The study of "divided government" has focused on the split partisan control of executive & legislative branches. The concept of divided government can also be applied to the study of state executive branches. There is no plausible reason for state electorates to prefer one party for governor & the opposing party for other state executive branch officials, yet many states have a governor of one party, while several of the state executive branch officers are of the opposing party. This study examines the extent of divided executive branches in state politics. Incumbency, state partisanship, & the changing nature of Southern politics affect levels of divisiveness in state executive branches. Electoral features do not affect levels of divisiveness. The data comprise states that had separately elected state executive officers between 1968 & 1993. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 27 References. Adapted from the source document.
Although retrospective evaluations of the economy and other issues have been hypothesized as major determinants of vote choice in national and congressional elections, there has been little systematic analysis of retrospective voting in presidential primary elections. Using the 1980 Democratic primary, the author examines the influence of perceptions of the economy and other retrospective issues in selecting a party's nominee for the presidency. Although the voters' family financial situation was a significant determinant of vote choice, voters' perceptions of Carter's handling of the economy exhibited the greatest relative impact in the model. Retrospective evaluations of the energy crisis and foreign affairs, as well as ideological orientation (representing "prospective" evaluations), were also found to have an important impact on vote choice in the presidential primaries. In short, this study demonstrates that, when a primary is contested by an incumbent president, primary voters behave in a similar manner to general election voters.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Wisconsin through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry is a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates, state constitutional office candidates, and political party committees. In the 1987-88 election cycle, the tobacco industry directly contributed $9,079 to legislators and candidates. In the 1995-96 election cycle the tobacco industry directly contributed $41,125. A majority of tobacco industry campaign contributions to legislative candidates and political parties have shifted from the Democratic party to the Republican party. In the 1987-1988, 1989-1990, and 1991-1992 elections cycles, the tobacco industry contributed 47%, 30% and 44%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. During the 1993-1994 and 1995-1996 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry contributed 51% and 62%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. A relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she will support tobacco control efforts. Several health related groups, such as the Health and Hospital Association, the Wisconsin Association of HMOs, and the Employer Health Care Cooperative Alliance, are represented by many of the same lobbyists as the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Madison was the first city in Wisconsin to pass a smokefree restaurant ordinance. Middleton and Shorewood Heights, suburbs of Madison, have also passed smoke free restaurant ordinances. Attempts at other smokefree ordinances have failed. Fond du Lac passed a ban on self service displays in 1991. However, a state circuit court and a state appellate court ruled that a 1985 state law preempts localities from passing more stringent local ordinances regarding minors' access to tobacco. Tobacco control efforts in Wisconsin have been characterized by a series of isolated initiatives with little structure or institutional support. This failure of the public health community to develop an institutional base capable of following through on victories or retooling from defeats may explain the lack of progress in tobacco control in Wisconsin.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Ohio through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates and political party committees. In the 1981-1982 election cycle, the tobacco industry contributed $3,970 to candidates and parties. In 1995-1996, the tobacco industry contributed $55,440 to candidates and parties. A majority of tobacco industry contributions to legislative candidates and political are contributed to the Republican party. During the 1991-92 and 1993-1994 electoral cycles, the tobacco industry contributed 54% and 53%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. During the 1995-1996 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry contributed 77% of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. In contrast to other states, there is not a statistically significant relationship between tobacco industry campaign contributions and legislative behavior in Ohio. Several health related groups, such as Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and United Health Care of Ohio, Association of Physician Assistants, the Ohio Health Information Management Association, and Ohio Dietetic Association are represented by lobbyists who also represent the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Franklin County in 1994 and Knox County in 1995 had formulated regulations making almost all or all public places smokefree. These regulations were rejected in Ohio courts. Since these defeats, there has been no progress (except voluntarily) on smokefree public places. Tobacco control advocates and organizations have effectively organized in preventing preemptive youth access legislation from passing in the Ohio state legislature.