Suchergebnisse

Chapman & Huffman argue that humans are neither unique nor superior to other animals. I believe they are right in claiming that we are no more unique than any other species, but wrong in assuming that this means we cannot be ranked as superior. I show how this need not undermine the central aim of their target article, for superiority can only be measured with respect to a certain standard, and it's only by using anthropocentric standards that we can be plausibly regarded as superior. Other — perhaps more neutral — standards yield different results.

Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands's notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.

AbstractComparative thanatologists study the responses to the dead and the dying in nonhuman animals. Despite the wide variety of thanatological behaviours that have been documented in several different species, comparative thanatologists assume that the concept of death (CoD) is very difficult to acquire and will be a rare cognitive feat once we move past the human species. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is based on two forms of anthropocentrism: (1) an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to an over-intellectualisation of the CoD, and (2) an emotional anthropocentrism, which yields an excessive focus on grief as a reaction to death. Contrary to what these two forms of anthropocentrism suggest, we argue that the CoD requires relatively little cognitive complexity and that it can emerge independently from mourning behaviour. Moreover, if we turn towards the natural world, we can see that the minimal cognitive requirements for a CoD are in fact met by many nonhuman species and there are multiple learning pathways and opportunities for animals in the wild to develop a CoD. This allows us to conclude that the CoD will be relatively easy to acquire and, so, we can expect it to be fairly common in nature.

In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an individual.

Front Matter -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Socio-Cognitive Abilities in Animals as the Object of Science-and What Has Been Neglected Thus Far -- Questions and Objectives of the Book -- Socio-Cognitive Abilities in Animals -- The Concept of Cognition and the Concept of Consciousness -- Culture in Animals? -- Language in Animals? -- Theory of Mind in Animals? -- Summary and Transition -- The Relevance of Socio-Cognitive Abilities in Animals for Animal Ethics and Animal Welfare -- Kinship and Responsibility: the Moral Status of Animals -- Kinship and Responsibility: the Discrepancy between Ethical Demands and the Status Quo -- Summary -- Discussion -- Cognitive Kinship and the Concept of an Evolutionary Self -- A Comparison of Arguments -- Possibilities of Modifying Personhood Rights for Animals -- Alternative: Turn the Focus Back to the Suffering of Animals? -- Final Evaluation of Personhood Rights for Animals -- Back Matter -- Acknowledgments -- Bibliography -- Index.