika Kolodnjija (Niko Kolodny), koji se međusobno dopunjuju i uzeti zajedno skoro da imaju oblik monografije (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). Moglo bi se reći da je Kolodnjijev pristup nestandardan s obzirom da on izbegava tipične načine opravdanja demokratije. Naime, kada je reč o opravdanju demokratije, Kolodnji smatra da je potrebno ponuditi neku vrstu nezavisnog opravdanja u odnosu na uobičajene pristupe. Ne insistira se toliko da su dva uobičajena pristupa pogrešna, koliko da je potrebno nezavisno opravdanje kako bi se uvidelo ono što im uopšte daje bilo kakav značaj. Kolodnjijevo nezavisno opravdanje demokratije zasniva se na ideji o društvenoj jednakosti. U radu ćemo nastojati da rekonstruišemo i kritički procenimo Kolodnjijevo stanovište posvećujući posebnu pažnju pitanju autoriteta demokratije.

Until recently, epistemic considerations have not been relevant for answering the question about democratic authority. It was usually considered that justifications that go in the direction of knowledge, truth or correctness favored decision making by experts rather than democratic decision making. However, recent research in the field of epistemic democracy has experienced significant change of the point of view in this regard. Now it seems unavoidable that the question about justification of democracy and its authority should have an epistemic dimension. In this paper, special attention will be paid to justification of democratic authority on epistemic grounds. Since I think that in order to answer the question about legitimate democratic authority, it is necessary to previously examine what makes democratic decision making legitimate, I will also consider different ways of justifying democracy that include epistemic considerations. Since Estlund's defense of epistemic proceduralism plays a key role in grounding democratic authority on epistemic basis, in this paper I will in greater detail discuss some essential issues regarding this conception.

Until recently, epistemic considerations have not been relevant for answering the question about democratic authority. It was usually considered that justifications that go in the direction of knowledge, truth or correctness favored decision making by experts rather than democratic decision making. However, recent research in the field of epistemic democracy has experienced significant change of the point of view in this regard. Now it seems unavoidable that the question about justification of democracy and its authority should have an epistemic dimension. In this paper, special attention will be paid to justification of democratic authority on epistemic grounds. Since I think that in order to answer the question about legitimate democratic authority, it is necessary to previously examine what makes democratic decision making legitimate, I will also consider different ways of justifying democracy that include epistemic considerations. Since Estlund's defense of epistemic proceduralism plays a key role in grounding democratic authority on epistemic basis, in this paper I will in greater detail discuss some essential issues regarding this conception.

In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy and its authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a monograph (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). It could be said that Kolodny's approach is a non-standard one given that he avoids typical ways of justifying democracy. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justification. It is not so much that he insists that the usual approaches are wrong as much as that an independent justification is necessary in order to discern what it is that gives them their significance. Kolodny's independent justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equality. In this paper I will try to reconstruct and critically assess Kolodny's approach by paying special attention to the question of democratic authority.

In this paper I shall investigate the relationship between public reason and deliberative democracy, mainly as it is presented in Rawls's later political theory. Against the critics who claim that Rawls has no deliberative democratic theory, I shall argue that he presented a complex view of public deliberation that contains a set of formal and substantive requirements derived from the idea of public reason. My main aim in this paper is to defend and further elaborate the thesis that Rawls's later political theory is crucially important for deliberative democracy. Furthermore, in light of the recent literature on deliberative democracy, I examine the relevance of Rawls's view for addressing some current problems, but also look at some limits of the public reason perspective.

U ovom radu bavimo se pitanjem određenja adekvatne koncepcije legitimnosti za Evropsku uniju. Zastupamo stanovište da u tom pogledu odlučujuću važnost ima ideja javnog uma, kako ju je formulisao Džon Rols. Rols je smatrao da ideja javnog uma ima svoju ulogu kako na domaćem planu ustavnih demokratija tako i na međunarodnom planu. Mi ćemo, polazeći od Rolsovih stavova, nastojati da formulišemo adekvatnu koncepciju javnog uma za Evropsku uniju. Ipak, za razliku od Rolsa, koji u međunarodnom kontekstu prvenstveno govori o narodima, argumentovaćemo da osnovu javnog uma Evropske unije treba da čini koncepcija slobodnih i jednakih građana. ; This paper will examine the issue of finding the most adequate conception of normative legitimacy for the European Union. I shall argue that John Rawls's idea of public reason is crucially important in this context. Rawls maintains that the idea of public reason is important not only for constitutional democracies, but also at the international level. Following Rawls's lead, this paper focuses on the idea of public reason at the EU level. However, I shall argue that the idea of public reason that is adequate for the European Union should be based on the conception of free and equal citizens, instead of Rawls's conception of peoples.

U ovom radu, bavimo se razlikom između liberalnog i republikanskog shvatanja pojma slobode. Zastupnici republikanskog stanovišta u novijoj teoriji politike, smatraju da pored tradicionalne razlike između negativnog i pozitivnog pojma slobode, treba uvesti i treći pojam koji slobodu određuje kao odsustvo dominacije. Kao što zastupnici liberalnog gledišta smatraju da shvatanju negativne slobode treba dati prednost u odnosu na pozitivnu slobodu, teoretičari republikanske orijentacije tvrde da shvatanju slobode kao odsustva dominacije treba dati prednost u odnosu na negativno shvatanje slobode. S obzirom da teoretičari republikanske orijentacije svoje gledište u velikoj meri određuju i brane uvođenjem trećeg pojma slobode, ističući analitičke, a ne samo normativne prednosti uvođenja takvog jednog pojma, naš zadatak u ovom radu biće da ispitamo da li to predstavlja poboljšanje u odnosu na određenje pojma negativne slobode. ; In this paper we will examine the difference between liberal and republican concepts of freedom. The proponents of republican view think that the third concept of freedom should be introduced in addition to negative and positive concepts of freedom. This third concept implies freedom as nondomination. Just as the liberal theorists think that there is a priority of negative over positive freedom, the republican theorists argue that there is a priority of nondomination over negative freedom. Since, the republican theorists defend the introduction of freedom as nondomination not only on normative, but also on conceptual grounds, our primary aim in this paper will be to investigate whether this notion has some analytical advantages over the concept of negative freedom.