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Prospects and pitfalls of participation -- Ugandan history and the constitution-making process -- Changing attitudes -- Creating informed distrusting democrats -- Constructing constitutional support -- Participation, constitution making, and democracy

Can field experiments be productively employed to study the impact of development assistance on democracy and governance (DG) outcomes? A small but growing number of practitioners and scholars, often working in partnership, are inventing a new research domain at the intersection of evaluation and political science. The article reviews recent and ongoing DG field experiments, and it offers lessons about the prospects and obstacles to the future development of a useful body of experimental evidence on the political economy of development.

Elections are thought to bolster legitimacy by providing fair mechanisms for selecting leaders. Survey data from more than 20,000 respondents in twelve African countries demonstrate that in Africa losers of elections are less inclined to trust their political institutions, consent to government authority or feel that voting matters. Contrary to initial expectations, however, losers are more willing than winners to defend their institutions against manipulation by elected officials. Losers in Africa seem critical of their institutions, but nonetheless willing to protect them, while winners seem submissive subjects, granting unconditional support to their current leaders. Finally, losers are much more likely than winners to denounce flawed elections, but losers have additional reasons to doubt the legitimacy of their current institutions.

Can participatory programs in transitioning countries increase the involvement of citizens beyond the level expected from individual-level characteristics, such as demographic traits, socioeconomic resources, and civic orientations? To answer this question, I examine the causes of participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process. Statistical analysis of a random sample survey of 820 citizens demonstrates that although individual-level factors play a role, many Ugandans participated because mobilizing agents pulled them into the process. I argue that programs to encourage active and equal participation will be most successful if they supplement weak indigenous institutions of mobilization and help all types of citizens to participate early on in the transition to democracy. Adapted from the source document.

A major challenge for transitioning states is to create a constituency of citizens to support and defend the new constitution. Participatory constitution-making is one of the most often recommended methods for enhancing constitutional legitimacy. This research tests the claim that public participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process built support for the 1995 constitution. Contrary to expectations, multivariate analysis of survey data demonstrates that citizens who were active in the process were no more supportive of the constitution than those who stayed at home. In-depth interviews reveal that local political leaders, not participation, caused citizens to view the constitution as legitimate or illegitimate. Constitutions are difficult for citizens to evaluate, so they rely on political elites for information and opinions. To predict whether participation will strengthen or weaken constitutional support, we must examine the messages that elites communicate to citizens about their participation, the process, and the resulting constitution.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 219-234) and index. ; Prospects and pitfalls of participation -- Ugandan history and the constitution-making process -- Changing attitudes -- Creating informed distrusting democrats -- Constructing constitutional support -- Participation, constitution making, and democracy. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Why do citizens in postauthoritarian African democracies trust government-owned broadcast media more than they trust private broadcasters, given the public media's lack of independence and history of state propaganda? Analysis of Afrobarometer data from sixteen countries indicates that low political sophistication, illiberal attitudes, and support for incumbents are all associated with greater relative trust in government media. Citizens also prefer public broadcasters in polities with greater press freedom and lower corruption. These results suggest that private media need more democratic and critical citizens, rather than higher quality reporting and greater press freedom, to compete with the state media for influence and resources. Adapted from the source document.

Why do citizens in postauthoritarian African democracies trust government-owned broadcast media more than they trust private broadcasters, given the public media's lack of independence and history of state propaganda? Analysis of Afrobarometer data from sixteen countries indicates that low political sophistication, illiberal attitudes, and support for incumbents are all associated with greater relative trust in government media. Citizens also prefer public broadcasters in polities with greater press freedom and lower corruption. These results suggest that private media need more democratic and critical citizens, rather than higher quality reporting and greater press freedom, to compete with the state media for influence and resources.