Suchergebnisse

In a dispute, governments weigh up their options when selecting between various dispute settlement mechanisms. By scrutinising the interaction of institutional design with state interests, this book analyses why particular forums are selected in maritime boundary disputes.

States engage in forum shopping when choosing a method for peaceful dispute settlement. As rational actors they weigh their options selecting either bilateral negotiations, a political third party or judicial means. The overarching concern of a government in combination with a forum's characteristics accounts for the specific choice in a given dispute. This paper develops an analytical framework identifying three distinct rationales guiding forum choice (1) achieving a favorable decision, (2) domestic leeway, and (3) gaining international visibility. This framework is applied to the Caribbean Sea boundary dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras. The case study clearly support the most central assumption of forum shopping that disputants choose the forum which they expect to award them a favorable decision.

When do states turn to the United Nations Security Council? Today the term threat to peace is interpreted more widely than ever before ranging from inter-state conflict over internal wars to humanitarian crisis. Alarming the Security Council to international crisis is an exceptional foreign policy choice. By far more conflicts are not brought to the attention of the Security Council than are put before that body. The paper explores when states actually turn to the Security Council and term a crisis a threat to international peace. One the one hand, the Security the Council has assumed a much more visible and active role in international dispute settlement since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the unilateral decision of the United States to invade Iraq raised serious doubts about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN's collective security system. A much repeated truism reminds UN scholars that any system of collective security can be only as good as its members want it to be. But so far we do not have a clear understanding of what its members do want it to be. While the option to involve the UN Security Council in any situation endangering peace is equally open to all states, only some states address the UN in some conflict situations. From this starting point, this paper contributes to the understanding of the role of the UN in fostering conflict resolution as well as shedding light on foreign policy choices by states. In what situations do states turn to the Security Council? Which states take the decision to alert the Council? And what do states want from the Council once they did? Addressing these questions, the paper presents instances in which states decided to turn to the Security Council. The systematic assessment builds on a set of case studies that includes different types of conflict situations in the 1990s as well as different states. States bring crisis situations before the Council which they either perceive as an immediate threat to themselves or as a threat to norms shared by the international community. The paper concludes with some generalizations about reasons for states to turn to the UN Security Council.

Many claim a process of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures is taking place. In order to capture this ongoing process we introduce an analytical framework to assess the degree of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures. We then proceed to present preliminary results of applying this framework to the procedure and practice of dispute settlement in the United Nations Security Council. In our concept, judicialization means that international dispute settlement procedures increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. the principle of a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law. We use a graded scale ranging from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial procedures to assess the degree of judicialization of any given dispute settlement procedure. From our institutionalist point of view, it is entirely an empirical question whether - and if so when - judicialized dispute settlement procedures lead to a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. For this reason we analyze in a second step the corresponding practice of dispute settlement. The degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedure within the framework of the United Nations Security Council remains low. Nonetheless, our comparison of the periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 suggests so far an increasing judicialization of the dispute settlement practice within the Security Council.

States engage in forum shopping when choosing a method for peaceful dispute settlement. As rational actors they weigh their options selecting either bilateral negotiations, a political third party or judicial means. The overarching concern of a government in combination with a forum's characteristics accounts for the specific choice in a given dispute. This paper develops an analytical framework identifying three distinct rationales guiding forum choice (1) achieving a favorable decision, (2) domestic leeway, and (3) gaining international visibility. This framework is applied to the Caribbean Sea boundary dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras. The case study clearly support the most central assumption of forum shopping that disputants choose the forum which they expect to award them a favorable decision. ; Bei der Wahl zwischen unterschiedlichen Formen der friedlichen Streitbeilegung betreiben Staaten forum shopping. Als rationale Akteure wägen sie ab, ob sie einen Konflikt durch bilaterale Verhandlungen, politische Streitschlichter oder gerichtlich beilegen wollen. Die Kombination aus den Beweggründen einer Regierung und forenspezifischen Eigenschaften bestimmt die Wahl zwischen den verschiedenen Foren. Diese Arbeit entwickelt einen vergleichenden Untersuchungsansatz, der (1) die Erfolgsaussichten, (2) den innenpolitischen Spielraum und (3) die Herstellung internationaler Sichtbarkeit als grundlegende Motive einander gegenüberstellt. Der Konflikt zwischen Nicaragua und Honduras über die Festlegung der gemeinsamen Seegrenze dient als Testfall. Die empirische Untersuchung bekräftigt die Grundannahme von forum shopping, nämlich dass Streitparteien dasjenige Forum wählen, in dem sie die besten Erfolgsaussichten vermuten.

