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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has enjoyed unparalleled military power. The international system is therefore unipolar. A quarter of a century later, however, we still possess no theory of unipolarity. Theory of Unipolar Politics provides one. Dr Nuno P. Monteiro answers three of the most important questions about the workings of a unipolar world. Is it durable? Is it peaceful? What is the best grand strategy a unipolar power such as the contemporary United States can implement? In our nuclear world, the power preponderance of the United States is potentially durable but likely to produce frequent conflict. Furthermore, in order to maintain its power preponderance, the United States must remain militarily engaged in the world and accommodate the economic growth of its major competitors, namely, China. This strategy, however, will lead Washington to wage war frequently. In sum, military power preponderance brings significant benefits but is not an unalloyed good

Kenneth Waltz resisted describing the post-Cold War world as unipolar. This reluctance results from two characteristics of his structural realism: its naturalistic view of systemic balances of power and its focus on relations among great powers. Yet, Waltz's thinking on the nuclear revolution allows us to correct these limitations of his structural theory and highlight two central aspects of American unipolarity: its potential durability in a nuclear world and its potential for preventive counter-proliferation wars. In sum, Waltz's structural realism, when combined with his thinking about a nuclear world, produces a powerful analytic apparatus to further our understanding of our post-Cold War unipolar world. Adapted from the source document.

The United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the Cold War ended and the world became unipolar. Still, the consensual view among international relations theorists is that unipolarity is peaceful. They base this view on two assumptions: first, the unipole will guarantee the global status quo and, second, no state will balance against it. Both assumptions are problematic. First, the unipole may disengage from a particular region, thus removing constraints on regional conflicts. Second, if the unipole remains engaged in the world, those minor powers that decide not to accommodate it will be unable to find a great power sponsor. Placed in this situation of extreme self-help, they will try to revise the status quo in their favor, a dynamic that is likely to trigger conflict with the unipole. Therefore, neither the structure of a unipolar world nor U.S. strategic choices clearly benefit the overall prospects for peace. For the world as a whole, unipolarity makes conflict likely. For the unipole, it presents a difficult choice between disengagement and frequent conflict. In neither case will the unipole be able to easily convert its power into favorable outcomes peacefully.

The United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the Cold War ended and the world became unipolar. Still, the consensual view among international relations theorists is that unipolarity is peaceful. They base this view on two assumptions: first, the unipole will guarantee the global status quo and, second, no state will balance against it. Both assumptions are problematic. First, the unipole may disengage from a particular region, thus removing constraints on regional conflicts. Second, if the unipole remains engaged in the world, those minor powers that decide not to accommodate it will be unable to find a great power sponsor. Placed in this situation of extreme self-help, they will try to revise the status quo in their favor, a dynamic that is likely to trigger conflict with the unipole. Therefore, neither the structure of a unipolar world nor U.S. strategic choices clearly benefit the overall prospects for peace. For the world as a whole, unipolarity makes conflict likely. For the unipole, it presents a difficult choice between disengagement and frequent conflict. In neither case will the unipole be able to easily convert its power into favorable outcomes peacefully. Adapted from the source document.

As the Cold War came to a close in 1991, US President George H. W. Bush famously saw its shocking demise as the dawn of a 'new world order' that would prize peace and expand liberal democratic capitalism. Thirty years later, with China on the rise, Russia resurgent, and populism roiling the Western world, it is clear that Bush's declaration remains elusive. In this book, leading scholars of international affairs offer fresh insight into why the hopes of the early post-Cold War period have been dashed and the challenges ahead. As the world marks the thirtieth anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, this book brings together historians and political scientists to examine the changes and continuities in world politics that emerged at the end of the Cold War and shaped the world we inhabit today