Suchergebnisse

peer-reviewed ; This doctoral thesis describes and explains the bargaining success of the member states and the European Parliament party groups (intra-institutional actors), and the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank and the Parliament (inter-institutional) actors in the negotiations on the European Council's Task Force report on economic governance and the Six-Pack legislative package on reforming the Stability and Growth Pact. Bargaining success is measured between the policy positions of the inter-institutional and intra-institutional actors and the decision outcomes on a wide range of controversies. Theoretical expectations on the variation in the bargaining success of the actors are developed from a wide range of studies on legislative procedures and bargaining models. The analyses are based on a dataset on the most controversial issues from the 2010 Task Force on economic governance and 2011 Six-Pack negotiations. The descriptive findings indicate that a mainly a North/East axis of member states, a right to centre constellation of party groups, the European Council, the Council of Ministers and European Central Bank shaped the outcome of the negotiations. The explanatory findings indicate that proximity to the European Central Bank and the European Council for member states, proximity to the European Central Bank and to the Council of Ministers and holding the position of rapporteur for party groups, and proximity to the European Council for the legislative institutions increased the bargaining success of the policy actors.

This article assesses the factors associated with member states' bargaining success during the negotiations in the European Council's 2010 task force on strengthening economic governance, the pre-decision stage for the Six-Pack. We test theories of decision-making based on the expertise of institutions, and EU member states' preferences and power resources using new data. With methods derived from the decision-making in the EU projects, we find that proximity to the European Central Bank was associated with greater bargaining success for member states and that the opposite was the case for closeness to the Commission's preferences. We find mixed evidence that member states' level of indebtedness is associated with bargaining success, defined as the minimum distance between the position of a member state and the final outcome. The findings indicate the importance of the ECB's role given its technical expertise, in defining the outcomes of the task force.

AbstractThis study revisits the salience of the Brexit negotiations using an advanced Decision‐Making in the European Union (EU) methodology to assess the relative importance of 20 key issues amongst the EU27 member states, the European Commission and the UK. Unlike earlier studies that suggest more uniform salience levels, except for the UK, our analysis identifies eight clusters of actors influenced by their political, economic and geographical contexts. These differences in salience levels have been conducive to logrolling, which likely supported a unified EU stance and a successful agreement with the UK. Additionally, our research quantitatively confirms the UK's distinct salience position, highlighting its isolation and reducing its ability to use divisive negotiation tactics. These findings offer insights into both the dynamics of past Brexit negotiations and ongoing EU–UK policy developments. They contribute to the analysis of Brexit and international negotiations in general by systematically exploring salience in high‐level diplomatic negotiations.