When do states turn to the United Nations Security Council? Today the term threat to peace is interpreted more widely than ever before ranging from inter-state conflict over internal wars to humanitarian crisis. Alarming the Security Council to international crisis is an exceptional foreign policy choice. By far more conflicts are not brought to the attention of the Security Council than are put before that body. The paper explores when states actually turn to the Security Council and term a crisis a threat to international peace. One the one hand, the Security the Council has assumed a much more visible and active role in international dispute settlement since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the unilateral decision of the United States to invade Iraq raised serious doubts about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN's collective security system. A much repeated truism reminds UN scholars that any system of collective security can be only as good as its members want it to be. But so far we do not have a clear understanding of what its members do want it to be. While the option to involve the UN Security Council in any situation endangering peace is equally open to all states, only some states address the UN in some conflict situations. From this starting point, this paper contributes to the understanding of the role of the UN in fostering conflict resolution as well as shedding light on foreign policy choices by states. In what situations do states turn to the Security Council? Which states take the decision to alert the Council? And what do states want from the Council once they did? Addressing these questions, the paper presents instances in which states decided to turn to the Security Council. The systematic assessment builds on a set of case studies that includes different types of conflict situations in the 1990s as well as different states. States bring crisis situations before the Council which they either perceive as an immediate threat to themselves or as a threat to norms shared by the international community. The paper concludes with some generalizations about reasons for states to turn to the UN Security Council. ; Wann wenden sich Staaten an den Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen? Heutzutage wird der Begriff Friedensbedrohung umfassender als je zuvor interpretiert. Die Spannbreite reicht von zwischenstaatlichen Konflikten über interne Kriege bis hin zu humanitären Krisen. Dennoch ist es für Staaten eine außergewöhnliche außenpolitische Entscheidung den UN-Sicherheitsrat anzurufen. Nur in sehr wenigen Situationen lenken Staaten die Aufmerksamkeit des Sicherheitsrats auf internationale Krisen. Das Papier untersucht, wann Staaten sich entscheiden, eine Krise dem Sicherheitsrat vorzulegen und diese als Bedrohung für den Weltfrieden zu bezeichnen. Einerseits übernimmt der UN-Sicherheitsrat eine sichtbare und aktive Rolle in der Konfliktbeilegung seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, andererseits warf spätestens der Irak-Krieg Zweifel über die Legitimität und Effektivität des Sicherheitsrats auf. Eine Binsenweisheit der UN-Forschung betont, dass eine kollektives Sicherheitssystem nur so gut sein kann wie seine Mitglieder es zulassen. Es ist allerdings noch unklar, welche Vorstellungen die Staaten über das Sicherheitssystem der Uno haben. Obwohl allen Staaten offen steht, jede Krisensituationen dem Sicherheitsrat vorzulegen, nutzen nur einige Staaten in wenigen Situationen diese Möglichkeit. In dieser Ausgangslage trägt das Papier zu einem besseren Verständnis über die Rolle der Uno bei der Konfliktbearbeitung wie auch über außenpolitische Entscheidungen von Staaten. In welchen Situationen wenden sich Staaten an den Sicherheitsrat? Welche Staaten entscheiden sich für die Anrufung des Rats? Und was wollen Staaten dann vom Rat? Das Papier stellt Umstände und Krisen vor, in denen Staaten den Sicherheitsrat angerufen haben. Die systematische Erhebung basiert auf Fallstudien und umfasst verschiedene Typen von Konfliktsituationen in den 1990er Jahren und verschiedene Staaten. Staaten wenden sich an den Sicherheitsrat, wenn sie entweder sich unmittelbar selbst bedroht fühlen oder bei einer Gefährdung von Normen der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft. Die Untersuchung unternimmt zum Ende einen Generalisierungsversuch über die Gründe von Staaten, den Sicherheitsrat anzurufen.

