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In this paper, we assume that redistribution modifies the community structure of an economy and generates both intra and intergenerational mobility. In a world in which neighbourhood attributes and family backgrounds are important to determine the investment effort and the productivity of education, we abandon the stylised median voter in favour of more nuanced pressure-group reasoning and study (i) the conflicts of material interest, (ii) both the income distribution and growth dynamics. We find multiple politico-economic regimes where the pressure for redistribution is highly non-linear depending on social affinity. In some range of inequality, the ends may oppose high rates of redistribution against the middle and more unequal and segmented economies may redistribute less, not more. Our framework displays multiple steady states describing either a situation of equality and integration or segregation with persistent inequality depending on historical economic discrimination. Re-distribution increases the number of candidates for the integrated equilibrium, but an economy's institutions will have first to overcome ranges of inequality in which voting cycles are likely to emerge.

In this paper, we abandon the stylized median voter and study (i) how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on social affinity and on the prospect of upward or downwardmobility of the different income classes, (ii) income distribution dynamics, intergenerational community formation and growth. In a world in which redistributive policies, whether fiscal or educational, affect how the entire economy breaks up into different communities, we find multiple politico-economic regimes that are supported by new international empirical evidence. In particular, we highlight a political economy decision mechanism through which the pressure for redistribution can be highly non linear therefore providing an explanation as to whymore inequality can be associated with less, rather than more, redistributive taxation. Our framework displays multiple steady states which depend on historical economic discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions on the initial pattern of income distribution and local versus social spillovers ratio under which inequality and segregation persist in the long run.

In this paper, we abandon the stylized median voter and study (i) how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on social affinity and on the prospect of upward or downwardmobility of the different income classes, (ii) income distribution dynamics, intergenerational community formation and growth. In a world in which redistributive policies, whether fiscal or educational, affect how the entire economy breaks up into different communities, we find multiple politico-economic regimes that are supported by new international empirical evidence. In particular, we highlight a political economy decision mechanism through which the pressure for redistribution can be highly non linear therefore providing an explanation as to whymore inequality can be associated with less, rather than more, redistributive taxation. Our framework displays multiple steady states which depend on historical economic discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions on the initial pattern of income distribution and local versus social spillovers ratio under which inequality and segregation persist in the long run.

Cet article étudie l'impact du marché du crédit sur les prix du foncier et ses implications en termes de politiques fiscales. Nous introduisons un coût à l'emprunt et une contrainte d'apport personnel dans le modèle standard d'économie urbaine. Ces imperfections s'avèrent réduire les prix de la terre dans les localisations les plus attractives. Cette baisse est d'autant plus forte que les terres sont rares et les villes peuplées et dotées d'infrastructures de transport inefficaces. La contrainte d'apport personnel peut générer des écarts d'utilités d'équilibre entre des ménages initialement homogènes. Le théorème d'Henry George, selon lequel une taxe confisquant les rentes foncières suffit à financer les biens publics, doit être amendé en présence de contraintes de crédit. Pour chaque type d'imperfections du marché du crédit, nous proposons un système de taxation optimale .

We develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. When the regulator contracts with a single agent, the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator's ability to transfer rents across periods. Hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is socially preferable to hiring a sequence of agents, even when no commitment is feasible. By contrast, shorter franchises are socially preferable if the agent has limited liability.

Résumé Cet article développe un modèle théorique d'économie urbaine qui étudie les conséquences d'effets de voisinage informationnels sur l'organisation de la ville. Il s'agit, en particulier, d'examiner l'impact de tels effets de voisinage sur le processus de ségrégation urbaine. Pour ce faire, nous développons un modèle à générations imbriquées avec choix individuel d'éducation et de localisation. Lorsqu'il est jeune, un individu décide du niveau d'effort d'éducation. L'hypothèse centrale est de dire que les jeunes évaluent les rendements de l'investissement scolaire en observant les résultats obtenus par la génération précédente du quartier. Lorsqu'il atteint l'âge adulte, un individu doit décider du lieu de résidence de la famille. À la différence des résultats obtenus dans la littérature, nous montrons que, sous certaines conditions, deux types de ville existent et sont stables. (i) Une ville intégrée peut émerger dans laquelle les quartiers sont composés d'une population hétérogène et présentent les mêmes incitations à l'éducation. (ii) Une ville ségrégée est possible qui comporte un ghetto de pauvres avec une mauvaise information sur l'intérêt de l'éducation et un taux d'éducation faible. Enfin, l'analyse normative n'aboutit pas toujours au même classement des deux équilibres.

International audience ; We develop a new model of a "featureful" city in which locations are di¤erentiated by two attributes, that is, the distance to employment centers and the accessibility to given amenities. The residential equilibrium involves the spatial separation of households sharing similar incomes. Under Stone-Geary preferences, amenities and commuting are subsumed into a location-quality index. Hence, the assignment of households to locations becomes one-dimensional. Since residential choices are driven by the location-quality index, the income mapping may be fully characterized. Using a rich micro-dataset on the Netherlands, we show that household income sorting is indeed driven by amenities and commuting times.

International audience ; We develop a new model of a "featureful" city in which locations are di¤erentiated by two attributes, that is, the distance to employment centers and the accessibility to given amenities. The residential equilibrium involves the spatial separation of households sharing similar incomes. Under Stone-Geary preferences, amenities and commuting are subsumed into a location-quality index. Hence, the assignment of households to locations becomes one-dimensional. Since residential choices are driven by the location-quality index, the income mapping may be fully characterized. Using a rich micro-dataset on the Netherlands, we show that household income sorting is indeed driven by amenities and commuting times.

International audience ; We develop a new model of a "featureful" city in which locations are di¤erentiated by two attributes, that is, the distance to employment centers and the accessibility to given amenities. The residential equilibrium involves the spatial separation of households sharing similar incomes. Under Stone-Geary preferences, amenities and commuting are subsumed into a location-quality index. Hence, the assignment of households to locations becomes one-dimensional. Since residential choices are driven by the location-quality index, the income mapping may be fully characterized. Using a rich micro-dataset on the Netherlands, we show that household income sorting is indeed driven by amenities and commuting times.