Suchergebnisse

AbstractMeanwhile, energy security is threatened in new domains – maritime and cyber. In the maritime domain, military operations target construction works of the new objects as well as operating interconnectors, cables, LNG terminals, and other strategic assets. Regular situational awareness in the Baltic Sea region is lacking, as is sufficient naval and civilian maritime cooperation. In the cyber realm attacks become more frequent and more complex, critical infrastructure being the main target. As cyber security expertise and exercise are lacking and integration into European natural gas and electricity systems is not completed, blackout scenario in the Baltic States remains possible.

The paper explores state sovereignty by developing a systematic framework for categorising states based on their sovereignty status. At the heart of our analysis lies the distinction between sovereign states and satellite states – a distinction that has significant implications for global security, stability, and the balance of power. While sovereign states exercise full autonomy and control over their affairs, satellite states often find themselves in a subordinate position, heavily influenced or even dominated by external powers. A theoretical framework deconstructs the concept of sovereignty into four crucial elements: authority, legitimacy, independence, and territoriality, which provide a structured assessment of the level of sovereignty in a state and serve as the basis for our analysis. To illustrate the application of our framework, we adopt a case study approach focused on Belarus. As a nation situated at the crossroads of Eastern Europe with a history marked by geopolitical contestation and strategic manoeuvring, Belarus provides a compelling context for examining sovereignty dynamics. Through a systematic analysis of Belarus' political, economic, and military landscape, we seek to assess its sovereignty status within the framework of our analysis. While the topic of Belarus' sovereignty and integration within Russia has been extensively explored over the years, the innovative contribution of this paper lies in purposefully designed methodology for sovereignty assessment and the use of the latest empirical data while practically applying the model for the case of Belarus.

This article explores the key factors that could lead to a potential spillover of the conflict from Ukraine into Moldova. It also proposes strategies for Moldova to mitigate this risk and safeguard its stability against Russian aggression. By utilizing a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews and quantitative analysis of institutional indices, migration and demographic data, also defense budget figures, the article provides a comprehensive evaluation to address the research question. The theoretical framework is based on the cross-border conflict theory, specifically employing the concept of securitization to frame Moldova's response to security challenges. While the article does not predict outcomes, it highlights Moldova's options to mitigate vulnerabilities and collaboratively enhance stability. Prioritizing the strengthening of the national security framework and proactive diplomatic initiatives emerges as essential.

The study traces the development occurred in the alliance between Putin's Russia and the European far-right parties since the European Parliamentary election held in May 2019. The article briefly summarizes the populist upsurge in Europe, exploring the reasons behind it. Consequently, the relations established between the political actors are outlined, starting with the concept of "sovereign democracy" to cover all the eventual points where the interests of the Kremlin match with those of the European far-right populists. The ultimate purpose of the study is to define three possible macro-scenarios for the alliance and, indirectly, for the European Union in the near term, concluding that even though the uprising of the populist parties has been somehow contained and the alliance has been widely exposed, the far-right still benefits from great success among public opinion. Furthermore, however ephemeral and transitory the collaboration between Putin and the populists may be, it has already laid the foundations for a more fruitful understanding. Russia's importance as an economic and political partner will grow as its friendly political forces do and their mutual sympathy will stand until there are reciprocal gains.

The study traces the development occurred in the alliance between Putin's Russia and the European far-right parties since the European Parliamentary election held in May 2019. The article briefly summarizes the populist upsurge in Europe, exploring the reasons behind it. Consequently, the relations established between the political actors are outlined, starting with the concept of "sovereign democracy" to cover all the eventual points where the interests of the Kremlin match with those of the European far-right populists. The ultimate purpose of the study is to define three possible macro-scenarios for the alliance and, indirectly, for the European Union in the near term, concluding that even though the uprising of the populist parties has been somehow contained and the alliance has been widely exposed, the far-right still benefits from great success among public opinion. Furthermore, however ephemeral and transitory the collaboration between Putin and the populists may be, it has already laid the foundations for a more fruitful understanding. Russia's importance as an economic and political partner will grow as its friendly political forces do and their mutual sympathy will stand until there are reciprocal gains.

