Faced with an international trend to replace security planning based on threats by one based on capacities, the present article analyzes the German, French and British example of capacity-generated development on a state-nation level. Furthermore, the article takes the example of the European Union to explain reciprocal effects that occur between nation-states and international organizations in this range. Tables, References. O. van Zijl
While the EU has subscribed to the Comprehensive Approach (CA) on the rhetorical level, it struggles to effectively apply its unique toolbox and substantial resources, and that particularly in the area of peacebuilding. Hence, numerous actors call for an EU peacebuilding strategy to define and prioritize the Union's objectives and to improve the coordination and effectiveness of its Instruments across the peacebuilding activities, i.e., civil and military capabilities, institutions and operations. This article shows that such a strategy is both necessary and doable. First, it defines the underlying concepts: strategy and peacebuilding. Second, it analyses the EU-settings in which peacebuilding concepts, instruments and resources are located and identifies factors that regularly spoil strategic coherence within EU peacebuilding. Third, by applying strategy analysis to the context of peacebuilding this paper develops a definition of a peacebuilding strategy and describes how such a strategy could improve the effectiveness of the EU's CA. It shows that successful strategies are based on strategic coherence: (a) strategies, able to deal with the existing diversity of concepts, institutions and resources, and b) that strategic planning, capability development and implementation form a coherent process. Adapted from the source document.
The "revolution in military affairs" is a focal point of security policy making & arms dynamics today. The basis of this (r)evolution is formed by the ever-intensifying integration of information technology in strategies, weapon systems, & armed forces' structures. This debate is overlapped by a discourse on the role of information as a central factor in future warfare, both in terms of capabilities & threats. As this article shows, different concepts get mixed up under the generic term information warfare. However, the two main lines of argument, information-based warfare & cyberwarfare, show multiple differences. This becomes most visible if one takes a look at the different goals & means as well as the respective status of realization, but also with regard to the problems & risks as well as possible reactions. Adapted from the source document.
The European Security Strategy (ESS) not only furthered the common European security & defence policy, but also named for the first time a set of concrete threats for the security of the EU. The ESS furthermore formulated the objective to combine the efforts of the Union, thus enabling a common approach to counter these threats. One of the results is the European Security Research Program (ESRP) put forward by the European Commission. As we will show, the ESRP remains plagued by several inconsistencies which impair its effectiveness: while potentially providing viable solutions the program might also generate undesirable consequences due to these inherent problems. These potential risks & their management also mark the point of reference for a proposed interdisciplinary research program concerned with the impact of new security technologies on European societies & individuals. Adapted from the source document.