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in New Jersey through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates, gubernatorial candidates, and political party committees. In the 1982-1983 election cycle, the tobacco industry contributed $17,249 to candidates and parties. In 1994-1995, the tobacco industry contributed $269,075 to candidates and parties. The tobacco industry was the leading contributor to political parties and leadership PACs in New Jersey during the 1994-1995 election cycle. The combined contributions from Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, the Tobacco Institute, Smokeless Tobacco Council, US Tobacco, Coast Cigarettes and New Jersey Amusement Co., to political parties and leadership PACs totaled $233,100. Although direct campaign contributions to legislative candidates has decreased slightly since 1990-1991, the tobacco industry has compensated by contributing to leadership PACs, which have no campaign contributions limits. In 1994-1995 the tobacco industry contributed $192,550 to leadership PACs, $107,800 to Republican leadership PACs and $84,750 to Democratic leadership PACs. In addition to providing campaign contributions, the tobacco industry is active in lobbying members of the legislature and the administration. During the 1994-1995 legislature, the tobacco industry spent $725,107 in lobbying expenditures. The tobacco industry became an especially active lobby during the 1986-1987 legislative session after the legislature had passed several clean indoor air laws in the early and mid 1980s. A relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she is to support tobacco control efforts. The tobacco industry also tends to contribute more money to legislators that have supported the industry in the past. Several health related groups, such as Blue Cross, the Medco Behavioral Care Corporation, and Cathedral Health Care Systems, are represented by many of the same lobbyists as the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Before 1994, there were very few local smoke free or limiting tobacco to children ordinances in New Jersey. Since 1994, when the state Supreme Court upheld the 1990 East Brunswick ordinance that banned vending machines, 153 New Jersey localities have passed smoke free air ordinances or ordinances controlling the availability of tobacco to children. Despite a state Supreme Court decision to uphold the East Brunswick ordinance that eliminated cigarette vending machines, New Jersey cigarette distributors continue to legally challenge municipalities that enact ordinances that eliminate cigarette vending machines.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Pennsylvania through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates, state constitutional office candidates, and political party committees. In the 1979-1980 election cycle, the tobacco industry contributed $3,600 to candidates and parties. In 1995-1996, the tobacco industry contributed $65,850 to candidates and parties. A majority of tobacco industry contributions to legislative candidates and political parties have shifted from the Democratic party to the Republican party. During the 1991-92 and 1993-1994 electoral cycles, the tobacco industry contributed 40% and 38%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. During the 1995-1996 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry contributed 53% of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. A relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she is to support tobacco control efforts. The tobacco industry also tends to contribute more money to legislators that have supported the industry in the past. Legislative behavior significantly influenced the level of tobacco industry contributions in 1993-1994, but did not in 1995-1996. Several health related groups, such as Abington Memorial Hospital, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Lehigh Valley Hospital and the Family Health Council are represented by lobbyists who also represent the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Pennsylvania was one of the first states to pass statewide legislation (the 1988 Clean Indoor Air Act) that preempts localities from enacting stronger clean indoor air ordinances than that of statewide law. Lower Merion township was the first locality in Pennsylvania to ban all cigarette vending machines in 1991. However, an injunction sought by local cigarette vending machine companies prevented Lower Merion from enforcing its ordinance. Although the constitutional merits of the case were never decided, the failure of health organizations and public officials to defend the ordinance and the threat of lawsuits by cigarette vending machine companies stopped the spread of ordinances that completely ban cigarette vending machines. The creation of the Uptown Coalition represented a significant broadening of the tobacco control community to explicitly include the African-American community, and represented the first time a specific tobacco brand was derailed in 1990. The Uptown Coalition remains active in Philadelphia local tobacco control efforts. Pennsylvania tobacco control organizations have unsuccessfully attempted to pass statewide youth access legislation. The inclusion of preemption in statewide youth access legislation has divided the Pennsylvania tobacco control community.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in the state of Washington through campaign contributions, lobbying, and filing lawsuits. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates. In the 1985-86 legislative session, the tobacco industry contributed $31,100 to legislative candidates. Contributions reached a peak during the 1989-90 legislative session when the tobacco industry contributed $119,059 to legislative candidates. During the current 1995-1996 election cycle, the tobacco industry has contributed $69,573 to legislative candidates between January 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Tobacco industry contributions to legislative candidates is expected to exceed the 1993-1994 amount of $70,524. During the 1993-1994 legislative session, the combined contributions of Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the Tobacco Institute ranked eighth among top contributors to legislative campaigns in Washington. In the past few election cycles, there has been a significant shift in tobacco industry contributions away from the Democratic party and towards the Republican party in Washington. During the 1989-90 election cycle, 47 percent of tobacco industry contributions