Suchergebnisse

Bilateral and regional agreements concluded with the European Union (EU) and the United States are extensive and include high levels of IP protection and enforcement standards. Such protection is crucial to enhance their competitiveness, but it does not seem to be a priority for developing countries (DCs). This paper analyses how DCs should best address trade negotiations in which high standards of IP protection and enforcement are sought and few balancing (safeguard and flexibility) provisions, or such that can stimulate technology transfer, are on offer. The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition's "Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements" cover many issues that are worth discussing as to how these can be incorporated in the negotiating process. Data collected from the CARIFORUM region when negotiating the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement reconfirm the Principles' main recommendations; so do the experiences from India, Central American countries, Colombia and Peru in negotiations with the EU. The argument made here, however, is that a crucial factor in achieving more favourable outcomes for DCs is through an increase of their bargaining power. It will be examined what structural factors influence bargaining power and how this impacts the use of negotiating strategies.

The politicisation of recent European Union (EU) trade negotiations such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or the Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement suggests that the more negotiations focus on deep integration issues, the higher the potential for polarization of values and interests. Yet, as we argue, this pattern does not necessarily hold true in EU trade negotiations with the developing world. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements with West Africa and the Caribbean region, the pattern of politicisation was 'reversed': Politicisation remained low in the Caribbean region, despite the inclusion of deep integration issues. To the contrary, negotiations became highly politicised in West Africa, where negotiations focussed on the traditional realm of trade in goods. Combining the insights from the literature on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in trade policy-making in developing countries and on politicisation, we show that limited pre-existing mobilisation resources of NSAs, and few opportunities to engage with the political level of negotiations, imply that those affected by the inclusion of deep integration issues hardly mobilise. We also find that lack of technical expertise and the significance of traditional trade areas pre-empts NSAs from engaging in emotive framing on deep integration issues. This helps us to unpack the different patterns of politicisation across both regions: Politicisation in West Africa was facilitated by civil society actors who—in contrast to the Caribbean region—could draw on pre-existing networks, expertise, and direct access to the regional negotiation level.

The politicisation of recent European Union (EU) trade negotiations such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or the Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement suggests that the more negotiations focus on deep integration issues, the higher the potential for polarization of values and interests. Yet, as we argue, this pattern does not necessarily hold true in EU trade negotiations with the developing world. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements with West Africa and the Caribbean region, the pattern of politicisation was 'reversed': Politicisation remained low in the Caribbean region, despite the inclusion of deep integration issues. To the contrary, negotiations became highly politicised in West Africa, where negotiations focussed on the traditional realm of trade in goods. Combining the insights from the literature on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in trade policy-making in developing countries and on politicisation, we show that limited pre-existing mobilisation resources of NSAs, and few opportunities to engage with the political level of negotiations, imply that those affected by the inclusion of deep integration issues hardly mobilise. We also find that lack of technical expertise and the significance of traditional trade areas pre-empts NSAs from engaging in emotive framing on deep integration issues. This helps us to unpack the different patterns of politicisation across both regions: Politicisation in West Africa was facilitated by civil society actors who—in contrast to the Caribbean region—could draw on pre-existing networks, expertise, and direct access to the regional negotiation level.

The politicization of recent European Union (EU) trade negotiations such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or the Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement suggests that the more negotiations focus on deep integration issues, the higher the potential for polarization of values and interests. Yet, as we argue, this pattern does not necessarily hold true in EU trade negotiations with the developing world. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreements with West Africa and the Caribbean region, the pattern of politicization was 'reversed': Politicization remained low in the Caribbean region, despite the inclusion of deep integration issues. To the contrary, negotiations became highly politicised in West Africa, where negotiations focussed on the traditional realm of trade in goods. Combining the insights from the literature on the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in trade policy-making in developing countries and on politicization, we show that limited pre-existing mobilisation resources of NSAs, and few opportunities to engage with the political level of negotiations, imply that those affected by the inclusion of deep integration issues hardly mobilise. We also find that lack of technical expertise and the significance of traditional trade areas pre-empts NSAs from engaging in emotive framing on deep integration issues. This helps us to unpack the different patterns of politicization across both regions: Politicization in West Africa was facilitated by civil society actors who—in contrast to the Caribbean region—could draw on pre-existing networks, expertise, and direct access to the regional negotiation level.

AbstractThis article builds on the literature on trade negotiating constraints to advance a reconceptualization of Putnam's () two‐level game that accounts for the possibility of detachment. Limited institutional capacities for collecting and transmitting information about the domestic win‐set may prevent domestic constituents from exerting influence on the negotiator. This perspective sheds new light on the outcomes of negotiations in two‐level games, as they do not necessarily reflect actual win‐sets, but more likely the negotiator's (mis)perceptions or (mis)representations thereof. The article builds on an explorative case study of the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations between the EU and the West African (2003–14) and the Caribbean (2003–07) regions. It relies on qualitative data, including over 60 interviews. The findings demonstrate that detachment meant that these controversial North–South trade agreements primarily reflected the negotiators' perceptions of the regions' interests or their own preferences, which raises doubts about their developmental impact and complicates their implementation.