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AbstractThis essay considers the difficulties confronting the international community in addressing the challenge of biological weapons through multilateral negotiations. After a brief review of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the article addresses four categories of factors that help understand the relative lack of success: those related to the structure and conduct of the negotiating process, those stemming from the unique nature of the life sciences, those associated with domestic political dynamics in the United States, and those associated with changes in the structure and dynamics of the international system. It closes with reflections on how the international community can embed negotiations in a broader strategy for bolstering capabilities to manage the security risks related to the advances of the life sciences and related technology.

Calls for novel approaches to tackle the issue of chemical & biological weapons (CBWs). It is argued that governments' preoccupations make it especially incumbent on nongovernmental organizations to take up the challenge. A historical overview underscores the urgent context in which the security community must address CBWs. Four basic arguments as to why new approaches are necessary to confront CBWs are articulated: (1) The old ways have not worked too well. (2) There is no reason to believe that ongoing political disputes that hindered progress will not continue to do so unless the usual practices & procedures change. (3) Old methods fail to accommodate inputs from key players who ought to be contributing to problem solving. (4) Old methods sometimes confuse intermediate goals with the ultimate objectives. Terrorism, rapid scientific & technological advances, & the behavior in related industries also lend urgency to the situation. An intellectual infrastructure that offers a common framework for understanding the CBW problem is posited to open up policy options & promote identification of new policy tools or the novel application of existing tools. This infrastructure centers on threat, risk, & impact assessments; supports a conceptual & policy environment that stresses the appropriate place of science & technology; & helps shape the behavior of those who might pursue CBWs. J. Zendejas

Discusses possible terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons, in context of Sept. 11, 2001 attacks and anthrax scares in the US; threat assessment and policy options.

Discussion of Middle East arms control has centered on weapons of mass destruction and confidence building measures, ignoring the possibility of a conventional arms control arrangement. Although the potential for such an agreement may be distant, the author argues that the changing environment in the Middle East requires that this issue be given new consideration. The exploration of conventional arms control also may focus Washington's attention on what such an agreement should include, thus enabling policymakers to avoid wasting time and political capitol when the prospects for such an agreement emerge. The author explores the requirements for such an agreement and outlines them in an illustrative framework. Any arms control package must address five requirements. The first is to maintain the ability of states to defend themselves, either through their own efforts or in combination with others. It must decrease the feasibility of a state taking offensive action, particularly without warning. It must be directed at preventing precipitation of conflict through miscalculation. It must limit the ability of any state to assert regional hegemony. Finally, it should moderate, if not reverse, the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of military arsenals of regional states. Given these guidelines, the author creates an illustrative framework agreement based on four categories. The first is Limitations and Reductions, which specifies the maximum and minimum level of equipment and the rate of arms reduction. The second section, Deployment Limitations, outlines the requirements for the demilitarization of disputed territories of the Golan Heights and the West Bank. The Verification and Monitoring section of the Framework specifies which groups and organizations have the authority to inspect the reduction process and calls for the creation of a Treaty Monitoring Center to oversee it. Finally, the Associated Measures outlines the transparency requirements of each party's military.