to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties and party controlled committees went to the Republican party. Contributions to Republicans increased to 60 percent in the 1991-1992 election cycle and 66 percent in the 1993-1994 election cycle. Between January 1, 1995 and September 30, 1996, the tobacco industry contributions to the Republican party has increased to 83 percent. The tobacco industry makes significant contributions to legislative leaders. House Speaker Clyde Ballard has received $11,880 in tobacco industry contributions since 1986, more than any other current legislator. All Republican House Leaders have received tobacco industry contributions and generally had more pro-tobacco industry policy scores. In the Senate, where the Democrats held a one vote majority during the 1995-1996 session, Majority Leader Sid Snyder received $3,600 from the tobacco industry throughout his career. Valoria Loveland, the Democratic Caucus Chair, received $1,600 in tobacco industry contributions during the 1995-1996 electoral cycle. In addition to providing campaign contributions, the tobacco industry is active in lobbying members of the legislature and the administration. In 1993 and 1994, the tobacco industry spent $643,188. The trend suggests that the tobacco industry will exceed that amount during the 1995-1996 session. In 1995, the tobacco industry spent $368,660 in lobbying expenditures, an increase in the rate of lobbying expenditures over the previous election cycle. The tobacco industry became an especially active lobby in 1991 and 1992, after a number of local smoke free and youth access ordinances were passed in Washington cities and counties. A statistical relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she is to support tobacco control efforts. The tobacco industry also tends to contribute more money to legislators that have supported the industry in the past. Besides campaign contributions and lobbying, the tobacco industry has used legal tactics to slow down tobacco control activity in the state of Washington. Legal action by the tobacco industry has 1) lead the city of Puyallup to rescind a smoke-free restaurant ordinance, 2) forced the Department of Labor and Industries to defend their clean indoor air regulations in Superior court, and 3) has created an atmosphere of intimidation among organizations associated with Project ASSIST. Despite the highest tobacco tax in the nation, none of the money raised from tobacco taxes has been earmarked for tobacco prevention or cessation programs. The state of Washington is among 19 states and counties that is suing the tobacco industry in order to recover health and medical costs associated with tobacco related illnesses.
The tobacco industry is a major and increasing political force in Colorado through campaign contributions, lobbying, and initiative campaigns. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative and statewide candidates. In the 1979-1980 election cycle, the industry contributed only $725 to legislative candidates. In the 1993-1994 election cycle, contributions to legislative and statewide candidates increased to $60,800. In 1995 alone, the tobacco industry has contributed $37,350 to current legislators and state constitutional officers. This puts the industry at a pace to exceed its 1993-1994 election cycle donations. In 1994, the combined contributions of Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds and the Tobacco and Candy PAC ranked sixth among top contributors to legislative and statewide candidates in Colorado. In the 1993-1994 cycle, 89% of tobacco industry contributions went to incumbent legislators. Although the tobacco industry has provided some support to challengers, most contributions are to support incumbents. The tobacco industry contributes higher sums of money to legislative leaders and key committee members. House Speaker Chuck Berry (R-El Paso) has received $5,150 since 1984. President pro tem of the Senate, Tilman Bishop (R-Mesa), has received $3,225 since 1982. Almost 36 percent of the contributions to legislative candidates in 1995 went to legislators who are currently on the Legislative Council -- a joint committee of the state legislature that has the power to regulate smoking in the state Capitol. Members of the powerful Joint Budget Committee have also received significant contributions from the tobacco industry. In addition to providing campaign contributions, the tobacco industry is active in lobbying members of the legislature and the administration. In 1993 and 1994, the tobacco industry spent $263,559 in lobbying expenditures. The trend is that the tobacco industry will exceed that amount during the 1995-96 session. In 1995, the tobacco industry spent $144,438 in lobbying expenditures, an increase in the rate of lobbying expenditures over the previous election cycle. The tobacco industry became an especially active lobby in 1987 and 1988, after a number of local smoke free ordinances were passed in Colorado municipalities. In 1994, Amendment 1, the initiative to increase Colorado's excise tax on a pack of cigarettes by fifty cents, was defeated. The tobacco industry spent over $5.5 million to defeat the initiative. A statistical relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she is to support tobacco control efforts. The tobacco industry also tends to contribute more money to legislators that have supported the industry in the past. The Colorado General Assembly appears to be anti-tobacco control in contrast to public opinion and Colorado local governments where most tobacco control efforts have been enacted. Despite public opinion in favor of clean indoor air and vigorous local tobacco control efforts, the Colorado General Assembly has not supported tobacco control issues. The General Assembly tends to pass weak legislation regarding tobacco control. Increased tobacco industry political spending at the state level appears to coincide with increased tobacco control action in local communities. The tobacco industry seeks preemptive legislation to counteract local tobacco control efforts. State preemption bills were introduced in 1993 and 1996, but public health groups stopped them both times.
