Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the ex ante value of information in the property rights model where the possibility exists that an investing agent can be provided with relevant information before investments are undertaken. When contracts are incomplete, from an ex ante perspective, informing the investing agent does not necessarily increase the expected surplus resulting from a relationship between two economic agents. The paper highlights the fact that the second‐best nature of the problem that arises from contractual incompleteness can ensure this.

This study provides a four-good general equilibrium framework with international trade for assessing the impact of the advancement of automation and artificial intelligence (A&AI) on the welfare of a group of agents who are excluded from both owning productive assets, such as capital and land, as well as consuming digital output (digital exclusion). We show that, depending on the magnitude of the factor intensities, the accumulation of A&AI capital may negatively affect the income of the excluded group, who provide unskilled labor, or the owners of land. In doing so, we bring out the conflict of interests that may arise between the owners of A&AI capital and other groups within society, which has implications for the pressure that exists to slow down the adoption of A&AI in an economy.

We present an analytical approach to institutional analysis that draws inspiration from control process engineering in the physical sciences. We characterize smart institutions as having three foundational features. First, smart institutions are context sensitive and expressly allow for a unified consideration of social, political and economic factors, thereby providing a richer and more eclectic approach to their operation. Second, smart institutions are forward-looking in their operation rather than deriving from their past functions and purpose in contrast to most generic institutions. Third, as opposed to generic institutions, smart institutions emphasize the role of information and specifically that of subjective social feedback on institutional performance. A theory of smart institutions, consequently, presents distinct advantages over traditional institutional analysis.

AbstractWe examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare‐maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy‐makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue‐maximizing policy‐makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare‐maximizing policy‐makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.