The study traces the development occurred in the alliance between Putin's Russia and the European far-right parties since the European Parliamentary election held in May 2019. The article briefly summarizes the populist upsurge in Europe, exploring the reasons behind it. Consequently, the relations established between the political actors are outlined, starting with the concept of "sovereign democracy" to cover all the eventual points where the interests of the Kremlin match with those of the European far-right populists. The ultimate purpose of the study is to define three possible macro-scenarios for the alliance and, indirectly, for the European Union in the near term, concluding that even though the uprising of the populist parties has been somehow contained and the alliance has been widely exposed, the far-right still benefits from great success among public opinion. Furthermore, however ephemeral and transitory the collaboration between Putin and the populists may be, it has already laid the foundations for a more fruitful understanding. Russia's importance as an economic and political partner will grow as its friendly political forces do and their mutual sympathy will stand until there are reciprocal gains.

The study traces the development occurred in the alliance between Putin's Russia and the European far-right parties since the European Parliamentary election held in May 2019. The article briefly summarizes the populist upsurge in Europe, exploring the reasons behind it. Consequently, the relations established between the political actors are outlined, starting with the concept of "sovereign democracy" to cover all the eventual points where the interests of the Kremlin match with those of the European far-right populists. The ultimate purpose of the study is to define three possible macro-scenarios for the alliance and, indirectly, for the European Union in the near term, concluding that even though the uprising of the populist parties has been somehow contained and the alliance has been widely exposed, the far-right still benefits from great success among public opinion. Furthermore, however ephemeral and transitory the collaboration between Putin and the populists may be, it has already laid the foundations for a more fruitful understanding. Russia's importance as an economic and political partner will grow as its friendly political forces do and their mutual sympathy will stand until there are reciprocal gains.

Abstract
Meanwhile, energy security is threatened in new domains – maritime and cyber. In the maritime domain, military operations target construction works of the new objects as well as operating interconnectors, cables, LNG terminals, and other strategic assets. Regular situational awareness in the Baltic Sea region is lacking, as is sufficient naval and civilian maritime cooperation. In the cyber realm attacks become more frequent and more complex, critical infrastructure being the main target. As cyber security expertise and exercise are lacking and integration into European natural gas and electricity systems is not completed, blackout scenario in the Baltic States remains possible.

[straipsnis, santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba]
Praėjus 27-eriems nepriklausomybės metams ir 13-ai narystės Europos Sąjungoje metų, elektros energijos srityje Baltijos šalys vis dar veikia iš Maskvos valdomoje sinchroninėje IPS/UPS zonoje, o iki 2014 m. pabaigos buvo visiškai priklausomos ir nuo Rusijoje priimamų sprendimų dėl gamtinių dujų tiekimo ir jų kainos. Vis dėlto priklausymas tai pačiai elektros energetikos sistemai ir Kaliningrado aprūpinimo per Lietuvą veiksnys teisinio abipusiškumo ir pasitikėjimo tarp Baltijos šalių ir Rusijos nesukūrė. Atvirkščiai, Rusijos politika sąlygojo konkrečius neigiamus padarinius Baltijos valstybėms: didesnes didmenines gamtinių dujų kainas, politinių, techninių bei kitų priežasčių sąlygotus energijos tiekimo sutrikimus, politinį šantažą ir pan. Kita vertus, pastarojo meto Lietuvos, Latvijos ir Estijos pažanga, siekiant energetinės nepriklausomybės, nuteikia optimistiškai – Baltijos šalys, regis, atrado Rusijos spaudimui pasipriešinti tinkamas priemones.