January 1, 1996 through May 31, 1997 was an active period for tobacco policy making in California. The fight in Spring, 1996, over the allocation of Proposition 99 revenues was more public and aggressive than it had been in the past, an increased level of public scrutiny was brought to bear on the implementation of the media campaign, the state of California's failure to sue the tobacco industry for recovery of medical costs became a political issue, and the tobacco industry continued to give generously to California legislators. In 1996, the Legislature and the Governor in 1996 observed the voters' mandate on the funding levels for the Proposition 99 Health Education programs. The Health Education Account was allocated 20% of the tax revenues, and these funds were appropriated to anti-tobacco education programs instead of to medical services. The Research Account was restored to receiving the 5% of the tax revenues, as the voters had mandated, after several years of receiving less than 1%. This positive action on the part of the Legislature and the Governor followed an aggressive, public campaign on the part of several key constituency groups: the American Heart Association, Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, and, to a lesser extent, the American Cancer Society and the American Lung Association. After the legislative battle, however, the constituency groups were faced with the failure of the Wilson Administration to conduct the kind of aggressive media campaign that it had done in the early years of the program. In particular, the Administration did not want to attack the tobacco industry, a strategy of proven effectiveness in reducing tobacco use. It had only expended $6,554,000 of the $12,197,000 allocated to the media campaign in 1995-1996, and, in 1996-97, did not release any new media until March 20, 1997. The conduct of the media campaign remains a concern for the constituency groups. The state of California has not yet sued the tobacco industry, although 32 other states had done so as of May 31, 1997. Although Attorney General Dan Lungren has claimed he is prevented from filing a lawsuit under California's products liability law, many people believe that this is not the case, because lawsuits filed by other states allege fraud, violations of the Business and Professions Code, violations of the racketeering laws, and violations of antitrust laws and breach of warranty. They are not product liability actions. The legislature is considering several laws that would clarify California's ability to sue, and has passed one such bill and sent it to the Governor for signature. Campaign contributions by the tobacco industry have tended to favor the party in power in California. During the 1991-1992 election cycle, 41 percent of tobacco industry contributions to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties, and party controlled committees went to the Republican party. In 1993-94, this increased to 45 percent. In 1995-1996, when the Republicans gained control of the Assembly, 57 percent of the contributions went to them. When the Democrats regained control of the Assembly in November, 1996, however, most of the contributions given between the election and December, 1996, went to Democrats. In California, Republican state legislators are perceived as more pro-tobacco industry than the Democratic state legislators. The tobacco industry has been generous in California. Between January, 1, 1995 and December 31, 1996, the tobacco industry contributed a total of $1,252,804 to legislative officeholders and legislative candidates. On a per member basis, California legislators in 1995-96 received more money than the members of Congress, $10,440 per member versus $5,044 per member. Both Assembly Speaker Cruz Bustamante (D-Fresno) ($63,750) and Senate President pro Tempore Bill Lockyer (D-Hayward) ($127,875) received more money that U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich ($30,500). The top three recipients of campaign contributions in California in 1995-1996 (Table 5) received more than the top three recipients in Congress in 1995. Lockyer, Assembly Member Curt Pringle (R-Garden Grove) and Assembly Member Curtis Tucker (D-Inglewood) received $127,875, $105,750 and $93,926 respectively. In Congress, the top three recipients in 1995-1996 were Congressmen from tobacco growing states. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) and Representative Bart Gordon (D-Tennessee) received $48,500, $35,150 and $33,000; respectively. Attorney General Dan Lungren was the top recipient of tobacco industry campaign contributions among the state constitutional officers in 1995-96, receiving $28,500. In six California legislative races, tobacco industry campaign contributions were an issue and in four of those, the candidate who was attacked for taking contributions lost.
