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Why was South Korea's 2022 presidential election so close, when only a few years prior the party of the winning candidate had been out of contention? The answer can be found by situating the election against a battle between democratic and anti-democratic forces. Anti-democratic forces cynically bid for power by denigrating politics. An examination of how this cynical sensibility developed, from 2016 to 2022, but on the back of a deeper history, points both to what was at stake in this election and to the methods deployed by representatives of the anti-democratic forces that helped create parity in the vote. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

AbstractIn the decade and a half following Korean liberation from Japan in 1945, a category of men prowled Seoul's back alleys and also its halls of power. These figures might be called street leaders, for they were directly linked on one hand to private agents of violence and on the other to the top state and political elites of the country. The most notorious individuals included Kim Tu-han, a gang leader who became an elected politician, and Yi Chŏng-jae, a 'political gangster' who helped party politicians with their dirty work. Street leaders like Kim and Yi were on the scene at key moments in the republic's early political development. An examination of the political careers of Kim and Yi reveals how important cooperation between such actors and elite politicians was to state-building, political mobilization, and design of electoral institutions—processes that created the contemporary South Korean polity. Both the alliances between politicians and street leaders as well as the destruction of those alliances left deep impressions on South Korean politics.

Establishing an effective legal framework for regulating elections is widely considered a priority for new democracies. Electoral regulation, though, can be profoundly political. I examine the politics of electoral regulation in South Korea. The country's restrictive campaign laws stand in sharp contrast to the liberal values that many espouse. Given the vibrancy of South Korea's civil society and the entrance of many former activists into party politics, it is surprising that laws continue to limit political discussion and participation during election campaigns. I shed light on this puzzle by examining the ways an established party elite appropriated predemocratic institutions of electoral governance. Restrictive election regulations have their origins decades before South Korea's democratic transition began in 1987. I offer evidence from the evolution of campaign laws in order to demonstrate continuity in important portions of the restrictions and to suggest reasons why a group of influential actors have converged around the perpetuation of these restrictions. This study has implications for the subject of electoral engineering and for thinking about South Korea's democratization. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

In the past decade, Chinese officials, scholars and journalists have made the term "shiminhua" a buzzword in discussions of the country's urbanisation. An innovation of writers from the People's Republic of China (PRC), the term relates to the problem of turning new urban residents into full members of the community, in legal, sociological, attitudinal and/or economic senses. The term is cited to legitimate or contest policies directed at those on the margins of cities. Rather than offering a definition, or even a single English translation, this article tries to make sense of shiminhua by linking it to several themes. Laden with ambiguities, problematic assumptions and elite prejudice, the term is of little analytic value. Nonetheless, rhetoric about shiminhua cuts to the core of conflicts over legitimate membership in urban communities. The term's use offers a window into debates over major issues in China's political and social development, including the extent of police control, legitimation of social stratification and the sort of welfare regime the country should build. (China/GIGA)