[only abstract in English; full article, abstract in Lithuanian] The infrastructural dependency of the Baltic States on Russia, even a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has lead to technological dependence and the maintenance of relations between scientists, business groups and political decision-makers. All this has further strengthened Moscow's tools in the area of energy geopolitics in the Baltic region. On the other hand, use of the so-called "punishment" instruments, intended to force other states to review their policies toward a Moscow-leaning direction, has actually failed. Looking back, one may even say that the result was opposite: an aggressive Russian policy encouraged smaller countries to seek alternative supply routes, other partners and directions for integration. In this context, Lithuania may only appreciate that Moscow was not active enough in applying the positive instruments – offering preferential loans for the development of energy infrastructure, providing discounts for purchased resources etc. Namely these tactics would, in the long run, only increase the damage for Lithuania as an importer of energy resources.Thus, Russia's pressure (primarily in the field of natural gas supply and pricing) did not force the Baltic States to act in accordance with its guidelines, for example, to refrain from criticizing the Nord Stream or postpone their integration into the network of Continental Europe. On the contrary – due to the lack of active application of negative measures and the absence of any positive instruments, Lithuania has invested in the LNG terminal, electricity interconnections, a synchronization project, and it took certain political measures by taking part in the creation of the EU Energy Union. Of course, some elements of the "punishment" policy have been successful for Russia: in 2009, the Ostrovets NPP project reduced the attractiveness of the joint Baltic States' and Poland nuclear power plant project to the extent that it was abandoned. Extensive damage was caused not only to the economy of the country (Lithuania had definitely lost a potentially very important engine for its economy), but also to the image of the state, since Lithuania was eventually forced to freeze the Visaginas NPP project, which had been initiated and regionally promoted by Lithuania for more than a decade.Not everything may be considered as part of a strategy that is logical and "irresistible" for the states that strive to drop their dependency on the dominant supplier. For instance, this can be said of the EU-wide disagreements on NS2, which cause uncertainty about the EU's unity and both its ability and willingness to fulfill its earlier commitments. Without agreeing to either stopping the construction of the Ostrovets NPP or selecting another site, Lithuania attempts to send a message to Minsk saying that such a construction is unacceptable, yet it does not receive adequate support even from its closest neighbors. The membership of the Baltic States in the IPS/UPS system could easily be used for political purposes in Russia quite soon, but the Baltic States are not very keen on speeding up any political agreement on the most favorable direction of the synchronization. There is no common long-term solution for alternative gas imports into the Baltic countries, too. Nevertheless, the latest trends are of optimistic nature: the current combination of political will and economic opportunities in the Baltic States and the EU should be a sufficient boon for reaching the set goal of the Baltic States' integration into the Western European energy systems until 2025. ; [straipsnis, santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba] Praėjus 27-eriems nepriklausomybės metams ir 13-ai narystės Europos Sąjungoje metų, elektros energijos srityje Baltijos šalys vis dar veikia iš Maskvos valdomoje sinchroninėje IPS/UPS zonoje, o iki 2014 m. pabaigos buvo visiškai priklausomos ir nuo Rusijoje priimamų sprendimų dėl gamtinių dujų tiekimo ir jų kainos. Vis dėlto priklausymas tai pačiai elektros energetikos sistemai ir Kaliningrado aprūpinimo per Lietuvą veiksnys teisinio abipusiškumo ir pasitikėjimo tarp Baltijos šalių ir Rusijos nesukūrė. Atvirkščiai, Rusijos politika sąlygojo konkrečius neigiamus padarinius Baltijos valstybėms: didesnes didmenines gamtinių dujų kainas, politinių, techninių bei kitų priežasčių sąlygotus energijos tiekimo sutrikimus, politinį šantažą ir pan. Kita vertus, pastarojo meto Lietuvos, Latvijos ir Estijos pažanga, siekiant energetinės nepriklausomybės, nuteikia optimistiškai – Baltijos šalys, regis, atrado Rusijos spaudimui pasipriešinti tinkamas priemones.