In the past few election cycles, there has been a significant shift in tobacco industry contributions away from the Democratic party and towards the Republican party in California. During the 1991-1992 election cycle, 41 percent of tobacco industry contributions to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties and party controlled committees went to the Republican party. In the 1993-1994 election cycle, contributions to Republicans increased to 45 percent. During the current 1995-1996 election cycle, tobacco industry contributions to the Republican party has increased to 56 percent. The tobacco industry contributed a total of $553,673 to legislative officeholders and candidates between January 1, 1995 and March 26, 1996. $273,979 of this amount was contributed from January 1, 1996 through March 26, 1996, the date of the primary election. In California, Republican state legislators are significantly more pro-tobacco industry than Democratic state legislators. Comparing contributions made to legislators in California to contributions made to current members of Congress, the top three recipients in California in 1995 received more than the top three recipients in Congress in 1995. Former Assembly Speaker Willie Brown (D-San Francisco), Senator Ken Maddy (R-Fresno), and Assemblyman Jim Brulte (R-Rancho Cucamonga) received $35,250, $28,500 and $25,000; respectively in 1995. In Congress, the top three recipients in 1995 were Congressmen from tobacco growing states. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Representative Lewis Payne (D-Virginia) and Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tennessee) received $32,500, $24,500 and $22,500; respectively. In addition, during the last decade, the top recipients in California received more than the top recipients in the United States Congress. On a per member basis, California legislators in 1995 have received more money than the members of Congress in 1995. The tobacco industry had contributed $2,331 per member in the state of California. In comparison, the tobacco industry contributed $1,859 per member of Congress. Both former Assembly Speaker Willie Brown and current Assembly Speaker Curt Pringle received more tobacco industry contributions in 1995 than United States House of Representative's Speaker Newt Gingrich ($13,500). Willie Brown received $35,250 in 1995. The new Assembly Speaker, Republican Curt Pringle, received $16,250 in 1995. The tobacco industry has recently been making large last minute contributions in the weeks prior to an election. The tobacco industry made a contribution of $125,000 to Steve Kuykendall a few days before the 1994 general election. The tobacco industy also made several large contributions, including five $20,000 contributions, in the weeks prior to the March 26, 1996 California primary. In 1988, California voters passed Proposition 99, the Tobacco Tax and Health Promotion Act, increasing the state tobacco tax by 25 cents on a pack of cigarettes and 42 cents on other tobacco products. The initiative also created the largest and most aggressive tobacco control program in the world. The initiative specified how the revenue raised from the tobacco tax would be spent. Twenty percent of the revenues raised were earmarked for health education and five percent was earmarked for research on tobacco related diseases. The Governor and the Legislature have diverted a total of $280 million from anti-tobacco education and research to medical services. The level of political activity by the tobacco industry in California probably reflects the importance of California's tobacco control program. From enactment on January 1, 1989 through June 30, 1995, the combined effect of the tax increase mandated by Proposition 99 and the effect of the tobacco control programs dramatically accelerated the rate of decline of tobacco consumption in California. These effects reduced total cigarette consumption by 2.1 billion packs of cigarettes, worth $2.9 billion in pre-tax revenues to the tobacco companies. Thus, the tobacco industry has a strong incentive to reduce the magnitude or effectiveness of the Proposition 99 tobacco control programs. Diversions of Proposition 99 anti-tobacco education and research funds have decreased program effectiveness. Assuming a constant program effect, the result of these diversions was probably the fact that Californians smoked an additional 584 million packs of cigarettes, worth about $880 million in pre-tax sales above that which would have occurred had Proposition 99 been implemented as the voters mandated. Viewed in this context, the $21,139,152 the tobacco industry has spent on campaign contributions, lobbying, and other political activities (excluding $18,974,675 in the tobacco industry's unsuccessful attempt to enact Proposition 188 in 1994) in California since 1989 (when Proposition 99 went into force) was an excellent, and understandable, investment. Twice in 1995, Superior Court judges have ruled illegal the diversion of monies from the Proposition 99 Health Education and Research Accounts to medical services approved by the Legislature and Governor. In 1996, the Governor has again proposed diverting funds. The Legislature will act this summer.
