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AbstractShould money issuance be a licensed privilege, and if so, who should issue money? Morgan Ricks argues that free-wheeling money issuance by non-licensed shadow banks was a major factor behind the global financial crisis. Still, the regulatory reform agenda after the crisis has mostly been directed at banks (with a few exceptions). This has led to an enormously complex body of regulations that threatens to bring traditional banking to its knees. Ricks would instead restore money issuance as a privilege and leave other financial institutions with a lighter regulatory regime. He is not, however, in favor of narrow banking – as favored by Irving Fisher – but would leave credit allocation with the private banking sector. In this way his proposals are both radical and conservative. He brings a refreshing look to the regulatory debate, and the book is full of novel insights. His discussion of banks and deposit regulations should be required reading for all bank regulators, although his proposal may fall on barren ground in the current political environment. Nevertheless, the book should serve both as a primer for future monetary reform proposals, but also as a starting point for a pragmatic bipartisan debate about financial reform today.

The 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord is an important milestone in central bank history. It led to a lasting separation between monetary policy and the Treasury's debtmanagement powers and established an independent central bank focused on price and macroeconomic stability. This paper revisits the history of the Accord and elaborates on the role played by Marriner Eccles in the events leading up to the Accord. As chairman of the Board of Governors since 1934, Eccles was also instrumental in drafting key banking legislation that enabled the Federal Reserve System to assume a more independent role following the Accord. The global financial crisis has generated renewed interest in the Accord and its lessons for central bank independence. This paper shows that Eccles' support for the Accord-and central bank independence-was clearly linked to the strong inflationary pressures in the US economy at the time, and that he was equally supportive of deficit financing in the 1930s. This broader interpretation of the Accord holds the key to a more balanced view of Eccles's role at the Federal Reserve, where his contributions from the mid-1930s up to the Accord are seen as equally important. Accordingly, the Accord should not be viewed as the final triumph of central bank independence, but rather as an enlightened vision for a more symmetric policy role for central banks, with equal weight given to fighting inflation and preventing depressions.

The 1951 Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord is an important milestone in central bank history. It led to a lasting separation between monetary policy and the Treasury's debtmanagement powers and established an independent central bank focused on price and macroeconomic stability. This paper revisits the history of the Accord and elaborates on the role played by Marriner Eccles in the events leading up to the Accord. As chairman of the Board of Governors since 1934, Eccles was also instrumental in drafting key banking legislation that enabled the Federal Reserve System to assume a more independent role following the Accord. The global financial crisis has generated renewed interest in the Accord and its lessons for central bank independence. This paper shows that Eccles' support for the Accord—and central bank independence—was clearly linked to the strong inflationary pressures in the US economy at the time, and that he was equally supportive of deficit financing in the 1930s. This broader interpretation of the Accord holds the key to a more balanced view of Eccles's role at the Federal Reserve, where his contributions from the mid-1930s up to the Accord are seen as equally important. Accordingly, the Accord should not be viewed as the final triumph of central bank independence, but rather as an enlightened vision for a more symmetric policy role for central banks, with equal weight given to fighting inflation and preventing depressions. ; publishedVersion

The 1951 Treasury - Federal Reserve Accord is an important milestone in central bank history. It led to a lasting separation between monetary policy and the Treasury's debt-management powers, and established an independent central bank focused on price stability and macroeconomic stability. This paper revisits the history of the Accord and elaborates on the role played by Marriner Eccles in the events that led up to its signing. As chairman of the Fed Board of Governors since 1934, Eccles was also instrumental in drafting key banking legislation that enabled the Federal Reserve System to take on a more independent role after the Accord. The global financial crisis has generated renewed interest in the Accord and its lessons for central bank independence. The paper shows that Eccles's support for the Accord - and central bank independence - was clearly linked to the strong inflationary pressures in the US economy at the time, but that he was as supportive of deficit financing in the 1930s. This broader interpretation of the Accord holds the key to a more balanced view of Eccles's role at the Federal Reserve, where his contributions from the mid-1930s up to the Accord are seen as equally important. For this reason, the Accord should not be seen as the eternal beacon for central bank independence but rather as an enlightened vision for a more symmetric policy role for central banks, with equal weight on fighting inflation and preventing depressions.

On 5-6 September 2012 SUERF held its 30th Colloquium "States, Banks, and the Financing of the Economy" at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the Colloquium. All the papers in this publication discuss from different angles the complex interrelations between states and financial systems, which have developed in recent years with economic, financial and sovereign debt crises. The contributions look primarily on the monetary policy and financial regulation and supervision perspectives. In the preceding SUERF Study (2013/2), the focus of the contributions also delivered at the 30th SUERF Colloquium is on fiscal policy and sovereign debt perspectives.