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Among a set of extractive institutions particularly set up by colonial powers themselves, military conscription has been understudied to this day. In this paper, I attempt to delve deeper into this important historical institution in French West Africa (FWA) during the interwar era (1920-1939). First of all, I find that when the conscription target stipulated by higher colonial officials increased, strikingly the lower district-level authorities were not complying with this figure faithfully, even when they complied, the target increase was only met by a dubious increase in "deemed fit" soldiers in regions where labor constraints were already running high. Such findings point to a more complex French colonial rule in West Africa where authorities were "fighting over" the scarce resource of labor. Secondly, I find that in times of negative income shocks, potential flooding events in tropical regions of FWA made individuals more likely to volunteering into the army and correspondingly, an increase in drought risk in arid Sahel regions of FWA also made the indigenous more likely to present themselves to the military. Both effects point to the fact that the conscription system was being exploited as an informal insurance device by the locals at a time when insurance institutions were lacking and weather-induced negative agricultural income shocks were frequent.

Among a set of extractive institutions particularly set up by colonial powers themselves, military conscription has been understudied to this day. In this paper, I attempt to delve deeper into this important historical institution in French West Africa (FWA) during the interwar era (1920-1939). First of all, I find that when the conscription target stipulated by higher colonial officials increased, strikingly the lower district-level authorities were not complying with this figure faithfully, even when they complied, the target increase was only met by a dubious increase in "deemed fit" soldiers in regions where labor constraints were already running high. Such findings point to a more complex French colonial rule in West Africa where authorities were "fighting over" the scarce resource of labor. Secondly, I find that in times of negative income shocks, potential flooding events in tropical regions of FWA made individuals more likely to volunteering into the army and correspondingly, an increase in drought risk in arid Sahel regions of FWA also made the indigenous more likely to present themselves to the military. Both effects point to the fact that the conscription system was being exploited as an informal insurance device by the locals at a time when insurance institutions were lacking and weather-induced negative agricultural income shocks were frequent.

Among a set of extractive institutions particularly set up by colonial powers themselves, military conscription has been understudied to this day. In this paper, I attempt to delve deeper into this important historical institution in French West Africa (FWA) during the interwar era (1920-1939). First of all, I find that when the conscription target stipulated by higher colonial officials increased, strikingly the lower district-level authorities were not complying with this figure faithfully, even when they complied, the target increase was only met by a dubious increase in "deemed fit" soldiers in regions where labor constraints were already running high. Such findings point to a more complex French colonial rule in West Africa where authorities were "fighting over" the scarce resource of labor. Secondly, I find that in times of negative income shocks, potential flooding events in tropical regions of FWA made individuals more likely to volunteering into the army and correspondingly, an increase in drought risk in arid Sahel regions of FWA also made the indigenous more likely to present themselves to the military. Both effects point to the fact that the conscription system was being exploited as an informal insurance device by the locals at a time when insurance institutions were lacking and weather-induced negative agricultural income shocks were frequent.

Among a set of extractive institutions particularly set up by colonial powers themselves, military conscription has been understudied to this day. In this paper, I attempt to delve deeper into this important historical institution in French West Africa (FWA) during the interwar era (1920-1939). First of all, I find that when the conscription target stipulated by higher colonial officials increased, strikingly the lower district-level authorities were not complying with this figure faithfully, even when they complied, the target increase was only met by a dubious increase in "deemed fit" soldiers in regions where labor constraints were already running high. Such findings point to a more complex French colonial rule in West Africa where authorities were "fighting over" the scarce resource of labor. Secondly, I find that in times of negative income shocks, potential flooding events in tropical regions of FWA made individuals more likely to volunteering into the army and correspondingly, an increase in drought risk in arid Sahel regions of FWA also made the indigenous more likely to present themselves to the military. Both effects point to the fact that the conscription system was being exploited as an informal insurance device by the locals at a time when insurance institutions were lacking and weather-induced negative agricultural income shocks were frequent.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.