In this article, we demonstrate that the ocean is a space of politics and explore the what, who, and how of ocean governance. We first sketch the governance architecture and examine challenges and shortcomings concerning political authority. Starting from a definition of "ocean governance," we highlight that two fundamentally different regulatory approaches are applied to the ocean: a spatial ordering on the one hand and a sectoral segmentation on the other. States are the central actors regulating the use and protection of marine areas, but state sovereignty is stratified, with diminishing degrees of authority farther from the shoreline. As vast marine spaces are beyond the exclusive control of any given territorial state, political authority beyond areas of national jurisdiction must first be created to enable collective decision-making. Consequently, a multitude of authorities regulate human activities in the ocean, producing overlaps, conflicting policies, and gaps. Based on recent contributions to the fast-growing ocean governance research field, we provide a thematic overview structured along the dimensions of maritime security, protection of the marine environment, and economics to unveil patterns of authority in ocean governance.

Wie die Global Governance ist auch die Ocean Governance von einer ausgeprägten Mehrebenenpolitik gekennzeichnet. Lokale, nationale und globale Strukturen wirken zusammen, und es ist eine Vielzahl an staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Akteuren beteiligt. (APuZ)

Many claim a process of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures is taking place. In order to capture this ongoing process we introduce an analytical framework to assess the degree of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures. We then proceed to present preliminary results of applying this framework to the procedure and practice of dispute settlement in the United Nations Security Council. In our concept, judicialization means that international dispute settlement procedures increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. the principle of a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law. We use a graded scale ranging from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial procedures to assess the degree of judicialization of any given dispute settlement procedure. From our institutionalist point of view, it is entirely an empirical question whether - and if so when - judicialized dispute settlement procedures lead to a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. For this reason we analyze in a second step the corresponding practice of dispute settlement. The degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedure within the framework of the United Nations Security Council remains low. Nonetheless, our comparison of the periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 suggests so far an increasing judicialization of the dispute settlement practice within the Security Council. ; Viele Beobachter stellen eine Judizialisierung von internationalen Streitbeilegungsverfahren fest. Um diesen fortlaufenden Prozess erfassen zu können, stellen wir ein Analyseraster für die Bestimmung des Ausmaßes von Vergerichtlichung internationaler Streitbeilegungsverfahren vor. Danach präsentieren wir vorläufige empirische Ergebnisse der Anwendung unseres Rasters auf das Verfahren und die Praxis der Streitbeilegung im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen. Unserem Konzept zu Folge bedeutet Judizialisierung (Vergerichtlichung) von internationalen Streitbeilegungsverfahren die zunehmende Einbeziehung des normativen Grundsatzes von Unparteilichkeit, also einer Gleichbehandlung von gleichartigen Rechtsverletzungen. Wir verwenden eine abgestufte Skala, die von rein diplomatischen bis zu vornehmlich gerichtsförmigen Verfahren reicht, zur Bestimmung des Grades von Vergerichtlichung beliebiger Streitbeilegungsverfahren. Aus unserer institutionalistischen Perspektive ist es eine empirische Frage, ob - und wenn ja, wann - juridizialisierte Streitbeilegungsverfahren zu einer entsprechenden Praxis der Streitbeilegung führen. Aus diesem Grund untersuchen wir in einem zweiten Schritt die Praxis der Streitbeilegung. Das Ausmaß von Vergerichtlichung des Verfahrens im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen ist weiterhin gering. Nichtsdestotrotz weist bislang der Vergleich der Zeiträume 1974-1983 und 1990-1999 auf eine zunehmende Judizialisierung der Streitbeilegungspraxis im Sicherheitsrat hin.